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INTRODUCTION

Nineteen ninety-eight was a banner year for copyright legislation in the
United States. After much partisan debate and interest group wrangling,
Congress passed a slew of new copyright statutes. Most notably, it extended
copyright law into cyberspace, and it lengthened the basic term of copyright
protection by twenty years.' Little noticed amid all the sound and fury was a
more modest enactment-the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998
("FIMLA"). 2 The heart of the statute is an amendment to section 110(5) of the
Copyright Act, a provision of the law that, since 1978, has authorized
restaurants, bars and retail stores using "homestyle" audio and video
3
equipment to play broadcast music without paying license fees.
In its original form, this homestyle exemption did not create a broad
exception to music copyright owners' exclusive right to perform their works

' See Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 1-505, 112 Stat. 2860,
2877-86 (1998) (extending copyright protection and liability for copyright infringement to
the Internet); Sony Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. 105-298, § 102, 112 Stat.
2827, 2827 (1998) (providing for a basic term of copyright protection equal to 70 years
following the author's death).
2 See Fairness in Music Licensing Act, Pub. L. 105-298, § 202, 112 Stat. 2830-31
(1998), (codified in principal part at 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) and at §§ 101, 504, 513 (1999))
[hereinafter "FIMLA"].
I Prior to its revision in 1998, section 110(5) provided:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the following are not infringements of
copyright: ...

(5)(A) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a
work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a
kind commonly used in private homes, unless (i) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(ii) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public.
17 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994). Although the homestyle exemption has been widely used by
commercial establishments, Congress also intended it "to exempt from copyright liability
anyone who merely turns on, in a public place, an ordinary radio or television receiving
apparatus of a kind commonly sold to members of the public for private use." H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, at 86 (1976). See also infra Part II.B.4.
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publicly. Nevertheless, the statute was a thorn in the side of performing rights
organizations ("PROs") such as the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers ("ASCAP"), Broadcast Music, Inc. ("BMI") and the Society of
European State Authors and Composers ("SESAC, Inc.") who issue licenses
on behalf of both domestic and foreign songwriters, composers and music
publishers. 4 According to the PROs, commercial establishments entertained
their customers with broadcast music and thus derived significant financial
benefit for which their members were entitled to seek compensation. The
PROs sought to limit the exemption to small businesses and brought
infringement suits against non-exempt establishments who refused to purchase
licenses.
Businesses were also dissatisfied with the homestyle exemption, but for
very different reasons. They argued that the PROs were seeking to "double
dip" for royalties by charging for performances that had already been licensed
to be broadcast by radio, television and cable stations. Led by restaurant, bar
and small business associations, these groups lobbied Congress to exempt all
"secondary uses of broadcast music."'5 The PROs stridently opposed any
relaxation of the exemption and succeeded in blocking any change in the law
6
for several years.
The FIMLA represents the compromise Congress brokered between these
two groups. The new law does not repeal the "homestyle" exemption. Rather,
it adds a new and additional exemption for performances of nondramatic
musical works that is based not on the use of "homestyle" receiving equipment
but rather on the size of the establishment and the number of speakers or
television sets used to transmit the music. 7 The FIMLA grants a blanket

4 See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON Music LICENSING 863-84 (2d ed. 1996)
(discussing the history and licensing activities of PROs).
5 I use the phrases "secondary uses of broadcast music" or "in-store performances" to

refer to the act of a business using receiving equipment to tune into a radio, television or
cable program transmitted to the public so as to make that program heard within the
confines of its establishment. I realize, however, that some cable programs received in this
manner may not actually be broadcast. For the importance of this distinction, see infra
notes 210 and 467.
6 See infra Part II.B.5.b (discussing legislative history of FIMLA).
I When Congress enacted the FIMLA, it retained the text of the homestyle exemption in
its entirety. It also split the preexisting section 110(5) into two subsections-section
110(5)(A) for the homestyle exemption and section 110(5)(B) for the FIMLA itself. See
Lydia Pallas Loren, Paying the Piper,3 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. (forthcoming) (draft

on file with author) (providing a detailed analysis of the FIMLA and a comparison with the
homestyle exemption).
The relationship between the two subsections is somewhat ambiguous, however. Section
I I0(5)(A)'s homestyle exemption is preceded by the words "Except as otherwise provided

in paragraph (B)..." 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(A) (1999). A logical interpretation of this phrase
would be that the statutory text which follows contains a licensing exemption that is
separate and additional to the new FIMLA exemption codified in section 110(5)(B).
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licensing exemption to retail establishments that are smaller than 2000 square
feet and to food service or drinking establishments that are smaller than 3750
square feet. 8 Larger businesses are also exempt, provided that they use fewer

According to this view, a commercial establishment that failed to meet the detailed
standards of section 110(5)(B) would still be exempt from the payment of license fees if it
satisfied the requirements of section 110(5)(A). See Loren, supra, at 8, 11 (suggesting this
interpretation).
Alternatively, because section 110(5)(B) applies only to defined "establishments," the
"except as otherwise provided" clause might be interpreted to preclude such establishments
(but not other copyright users) from relying on the homestyle exemption in the event that
the establishment fails to qualify for the FIMLA exemption.
In defending the statutes before the World Trade Organization, however, the United
States has adopted an entirely different and far more controversial construction of the
"except as otherwise provided" clause. Seizing on the fact that the FIMLA applies solely to
nondramatic musical works, the United States has argued that the homestyle exemption now
applies only to copyrighted works other than nondramatic musical works. See First
Submission of the United States of America, United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S.
Copyright Act, WTO Doc. WTJDS 160, at 5 (Oct. 26, 1999) [hereinafter First U.S.
Submission] (copy on file with author) ("the 1998 Amendment [to section 110(5)]
dramatically limited the homestyle exemption ....Section 110(5)(A) no longer covers
nondramatic musical works at all.").
Although WTO jurists are more likely to find such a narrow construction of the
homestyle exemption compatible with the United States' international copyright treaty
obligations, the construction requires an exceptionally strained reading of the statutory text.
Had Congress intended to exclude nondramatic musical works from the homestyle
exemption, it could have easily done so by amending section 110(5)(A) to exempt a
"communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a work, other
than a nondramatic musical work, by the public reception of the transmission on a single
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes ....
" As it stands, Congress
did not expressly limit the type of works to which the homestyle exemption applies.
More fundamentally, the interpretation advocated by the United States would radically
alter the careful balance struck by the Copyright Act between copyright owners and
copyright users. Indeed, if the homestyle exemption no longer applies to non-dramatic
musical works, then it turns a principal justification for enacting the homestyle exemption
on its head. For example, under the approach the United States advocates, any member of
the public who plays music by "merely turn[ing] on, in a public place, an ordinary radio or
television receiving apparatus of a kind commonly sold to members of the public for private
use," H.R. REP. No. 94-1733, at 75 (1976), is now a copyright infringer. If Congress had
intended such a radical (and nonsensical) revision of United States copyright laws,
presumably it would have made its intent clear. However, nothing in the FIMLA's
legislative history suggests that Congress intended to narrow the homestyle exemption at all,
let alone adopt such a fundamental change to United States copyright policy. See infra Part
IL.B (analyzing legislative history of section 110(5)). For these reasons, I will assume in the
remainder of this Article that the homestyle exemption continues to encompass nondramatic
musical works.
8 The FIMLA defines an "establishment" as "a store, shop, or similar place of business
that is open to the general public for the primary purpose of selling goods or services." 17
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than a specified number of speakers or television sets. 9 Taken together, these
new rules will make it significantly easier for business establishments to avoid
paying license fees to performing rights societies for playing radio and TV
broadcasts of copyrighted music to entertain their customers and employees.' 0
Given its narrow, albeit detailed, focus, the FIMLA seems at first glance to

U.S.C. § 101 (1999) (defining establishment). It defines a "food service or drinking
establishment" as "a restaurant, inn, bar, tavern, or any other similar place of business in
which the public or patrons assemble for the primary purpose of being served food or
drink." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1999) (defining food service or drinking establishment).
I The FIMLA's equipment requirements are exceptionally detailed. They provide that
stores greater than 2000 square feet and bars and restaurants greater than 3750 square feet
are exempt from paying license fees if, in the case of audio performances only, "the
performance is communicated by means of a total or not more than 6 loudspeakers, of which
not more than 4 loudspeakers are located in any I room of adjoining outdoor space." 17
U.S.C. §§ 110(5)(B)(i)(I), (5)(B)(ii)(1) (1999)). In the case of audiovisual performances,
businesses are exempt if:
any visual portion of the performance or display is communicated by means of a total
of not more than 4 audiovisual devices, of which not more than I audiovisual device is
located in any I room, and no such audiovisual device has a diagonal screen size
greater than 55 inches, and any audio portion of the performance or display is
communicated by means of a total of not more than 6 loudspeakers, of which not more
than 4 loudspeakers are located in any I room or adjoining outdoor space.
Id. §§ 110(5)(B)(i)(II), (5)(B)(ii)(1I) (1999).
'0 See Jon M. Garon, Media & Monopoly in the Information Age: Slowing the
Convergence at the Marketplace of Ideas, 17 CARDozo ARTS. & ENT. L.J. 491, 525 (1999)
("The Fairness in Music Licensing Act changed the legal balance between the performing
rights societies and the restaurant owners in favor of the restaurateurs and publicans."); Jane
C. Ginsburg, Copyright Legislationfor the "Digital Millennium", 23 COLUM.-VLA J. L. &
ARTS. 137, 178 (1999) ("Given the terms of new § I10(5)(B), it is no longer possible to
rationalize the provision as exempting 'incidental uses' of music; now music may be very
much in the foreground of the business establishment's operations, yet remain
uncompensated.").
The FIMLA did more than just broaden the homestyle exemption. It also created a new
process for businesses to challenge the royalty rates charged by PROs. Previously,
businesses seeking to challenge the reasonableness of ASCAP or BMI's licensing rates were
required to litigate the issue before the federal district court in New York charged with
overseeing the antitrust content decrees governing the PROs' activities. See infra Part I.A.2.
Under the new rules, individual proprietors who own or operate fewer than seven nonpublicly traded establishments may initiate a challenge by bringing suit before the federal
district court in the seat of the federal circuit court where the business establishment is
located. All challenges must be adjudicated within six months after they are filed. See 17
U.S.C. § 513 (1999).
As a concession to music copyright owners, the statute also provides that if a business
asserts section 110(5) as a defense to an infringement action without having reasonable
grounds for believing that its exemption are applicable, the plaintiff is entitled to recover
twice the amount of the licensing fee the business should have paid for up three years, in
addition to another other applicable damages. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(d) (1999).
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be among the least notable copyright developments of 1998. However, the
statute is noteworthy for two reasons. First, because it is at odds with a longstanding trend in United States law toward expanding the rights of copyright
owners and narrowing the free use exemptions applicable to users of

copyrighted works," and second, because it breaches the United States'

international copyright treaty obligations. 12
Within days of the law's entry into force in January 1999, the fifteenmember European Community ("EC") challenged both the FIMLA and the
homestyle exemption under the dispute settlement procedures of the World
Trade Organization ("WTO"). The EC is acting on a complaint by the Irish
Music Rights Organization that the FIMLA is causing its members to lose
$1.36 million annually in licensing royalties. 13 Canada, Australia and
Switzerland soon joined the EC in seeking formal consultations with the
United States, alleging that their songwriters and music publishers will also be
denied foregone performance royalties.' 4 At issue in the talks was whether the
FIMLA violates the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works ("Berne"), 15 as incorporated into the Agreement on the
16
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPs Agreement"),
by authorizing secondary uses of broadcast music without the payment of
license fees.
When the parties were unable to resolve their differences, on May 26, 1999,
the EC requested the WTO to convene a dispute settlement panel to decide its
complaint. 17 Under the rapid timetable for WTO dispute settlement, a three-

" See infra Part II.
12

See infra Part Ill.

1"See Daniel Pruzin, EU Seeks WTO Talks on 1998 Changes to United States
Music-Licensing Copyright Rules, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 224, 224 (Feb. 10, 1999);
Daniel Pruzin, Three Countries Join EU-United States Talks on Rules Violations Under
Copyright Act, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 321, 321 (Feb. 24, 1999).
14 Australia, for example, alleged that the United States is "a major source of
performance royalties for its copyright holders, whose losses from the Fairness in Music
Licensing Act are estimated at over $1 million per year." Pruzin, Three Countries Join,
supra note 13, at 321.
"5Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 828
U.N.T.S. 221 (last revised at Paris, July 24, 1971) [hereinafter Berne Convention]. The
United States ratified the Berne Convention on March 1, 1989. As of July 1999, 140
nations were parties to the Berne Convention. See Contracting Parties Of Treaties
Administered By World Intellectual Property Organization,Berne Convention (visited Nov.
1, 1999) <http://www.wipo.org/eng/ratific/e-berne.htm> [hereinafter Contracting Parties]
(listing parties to Berne Convention).
16 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex I C, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTs-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31; 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1201 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPs].
17Australia, Japan and Switzerland reserved their third-party rights to participate in the
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member panel of international trade and copyright experts will review the
complaint and issue a decision in the Spring of 2000. The losing party may
then appeal the panel's decision to the WTO's Appellate Body, whose
decisions cannot be overturned except by a consensus vote of all 134 WTO

member States.' 8 For reasons explained in greater detail below, a ruling in
favor of the EC seems likely. Thus, in the first year of the new millennium,
Congress may be faced with an unprecedented choice: modify the Copyright
Act to satisfy the demands of international trade jurists or face retaliatory trade
sanctions.
19
Although the dispute over the FILMA is rather modest in monetary terms,
there are three reasons why the case has an importance far broader than might
first seem apparent. First, the dispute comes at a time when the United States
has adopted an aggressive international trade enforcement policy. The United
20
States has been the most frequent and successful litigant before the WTO,

proceedings. See Overview of the State-of-Play of WTO Disputes (last modified Aug. 6,
1999) <http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm> [hereinafter State of Play].
'8 As of November 23, 1999, there were 135 members of the WTO and TRIPs
Agreements. See <http://www.wto.org/wto/about/organsn6.htm> (listing WTO members).
"9The EC claims that music copyright owners in its fifteen member nations will lose
$30.3 million annual under the United States law. See Pruzin, Three Countries Join, supra
note 13, at 321. By contrast, losses to the United States and Canada from the EC's ban on
hormone-treated beef and its banana import system each total more than $200 million
dollars. See Daniel Pruzin, United States Blocks EU Request for Banana Panel While
Hormone Beef Issue Simmers at WTO, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 945, 945 (June 2,
1999).
Nor are the royalties particularly large from the perspective of commercial
establishments. In 1997, ASCAP, one of three United States PROs, estimated that the
average restaurant paid a license fee of $1.58 per day for the right to play broadcast music
from ASCAP's repertory. See Music Licensing in Restaurants and Retail and Other
Establishments, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 74 (1997) (statement of Wayland Holyfield, on
behalf of ASCAP) [hereinafter 1997 Hearings] (arguing that allowing establishments to
play music without a license deprives songwriters of their property and adding that $1.58 "is
less than the cost of a tall cola where I come from").
In 1996, ASCAP's blanket license for retail establishments to perform broadcast music
was $153 per year for a store using three speakers, with $31.50 for each additional speaker.
BMI's blanket license ranged from $60 per year for retail stores up to 1500 square feet to
$480 per year for stores of over 5000 square feet. Rates for restaurants and bars are based
on different factors, including maximum room occupancy and entertainment expenses. See
E. Scott Johnson, Storecasting and the Copyright Law - Understanding the § 110(5)
Exemption for Small Commercial Establishments at S-10 in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BROADCASTERS, LEGAL GUIDE TO BROADCAST LAW AND REGULATION (5th ed. 1996).
20 Gary G. Yerkey, United States Using WTO Dispute Resolution System Far More
Aggressively Than Other Countries, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 540, 540 (Mar. 31, 1999)
(quoting a United States Trade Representative's statement that "the United States success
rate in the WTO so far has been 'very strong."'); see also Chad Bowman, United States To
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using the dispute settlement system and the threat21of trade sanctions to pressure
other treaty parties to modify their national laws.
The United States has been equally assertive in seeking to protect the
intellectual property rights of American businesses, authors and inventors. In
the first case decided under the TRIPs Agreement, the United States
successfully sued India for failing. to protect pharmaceutical and agricultural
patents. 22 Its efforts in the area of copyright law have proved equally fruitful.
In the last three years, the United States reached favorable settlements in
complaints against Ireland, Japan and Sweden, all of which agreed to augment
their national copyright statutes to provide increased levels of copyright
protection and enforcement that the United States claimed was compelled by
the Berne and TRIPs treaties. 23 In addition to these actions, complaints against
Greece (for unauthorized broadcasts of American movies and television
programs) and Denmark (for inadequate ex parte enforcement measures in
civil infringement cases) remain on hold pending consultations between the
24
parties.
This strong enforcement stance makes the FIMLA dispute-the first
challenge to American intellectual property laws to come before the WTOparticularly embarrassing for the United States. Indeed, the Register of
Copyrights, the former Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, and the
Secretary of Commerce all stressed to Congress that a broad licensing
exemption was suspect under the Berne and TRIPs treaties and warned that the
Use WTO Dispute Settlement Process To Press For TRIPs Compliance, Official Says, 15
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1959, 1959 (Nov. 25, 1998) (characterizing the United States
experience with dispute settlement under TRIPs as "satisfactory").
21 For example, when the United States perceived that the EC's import restrictions on
bananas and hormone-treated beef violated WTO agreements, it filed and won two hardfought cases. When EC nations refused to alter their trade laws to comply with those
rulings, the United States swiftly imposed punitive trade sanctions on a variety of European
goods. See Pruzin, supra note 19, at 945 (summarizing disputes).
22 See India - Patent Protectionfor Pharmaceuticaland Agricultural Chemical Products,
Status Report by India, (Apr. 16, 1999) available in 1999 WL 231665.
23 See Gary G. Yerkey, United States, Sweden Settle Dispute Over Intellectual Property
Protection, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 2065, 2065 (Dec. 9, 1998) (noting that the Swedish
Parliament adopted new legislation to enhance provisional remedies available to copyright
owners in civil cases); US Withdraws Request for WTO Panel on Ireland IP After
UnderstandingReached, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 269, 270 (Feb. 18, 1998) (reporting
that the United States and Ireland concluded an "understanding" in which Ireland committed
to enact copyright legislation relating to translations of official works, architectural works,
anonymous and pseudonymous works, ownership of rights in films, and exceptions to
exclusive rights); Record Firms See More Gold in Oldies in Wake of US-Japan Copyright
Pact, J. COMMERCE, Jan. 28, 1997, at 3A (reporting settlement of dispute between United
States and Japan over the latter's failure to protect sound recordings published in the United
States prior to 1971).
24 For a compendium of all disputes filed with the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body and
copies of reports by the WTO panels and Appellate Body, see State of Play, supra note 17.
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EC would challenge such an exemption were it enacted. 25 Yet Congress chose
to disregard their warnings in its rush to split the difference between business
interests who wanted a total exemption for secondary uses of broadcast music
and PROs and copyright owners who opposed any relaxation of the homestyle
exemption. 26
Given the years of negotiation required to reach this
compromise, it is uncertain whether Congress will change its stance if WTO
27
jurists agree with the EC that section 110(5) is incompatible with the treaties.
If it does not, the United States will find it increasingly difficult to continue
pursuing an aggressive international trade and intellectual property
enforcement policy against other treaty parties.
Congress' willful refusal to follow international copyright law illustrates the
second way in which the FIMLA dispute is important. Since ratifying the
25 See Mar. 20, 1998 Letter from William M. Daley, Secretary of Commerce to Newt
Gingrich, Speaker of the House of Representatives, reprinted in 56 PAT., TRADEMARK &
COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 1396, 740-41 (Oct. 15, 1998) ("we know that our trading partners
will claim that [an earlier version of the FIMLA] is an overly broad exception that violates
our obligations under.., the Berne Convention ... and TRIPs .... ); see also Jan. 16,
1998 Letter from Bruce A. Lehmann, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks to Hon. Howard Coble, Chairman, House Subcommittee on
Courts and Intellectual Property, reprinted in, 56 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA), No. 1396, 740-41 (Oct. 15, 1998) ("We are seriously concerned, as you are, that, if
enacted, Section 110(5) of H.R. 789 could be challenged by our trading partners, who could
argue that it is an overly broad exception that would violate our obligations under the Berne
Convention .... "); Sept. 28, 1994 Letter of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights to
William J. Hughes, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial
Administration, reprinted in 56 PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), No. 1396, 741
(Oct. 15, 1998) ("My concern is that the proposed amendment to section 110(5) would do
further violence to our Berne obligations."). For a more detailed discussion of these
arguments and the FIMLA's legislative history, see infra Part II.B.5.b.
26 In this respect, Congress confounded copyright experts, who predicted that the Berne
Convention would act "as a brake on legislative creativity" and prevent legislators from
"cut[ting] the baby in half' when faced with a dispute between copyright owners and the

users of creative works. See Ralph Oman, The Impact of the Berne Convention on United
States Copyright,455 PLI/PAT 233, 248 (1996).
27 The United States has so far complied with the few WTO decisions it has lost,
although whether its modifications of United States law in the Shrimp-Turtle case are
sufficient is a matter of debate among WTO member states. See Asians Contest U.S.
Shrimp/Turtle Rule, Callfor Complete Lifting of Import Ban, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA)
1250 (July%28, 1999); William R. Sprance, The World Trade Organization and United
States' Sovereignty: The Political and ProceduralRealities of the System, 13 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 1225, at 1226-27, 1246 (1998) (discussing the conflict between United States
membership in the WTO and concerns over United States sovereignty). In addition, bills
are currently pending in Congress to create a WTO Dispute Settlement Review Commission
empowered to examine rulings adverse to the United States to determine, inter alia, if they
are arbitrary or capricious. Such findings could eventually force a vote on United States
withdrawal from the WTO. See Trade Policy Reform Act, H.R. 2612, 106th Cong. §§
4103-04 (1999).

HeinOnline -- 80 B.U. L. Rev. 102 2000

2000]

FAIRNESS IN MUSIC LICENSING ACT

Berne Convention in 1.989 and the TRIPs Agreement in 1994, Congress has
generally conformed its domestic laws to the requirements of international
copyright treaties by steadily increasing legal protections for authors and
copyright owners. 28 In those few areas where United States copyright law was
arguably not compatible with the treaties, the United States sought to shield
itself from international scrutiny. 29 The FIMLA-a plainly treaty-incompatible
statute open to challenge by United States' trading partners before the WTO-is
an exception to both of these trends.
A third reason for observers to be concerned about the FIMLA dispute
concerns WTO jurists' interpretation of copyright treaty exceptions and
limitations clauses. For more than a century since the founding of the Berne
Union in 1886, these clauses have granted national governments discretion to
balance the rights of copyright owners against other important societal goals,
including the proliferation of knowledge and artistic expression, the promotion
of freedom of expression and the development of culture. 30 Article 13 of the
TRIPs Agreement broke new ground by adopting a three-step test to judge the
legality of all exceptions and limitations on copyright owners' exclusive
rights. 31 The precise meaning of article 13, and its relationship to the
exceptions and limitations set out in the Berne Convention, are among the most
ambiguous and contested issues in international copyright law. 32 Were WTO
jurists to construe the three-step test narrowly, they might preclude member
states from tailoring their copyright laws to achieve these vital objectives. For
the United States in particular, a narrow construction of the three-step test
would call into question the validity of many aspects of the fair use doctrine.
To avoid the dangers that an adverse WTO ruling poses, the United States
28 The United States has enacted numerous revisions to the Copyright Act over the last

decade to comply with its treaty obligations, including the two statutes that accompanied the
FIMLA. See CRAIG JOYCE ET AL, COPYRIGHT LAW 34-44 (4th ed. 1998) (reviewing
legislation); Ralph Oman, US Enacts New Law on Internet Copyright, IP Worldwide, Jan.Feb. 1999, available in LEXIS, CURNWS File (reviewing the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act).
29 See Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPs Agreement:
The Case for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 357, 379 & n.92

(1998) (noting that moral rights are excluded from TRIPs because of United States concerns
over treaty-compatibility of its domestic laws); J.H. Reichman, Universal Minimum
Standards of Intellectual Property Protection under the TRIPs Component of the WTO

Agreement, 29 INT'L LAW 345, 366-67 (1995) (noting that the exception provided for rental
rights for cinematographic works protects United States movie rental business).
31 See Helfer, supra note 29, at 370-71 & nn.47-50 (citing authorities).
3' See TRIPs, supra note 16, art. 13.
32 See Neil W. Netanel, The Next Round: The Impact of the WIPO Copyright Treaty on

TRIPs Dispute Settlement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 441, 459-60 & n.72 (1997) [hereinafter
Netanel, The Next Round] (discussing relationship among the Berne Convention, TRIPs and
the WIPO Copyright Treaty regarding article 13). For a more detailed discussion, see infra
Part III.C.
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should seek an amicable resolution with the EC before the WTO's Appellate
Body issues a final ruling. 33 As this Article explains in greater detail below,
although the United States can raise several plausible arguments in defense of
the homestyle exemption and the FIMLA, it is highly probable that WTO
dispute settlement jurists will rule in favor of the EC. Thus, whether the
United State chooses to settle the dispute or litigates it to an unsuccessful
conclusion, Congress will soon need to address whether it can comply with the
WTO ruling while preserving the hard-fought and carefully-negotiated
compromise that the FIMLA's detailed rules embody.
In this Article I seek to explain why Congress deliberately chose to ignore
the United States' international trade and intellectual property policies when it
enacted the FIMLA. Drawing on insights from law and economics, and from a
study of the history of laws and licensing practices governing in-store
performances, I demonstrate that Congress and the courts have enacted and
then expanded an increasingly broad free use exemption for businesses who
play radio and television music. The exemption stems from a desire to correct
market failures created by the high transaction costs of licensing secondary
uses of broadcast music. Rather than correcting these market failures,
however, the successive revisions of the copyright law have had the opposite
effect, diverting resources of PROs and collective associations of copyright
users away from negotiating private licensing arrangements and toward
seeking a further widening of the exemption in Congress and the courts. At the
conclusion of the Article, I use insights from economics and history to develop
a legislative reform proposal that is compatible with the United States' treaty
obligations and creates incentives for music copyright owners and business
users to reach an efficient private licensing agreement to resolve the FIMLA
dispute.
Part I begins by identifying two distinct analytical approaches to analyzing
copyright in general and secondary uses of broadcast music in particular: an
economic efficiency approach and a distributional and fairness approach. Each
of these approaches prescribes different roles for government intervention in
the private licensing market for copyrighted works, and each has played a role
in shaping the complex web of laws currently regulating the practices of the
three PROs in the United States. These two analytical approaches also help to
explain the widespread culture of resistance that has emerged among United
States copyright users to paying for public performance rights, particularly for
secondary uses of broadcast music.
Part II analyzes the history of legal regulation of secondary uses of

31 It is unlikely, however, that the parties will settle their dispute. That the United States
chose to temporarily block the WTO from forming a dispute settlement panel to review the
FIMLA, together with its recent filing of fresh WTO challenges to EC trade and intellectual
property laws, suggests that that a compromise without a formal ruling by WTO jurists is
unlikely. See U.S. Blocks EU Attempt to Establish WTO Panel on Copyright Act Provision,

16 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 776, 776 (May 5, 1999).

HeinOnline -- 80 B.U. L. Rev. 104 2000

FAIRNESS IN MUSIC LICENSING ACT

2000]

broadcast music in the United States since the advent of radio broadcasting in
the 1920s. It describes the relationship between rent seeking by PROs in
Congress and the courts and market failures for licensing secondary uses of
broadcast music. Part II concludes that Congress' attempts to modify the
Copyright Act to correct these market failures has had the paradoxical effect of
increasing both rent seeking and user resistance to PRO licensing efforts,
resulting in an increasingly broad exemption benefiting business
establishments.
Part III identifies and critiques the international treaty arguments that the EC
has leveled against the FIMLA and "homestyle exemptions" under the Berne
Convention and the TRIPs Agreement, and the United States' response to
those arguments. It explores in detail the difficult interpretive issues that WTO
jurists are likely to encounter in analyzing the treaties' exceptions and
limitations clauses, particularly each part of the controversial three-step test in
article 9(2) of the Berne Convention and article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement.
Part III, after explaining why the WTO panel and Appellate Body are likely to
rule in favor of the EC, highlights the dangers to all treaty parties associated
with a narrow interpretation of the treaties' exceptions and limitations clauses.
Finally, Part IV draws upon the economic and distributional arguments
identified in Part I, the historical analysis developed in Part II, and the
international treaty obligations discussed in Part III, to develop legislative
reform options for Congress that are compatible with the United States' treaty
obligations and that will encourage copyright owners and copyright users to
reach an efficient private licensing agreement for secondary uses of broadcast
music. In particular, Part IV rejects, on efficiency and political pragmatism
grounds, proposals to repeal the FIMLA for foreign copyrighted music only
and to require broadcasters to pay for in-store performances. Then, after
assessing the advantages of private agreements over legislative solutions to the
market failure problem, Part IV explores the differing incentives for private
bargaining created if Congress restores a modified property rule entitlement to
music copyright owners, or, in the alternative, enacts a liability rule
compulsory license system and encourages the parties to bargain in its shadow.
I.

EXPLAINING THE FIMLA: AN ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND
DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS

To understand why Congress would endorse a statute that so clearly deviates
from recent United States international trade and copyright policies requires
stepping back to explore two distinct analytical approaches to secondary uses
of broadcast music. Each of these approaches helps to explain the evolution
and structure of the licensing market for these secondary uses, and each has
played a prominent part in the opposing arguments copyright owners and users
have raised to shape the legal rules regulating that market.
The first analytical approach adopts economic efficiency as its goal. It
advocates granting broad exclusive rights to music copyright owners as the
most effective way of creating a licensing system that transfers performance
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rights to their most productive uses. Under this efficiency rubric, the principal
concern is to facilitate private exchanges. Government intervention is limited
to correcting market failures that result from high transaction costs and
regulating excessive monopoly power that arises when copyright owners
license their musical works collectively through PROs.
The second analytical approach focuses on distributional concerns. It
questions the fairness of granting music copyright owners the unfettered right
to demand royalties for secondary uses of broadcast music, particularly given
the fees they have already collected from radio, television and cable stations
for the same performances. This distributional approach envisions government
intervention in the licensing market as an antidote to the monopoly pricing
power of PROs and as a means to achieve an equitable allocation of
entitlements between copyright owners and copyright users.
The Economic Efficiency Approach

A.
1.

Copyright's Property Rules, Transaction Costs and Market Failures

The exclusive rights that national copyright laws confer upon the authors of
creative works and their assignees are "quintessential property rule
entitlements. '34 That is, anyone seeking to exploit one of those exclusive
rights must obtain the prior permission of the copyright owner, which normally
involves payment of a license fee. 35 In the absence of such prior permission,
acts from
the copyright owner may seek an injunction to prevent unauthorized 36
occurring as well as damages necessary to deter future infringements.
According to neoclassical copyright theorists, 37 granting copyright owners
the exclusive right to control the exploitation of their creative works not only
provides the incentives necessary to generate creative works in the first
instance, it is also allocatively efficient. Once a copyrighted work is created, its
owner's profit-maximizing incentives will encourage the transfer of the right to
exploit that work to users who value it most highly, with value determined by
the market's pricing system. The role of government in this conception of
copyright is to establish a statutory regime that grants creators strong initial
entitlements to control their works, and then to step back and allow the
formation of licensing markets that facilitate the transfer of rights to their
38
highest and best uses.
Problems arise, however, where the presence of transaction costs impede the

11 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1302 (1996) [hereinafter
Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules].
" See id.
36 See id.
37 See Neil W. Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283,
308 (1996) [hereinafter Netanel, Democratic Civil Society].
38 See id. at 310.
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formation of efficient licensing markets. In fact, bargaining for the exchange
of intellectual property rights is rarely cost free. Copyright owners must search
for and negotiate with potential licensees, and once a deal is struck, they must
monitor the licensees' conduct and punish any violations of that deal.39 So
long as the aggregate of these costs do not exceed the value users place on
exploiting a copyrighted work, both parties have an incentive to negotiate for a
license.4 0 But when transaction costs reach a sufficient magnitude, they will
eventually exceed that value, creating a "market failure" for copyright
licensing.41 In such situations, potential licensees must either refrain from
42
using the work or use it illegally without the copyright owner's permission.
Three regulatory responses to the phenomenon of market failure are
possible. First, the government may convert the property rule entitlement to a
"liability rule." Second, it may permit the free use of the work. And third, it
may eschew any regulatory intervention and allow copyright owners to
structure private solutions to the market failure problem. I briefly outline each
of these responses and their drawbacks below.
Liability rules function on the principle of "take now, pay later." They
permit users to exploit the copyrighted work without the prior permission of its
owner provided that they compensate the owner for that use after the fact. In
the copyright context, liability rules take the form of statutory or judicial
compulsory licenses. These are government-set royalty rates the payment of
which entitles any licensee to use the work.4 3 By eliminating the need to locate
licensees, bargain over price and transfer assets from one party to the other,
compulsory licenses reduce transaction costs and thus facilitate many transfers
that would otherwise not occur. 44 However, they also create inefficiencies, as
copyright owners and users expend scarce resources lobbying the legislature
45
over how to structure and revise the compulsory license system.
The free use approach is premised on a different solution to the market
failure problem. Rather than establishing a fixed fee for all users, the
government might simply eliminate the copyright owners' legal entitlement
over certain modes of exploiting their works, particularly modes that are

39 See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 84 (2d ed. 1997)

(identifying these transaction costs).
40 See id. at 82.
" See id. (recognizing that parties will not bargain if transaction costs exceed the
productive gain of the bargain).
42 See Jay M. Fujitani, Comment, Controlling the Market Power of Performing Rights
Societies: An Administrative Substitute for Antitrust Regulation, 72 CAL. L. REV. 103, 107

(1984) (identifying these as two potential options for licensees where transaction costs are
high).
13 See Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules, supra note 34, at 1302.
' Government bodies administering a compulsory license also often serve record
keeping and collection functions. See id. at 1295.
45 See id. at 1299 (summarizing arguments against compulsory licenses).
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considered socially valuable. 46 The uncompensated use of copyrighted works
sanctioned by the fair use doctrine is often justified on precisely these grounds,
47
with the scope of the doctrine tailored to the degree of market failure.
Legally sanctioned free uses of this sort eliminate transaction costs because no
exchange need take place for the copyrighted work to be put to a productive
use.48 However, the free use approach is not without its dangers.
Commentators have argued that free use should be enacted only if doing so
49
would not substantially diminish authors' initial incentives to create.
The final approach to market failure is to refrain from any regulation of the
market. When faced with high transaction costs, copyright owners will
naturally find creative ways to reduce them. Specifically, they will overcome
collective action problems and conjoin their property rights to be administered
by private collective rights organizations that engage in group-based licensing
and enforcement of copyrighted works. 50 By offering a more or less uniform
menu of licensing options to individual licensees, by pooling enforcement
efforts and by fixing a predetermined formula for royalty distributions, these
organizations significantly reduce, but do not eliminate, transaction costs
without the initial intervention of the government. 5 1 However, these
organizations also enjoy substantial market power to extract monopoly rents
from licensees. They thus create their own market distortions that have long

46 See Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130 (1997)
("Market failure occurs when the transaction costs of a voluntary transfer are so high that a
consensual transfer is unlikely to take place spontaneously. In such a case, the law provides
users of copyrighted works with the statutory defense of fair use.")
47 See id.; see also Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and
Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600,
1614-15 (1982) (describing a three part test for determining when fair use should be
awarded to a defendant in a copyright infringement action).
48 See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2657 (1994) (applying this principle to patent law). Free use can
also be conceived of as the government's creation of a compulsory license system with a
royalty rate of zero. See id.
49 See Gordon, supra note 47, at 1614 (listing the impact on authors' incentives to create
as an important consideration in an optimal fair use system).
50 See 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 10.1.1, at 10:7 & n.19 (2d ed. Supp. 1999); see
also Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 34, at 1328-58 (discussing
performing rights organizations and patent pools).
51 For an explanation of why residual transaction costs will remain even after collective
rights organizations have formed, see infra Part I.A.4. For a discussion of why bargaining
between collective rights organizations and centralized associations of copyright users can
reduce these residual transaction costs, see infra text accompanying notes 181-88
(discussing the NLBA agreement); see also infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the advantages of
private licensing agreements over statutory solutions).
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52
attracted the attention of antitrust regulators.
Each of these three solutions to the market failure problem may be further
modified by private agreement. In the case of free uses, the parties may see
advantages in trading exploitation rights recognized by statute or judicial
decision for other sorts of access to copyrighted works. 53 In the case of
liability rules, copyright owners and users may bargain around a government54
created compulsory license to reach alternative licensing arrangements.
Finally, collective rights organizations, once formed, often negotiate industrywide licensing agreements with centralized trade associations of copyright
users, who have solved their own collective action problems and formed
private organizations to bargain over royalties on a group basis. 55 In each
instance, private agreements may result in a use of resources that is more
efficient than regulated solutions to the market failure problem (in the case of
compulsory licenses and free use exemptions), or than the initial licensing
options offered by collective rights organizations to individual, unorganized
controversial in the case
copyright users. 56 This efficiency claim is, however,
57
of users who bargain away their free use rights.

52 See generally STANLEY

M. BESEN

&

SHEILA

NATARAJ

KIRBY,

COMPENSATING

CREATORS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: COLLECTIVES THAT COLLECT (1989)

(providing an

in-depth economic analysis of PROs and their licensing practices).
" See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights
Management Information on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 590-91

(1998).
51 See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1037-38 (1995).
55 See, e.g., KOHN & KOHN, supra note 4, at 879-81 (providing examples of complex

licensing

agreements between PROs and industry-wide trade associations of copyright

users); Stanley M. Besen et al., An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L.
REV. 383, 398-99 & n.59 (1992) (citing negotiated agreements between PROs and the All
Industry Music Licensing Committee that set license fees for radio and television stations
and networks); Michael J. Freegard, Collective Administration: The Relationship Between
Authors' Organizationsand Users of Works, in 1985 COPYRIGHT 443, 445-51 (identifying
numerous group agreements with user associations); see also BESEN & KIRBY, supra note
52, at 20 (stating that "negotiated agreements with associations representing user industries"
are often "tailored to the industry being licensed").
56 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 54, at 1036-39 (compulsory license agreements); Bell,
supra note 53, at 599-600 (free use agreements); Freegard, supra note 55, at 448
(agreements between PROs and associations of copyright users).
" See Julie E. Cohen, WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will
Fair Use Survive? 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 236, 239-40 (1999) (critiquing
commentators who view copyright law as "merely establish[ing] a set of default rules,
which may be varied by contract"); see also infra Part IV.C. 1.
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2.

Public Performance Rights, PROs and Government Regulation
For copyright owners seeking to license the public performance of
copyrighted music, the market failure problem is especially acute because the
transaction costs standing in the way of bargained-for exchanges are
exceptionally high. These costs include identifying numerous potential
licensees in disparate locations, negotiating with them over payment terms,
monitoring compliance with each licensing agreement and taking legal action
to prevent infringements.5 8 A music copyright owner's public performance
right would be worth little if she were required to undertake each of these
activities on her own.
PROs formed in the United States in the first half of this century as a direct
response to the prohibitive costs of individual licensing. 59 PROs reduce
transaction costs in several significant ways. They provide a clearinghouse for
users seeking licenses, they collect and distribute revenues to the songwriters,
composers and publishers who are their members, they monitor the activities
of licensees and they take enforcement action where necessary to vindicate
their members' rights. 60 The largest cost savings are achieved through
"blanket licenses" that authorize licensees to perform all of the songs within
the PRO's repertory for a fixed fee. Blanket licensing serves the interests of
both parties to the licensing transaction because "[m]ost users want unplanned,
rapid, and indemnified access to any and all of the repertory of compositions,
and the owners want a reliable method of collecting for the use of their
61
copyrights."
Blanket licenses are not without their critics, however. As a recent
Congressional research report stated, "[the price of the blanket license and its
unlimited nature have been controversial almost from ASCAP's first days of
operation, especially among small business users who perform relatively small
amounts of music." 62 From an antitrust perspective, blanket licenses eliminate
competition among music copyright owners over the price of their works by

58 See, e.g., BESEN &

KIRBY,

supra note 52, at 2-10 (explaining the economies of scale

benefits inherent in PROs); Fujitani, supra note 42, at 107 (labeling the costs of individual
transactions as "staggering").
19 ASCAP was founded in 1914 by a group of composers, lyricists and music publishers.
BMI was established in 1939 by radio broadcasters to create an alternative music licensing
mechanisms that counteracted ASCAP's market power. Together, these two PROs control
virtually all music licensing in the United States, although a third and much smaller
organization, SESAC, Inc. licenses a small repertory specializing in country and gospel
music. See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 4, at 863-67, 871-72.
60 See BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 52, at 2-10; Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules,
supra note 34, at 1329-30.
61 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979).
62 Music Licensing Copyright Proposals: An Overview of H.R. 789 and S.28,
Congressional Research Service, at 4 (Aug. 18, 1998) [hereinafter Music Licensing
Copyright Proposals].
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linking the licensing of one work to the licensing of the entire repertory. 63 For
this reason, ASCAP and BMI, the two largest PROs in the United States, have
been subject to numerous antitrust challenges and currently operate under
consent decrees designed to limit their market power. 64
3.

"Through to the Viewer" Licenses and Secondary Uses of Broadcast
Music

Although the consent decrees validate the use of blanket licensing, they also
require the PROs to offer alternatives. 65 In the case of radio, television and
wired music networks, for example, the consent decrees require the PROs to
offer a single license, known as a "through to the viewer" license, to the entire
network and forbid them from demanding separate performance licenses from
each of the network's affiliated stations. 66 In this way, the PROs are forced to
bargain with the more powerful networks rather than the weaker affiliates, with
the costs of the license spread among the network's members through
67
contractual arrangements.
63

See BESEN & KIRBY, supra note 52, at 7-9; Besen, supra note 55, at 391-94

(commenting on the virtual monopoly over copyright use held by PROs).
64 See Music Licensing Copyright Proposals,supra note 62, at 6. In brief, the consent
decrees permit PROs to acquire only non-exclusive performance rights from their members,
thereby allowing users to negotiate a license directly with the copyright owner. The PROs
must also offer a blanket license to anyone who requests it and must charge equivalent rates
to similarly situated users. Licensees may challenge these rates before a federal district
court in the Southern District of New York known as the "Rate Court," at which proceeding
the PROs have the burden to prove that the rates are reasonable. See id.
65 For example, PROs must offer radio and television broadcasters "per program"
licenses which reflect the more limited use of music for particular programs. Under a per
program license, broadcasters may perform any musical work in the PRO's repertory in
exchange for either a flat fee for each program in which music is performed or a percentage
of the advertising revenues received for that program. This compensation scheme excludes
revenues from programs that do not contain music within the repertory. See Fujitani, supra
note 42, at 114 n.51. See also KOHN & KOHN, supra note 4, at 880-81 (characterizing per
program licenses as a "modified blanket license").
66 See United States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., 1966 Trade Cas. (CCH) 71,941 at 83,326
(S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 62,595 at 65,752
(S.D.N.Y. 1950). These licenses are sometimes also referred to as "source licenses" since
public performance rights "are cleared at the 'source' or initiating point in a performance
chain." Music Licensing Copyright Proposals,supra note 62, at 5 n.19. However, the term
source license is also used to describe any licenses obtained directly from copyright owners
rather than from PROs. See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 4, at 878-79.
67 As the "Rate Court" explained in a recent decision applying the "through to the
viewer" license to cable television operators, in the absence of such a restriction the PROs
could use their market power:
to extract non-competitive fees by the simple expedient of demanding not only a
license from the network-which conceivably has some bargaining power by virtue of
its ability to control the choice of music to be included in its network programming-
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The "through to the viewer" license is something of a misnomer, however,
since it does not authorize the transmission of music to all viewers or
listeners. 68 To the contrary, the PROs' licensing agreements with radio and
television broadcasters seek to prohibit anyone who receives the broadcast
69
from performing it in public locations for direct or indirect financial gain.
Relying on this licensing reservation and on the Copyright Act's "multiple
performance doctrine," 70 PROs have long demanded separate blanket licenses
from businesses who play broadcast music, just as they have from businesses
who use live or recorded music.

71

but also a separate license from each of the affiliated stations, which lack this leverage
since they do not control what music is included in the network programming that they
air.
United States v. ASCAP (In re Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc.), 782 F. Supp. 778, 790
(S.D.N.Y. 1991), aff'd 956 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1992).
6 See Music Licensing Copyright Proposals,supra note 62, at 5 n. 19. In addition, the

"through to the viewer" licenses are not applicable to all broadcast music. For music used
in non-network programming, individual radio and television stations must obtain their own
performance licenses either from the PROs or from the copyright owners. See id. Such
licenses would also be required to broadcast the music contained in locally produced or
syndicated radio or television programs. See id.
69 See Music Licensing Practices of Performing Rights Societies: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Intellectual Propertyand JudicialAdministration of the House Comm. On the
Judiciary, 103d Cong. 275 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 Hearings] (rebuttal statement of
ASCAP) ("ASCAP's licenses for broadcasters are limited to the performance by the
broadcasters. Excluded from the scope of those licenses are performances which take place
through the reception of programs by users who entertain their patrons with those
receptions."). An early version of the relevant language in the broadcaster licenses reads:
Nothing herein contained shall be construed as authorizing licensee to grant to others
any right to reproduce or perform publicly for profit by any means, method or process
whatsoever, any of the musical compositions licensed hereunder or as authorizing any
receiver of any such broadcast rendition to public perform or reproduce the same for
profit, by any means, method or process whatsoever.
STANLEY ROTHENBERG, COPYRIGHT AND PUBLIC PERFORMANCE OF MUSIC 24-25 (1954).

" According to the "multiple performance doctrine," each retransmission of a
performance is an act of exploitation over which the copyright owner may exercise control.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 63 (1975) ("[A] singer is performing when he or she
sings a song; a broadcasting network is performing when it transmits his or her
performance ...; a local broadcaster is performing when it transmits the network broadcast;
a cable television system is performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its
subscribers..."); see also MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§ 8.18[A] at 8-193 to 8-194 (1999).
71See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 763-64 (D. Del. 1981)
(explaining application of blanket licenses to nightclubs and bars and rejecting antitrust
challenge to same), aff'd, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982). Courts have recognized that the
rationale for blanket licensing is particularly compelling in the case of diffuse copyright
users who often have little control over selecting the particular musical works performed on
their premises. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U:S. 1, 20 (1979); Moor-Law,
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The net effect of this licensing system permits PROs to collect two sets of
royalties: one set from the radio and television stations who broadcast
copyrighted music to the public and a second set from commercial
establishments for the in-store performance of those same broadcasts. From an
economic perspective, this dual licensing system functions as "a risk-sharing
mechanism" that enhances the public distribution of copyrighted works. "By
providing authors with rights at multiple stages ....
the Copyright Act enables
authors to share the risks by lowering the price of the initial sale license (hence
encouraging uptake), and then earning income later. '72 Stated more
concretely, collecting two sets of royalties theoretically allows PROs to charge
broadcasters lower license fees to transmit music to listeners and viewers
located in homes, cars and offices than the fees they would be forced to charge
if broadcasters, rather than commercial establishments, were required to pay
for in-store performances as well. 73 At the margins, these increased fees, if
they cannot be fully passed on to advertisers, would cause the stations to
broadcast less copyrighted music to the public.
4.

The Effects of Enforcement Costs and User Resistance on PRO
Licensing Practices
As explained above, music copyright owners successfully reduced the
instances of market failure by creating PROs to license their works to users.
Government intervention occurred only much later to limit the monopoly
power that results from blanket licensing. But even without government
regulation, PROs would face significant market constraints on the prices they
charge to commercial establishments. These constraints have two related
sources: first, the enforcement costs associated with policing unauthorized
performances, and second, the resistance by music copyright users to paying
license fees.
The relatively high cost of enforcement stems from the public goods
character of copyrighted music and the nature of the mass marketplace.
Musical works are non-rivalrous, meaning that multiple users can consume
them at no additional marginal CoSt. 74 They are also widely dispersed in
society through broadcasts and the sale of records. For these two reasons,
many free riders will escape detection even where copyright owners band

Inc., 527 F. Supp. at 763-64.
72

Jeremy Thorpe, Collective Licensing of Copyright: Options For Competitive Reform, 5

213, 214-15 (1998).
Compare infra Part I.B.1 (discussing allegations by
commercial establishments that dual licensing permits "double dipping" for fees).
73 See 1994 Hearings, supra note 69, at 275 (rebuttal statement of ASCAP). For an
evaluation of how this argument operates in practice, see infra Part III.F. 1.c. 1).
74 See Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp at 763 (noting that "unlike private goods (e.g.
apples), one can use a public good without leaving any less for others to consume. Once a
musical composition is created, the marginal cost of additional consumption is zero").
AGENDA
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together in organizations that devote significant resources to enforcement.7 5
The enforcement gap is particularly wide for commercial establishments,
which are far more numerous than broadcast stations or theaters and whose use
of copyrighted music is often a subsidiary aspect of their business operations.
When perfect policing of music performances is impossible, an
economically rational response is to minimize enforcement costs by reducing
the number of infringers and increasing the number of licensees. The PROs
adopted a carrot and stick strategy to achieve this objective. First, they used
aggressive, high profile litigation to signal that infringers would be treated
severely if caught performing copyrighted music. 76 Second, they sought to
make licensing a more attractive option by lowering their blanket license rates.
The net result was lower blanket license fees but a higher percentage of
licensed businesses. As the court in BroadcastMusic, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc.

explained:
While normal competitive forces do not operate in this market, it is not
true that BMI's price for its [license to bars and nightclubs] is
unconstrained.... [T]he free rider problem does provide a significant
constraint on the price BMI charges. The higher the price it charges, the
greater the resistance of [business] users is likely to be, and, conversely,
the lower the price, the lower the resistance will be. Since the free rider

problem tends to make BMI's enforcement costs high and can, indeed,
cause increased costs to more than consume increased revenue from a
77
higher price, BMI considers this problem when setting a price.
The resistance by copyright users described by the court in Moor-Law
affects the market for performance licenses in two distinct ways. First,
resistance inhibits the PROs' power to charge monopoly license fees. In fact,
if the enforcement costs generated by user resistance are high enough, license
fees will be reduced to the same rate as they would be under competitive
conditions. 78 For this reason, resistance by users actually helps to counteract
the market distortions blanket licensing engenders, even in the absence of
government regulation. Licensing rates approaching the competitive market
price are particularly likely to result when centralized associations of copyright
users collectively negotiate license rates with PROs. 79
" See id.
76 The early history of ASCAP, for example, involved enforcement efforts so aggressive

that one commentator has characterized the organization as "little more than a costspreading club for copyright litigation." Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra
note 34, at 1330.
77 Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. at 764 (emphasis added).
78 See Lionel S. Sobel, The Music Business and the Sherman Act: An Analysis of the
"Economic Realities" of Blanket Licensing, 3 LOYOLA L.A. ENT. L.J. 1, 38 (1983).
79 See 1994 Hearings, supra note 69, at 89 (statement of Marvin Berenson, Vice
President and General Counsel, BMI) ("In an effort to reduce the cost of licensing... BMI
will negotiate master license agreements with an association of small business which use
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Second, resistance by users can create resource inefficiencies. Prior to the
time when a deal is struck, resistance causes both parties to the putative
licensing transaction to divert time and money away from productive
activities.8 0 Copyright owners, for example, invest resources in education
campaigns to persuade copyright users about the benefits of complying with
81
the law and in enforcement actions against users who fail to comply.
Copyright users, by contrast, expend resources to devise additional ways of
evading detection or making enforcement more difficult. 82 Ultimately, these
indirect costs generated by user resistance may encourage the parties to reach a
mutually acceptable licensing agreement. Until such an agreement is reached,
however, resistance both dissipates resources and acts as an additional
transaction cost that impedes private bargaining and magnifies the failure in
the licensing market.
B.

The Distributionaland FairnessApproach

Whether copyright owners and users ultimately perceive the transaction
cost-reducing benefits of licensing agreements cannot, however, be determined
solely from a cost-benefit perspective. Economists have long been aware that
non-monetary factors may cause the parties to miscalculate the advantages of
reaching an agreement. Such miscalculations are particularly likely to occur
"when the parties are committed to conflicting moral positions about fairness"
83
or where they harbor "hostility" toward one another.

Precisely such conflicting moral positions and hostility have pervaded the
music. Such an agreement is administered by the association for the benefit of its members
and will usually provide a reduced rate."); see also Besen, supra note 55, at 398-99 (when
licensees negotiate with PROs in groups, the PRO "may be forced to set fees, even all-ornone fees, that leave a portion of the surplus to licensees").
80 Cf Richard L. Hasen & Richard H. McAdams, The Surprisingly Complex Case
Against Theft, 17 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 367, 371 (1998) (arguing that theft is inefficient
because of its "indirect costs," including (a) investments thieves make in theft and (b)
defensive measures taken by owners). Because copyright law grants to songwriters and
publishers the right to control public performances of music and subjects infringers to civil
and criminal penalties, unauthorized performances can be seen as a form of theft.
1 See John M. Kernochan, Music Performing Rights Organizationsin the United States
of America: Special Characteristics;Restraints; and Public Attitudes, in 21 COPYRIGHT
389, 393 (1985) (advocating massive educational efforts to change user resistance to paying
for performance licenses).
82 The resistance strategies adopted by music copyright users, which overlap with rent
seeking activities, include: (1) pooling funds to fight PROs in litigation, (2) lobbying for
legislation to exempt particular users or uses or to create favorable compulsory licenses (3)
lobbying for laws to curb particular enforcement activities by the PROs, (4) contesting
coverage and payment of licenses both in and out of court and asserting meritless defenses
and (5) challenging the PROs' structure and licensing arrangements using antitrust laws.
See id. at 393-94. For a further discussion of rent seeking, see infra Part II.A.
83 COOTER & ULEN, supra note 39, at 85, 86.
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music licensing market, with users' resistance to paying fees rooted not merely
in economic self-interest but also "in incredulity, lack of comprehension, [and]
a want of sympathy for the [public performance] right. ' 84 In the case of
secondary uses of broadcast music, resistance has coalesced around three
clusters of arguments focused on distributional and fairness concerns. Because
these three arguments are likely to surface during the WTO dispute settlement
proceedings and their aftermath as justifications for the United States' music
licensing legislation, each of them merits discussion.
1.

"Double Dipping" for Licensing Fees

The most strident objection voiced by commercial establishments is that
copyright owners are "double dipping" for license fees. Double dipping
occurs, the establishments allege, because copyright owners collect a second
set of royalties for performances of music for which they have already received
license fees from broadcasters. 85 This practice is unfair both because it targets
one class of recipients to pay for broadcast music that any member of the
public can hear free of charge and because it provides excessive compensation
to copyright owners. 86 Businesses using broadcasts as background music
rather than to attract or influence the behavior of customers perceive double
dipping to be particularly inequitable. They assert that background music
confers only a de minimis financial benefit and thus should not require a
87
license.
84 Kernochan, supra note 81, at 393. See, e.g., 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 221
(statement of Pete Madland, President, Tavern League of Wisconsin) ("Being forced to pay
anywhere between $300-$1,000.00 a year to simply turn on a TV or radio is wrong.").
85 According to Stephen Barba, President of the Balsams Grand Resort Hotel:
ASCAP and BMI can hit up a hotel or restaurant for licensing fees on background
music that comes over television and radios. That is patently unfair because the rights
to use that music have already been paid for, usually many times over, by television
and radio stations.
I want to give you an example to be sure you understand what I mean by unfair
"double dipping." Think about when you see Michigan State's marching band play a
song at halftime of a nationally televised football game. Now guess how many times
ASCAP and BMI collect fees when that song is played over the air. Once? Twice?
Three times? No, they collect fees five times from five different sources-once each
from the stadium, the national TV network, the local TV station, the local cable system,
and-finally-from the bar that is showing the game.
Music Licensing and Small Business, Hearing Before the House Committee on Small
Business, 104th Cong. 67 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Hearings].
86 See Julie B. Raines, The Fairness in Musical Licensing Act: The Tavern Bill Casts a
Shadow, 20 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 169, 189-90 (1997) (businesses "believe they are
being singled out to pay licensing fees for the rebroadcast of radio and television signals
when the rest of the world can tune in for free").
87 See 1994 Hearings, supra note 69, at 137 (statement of Guy Gregg, Nat'l Restaurant
Ass'n) ("The presence of background music in a restaurant or tavern ... is genuinely
incidental, not in any way used to attract customers."); id. at 117 (statement of Joe Johnson,
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PROs and music copyright owners respond that they are justified in seeking
such fees because businesses derive a financial benefit from performing
broadcast music that is distinct from the benefit accruing to radio, television
and cable stations, namely the use of music to entertain customers or increase
the productivity of employees. 88 Although that financial benefit may be
indirect for background music, it nevertheless contributes to the businesses'
overall profitability. 89 In addition, PROs contend that the royalty fees paid by
broadcasters and cable companies are priced to exclude the separate
90
performances by commercial establishments.

Abuses of Monopoly Power
A second argument businesses invoke to contest the payment of license fees
2.

focuses on the PROs' abuse of their monopoly pricing power. This argument
is based not on any economic theory, but rather on the claim that PROs are
overreaching in various ways in the manner in which they license secondary
uses of broadcast music.
First, businesses claim that the "all or nothing" nature of blanket licensing
forces them to purchase rights to more copyrighted music than they are ever
likely to consume. 9' In particular, because the content of the broadcasts is
beyond their control, businesses must purchase licenses from all three PROs to
avoid claims of infringement-a fact in tension with the underlying rationale for
blanket licensing. 92 Second, commercial establishments assert that PROs
provide them with insufficient information about how blanket license fees are
calculated or the identity of the songs in their repertories. 93 This information
deficit prevents users from ascertaining whether the PROs are charging
equivalent rates to similarly situated users and from making an informed
choice between broadcast music and other alternatives. 94 Finally, businesses
Nat'l Licensed Beverage Ass'n) ("There is little economic advantage to us in having
pleasant radio or other background music in a restaurant or in having a television on the bar
for our customers.").
88 See id. at 275 (rebuttal statement of ASCAP).
89 Music Listening Copyright Proposals, supra note 62, at 23 (noting that "parsley,
which is incidental to food service, is paid for-similarly, incidental music, which is
performed because it attracts patrons, should be paid for").
90 See 1994 Hearings, supra note 69, at 275 (rebuttal statement of ASCAP). See infra
Part III.C.3.a.3 (evaluating this claim).
91 See Raines, supra note 86, at 192 (business owners "argue that they use only a faction
of the thousands of song titles which they 'are currently licensed to use").
92 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 766 (D. Del. 1981),
aff'd, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982) ("When the only option the seller offers is all-or-nothing,
the buyer presumably wants to deal with as few sellers as possible.").
9' See 1996 Hearings, supra note 85, at 191 (submission of Music Licensing Coalition)
(asserting that licensees "get no product information, no comparison shopping opportunities,
and no way to choose an alternative product...").
94 See e.g.,1996 Hearings, supra note 85, at 3 (statement of Rep. Meyers). Alternatives
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claim that they have no practical way to dispute unfair or excessive license
fees. 95 Although the antitrust consent decrees permit licensees to challenge
royalty fees before a Rate Court, that court is located in New York, and
litigation before it is prohibitively expensive in comparison to the amount of
96
license fees at stake.

The PROs defend the blanket licensing as the only practical way for many
businesses to purchase access to their repertories. 97 They also stress the
importance of blanket license royalties to their members' livelihoods and
creative efforts. 98 With respect to information about their repertories and
licensing practices, the PROs assert that such information is already widely
available, and that it would be impractical to provide the additional data
commercial establishments seek without incurring significant costs or
disclosing private or commercially sensitive information. 99 Finally, PROs
claim that the strictures of the consent decree are sufficient to control any
alleged abuses of monopoly power, and that the Rate Court's expertise in
setting reasonable license rates is preferable to a system of local arbitration that
would result in different fees for identical uses. 100
3.

Overly Aggressive Licensing and Enforcement Tactics

A third argument invoked by businesses concerns the strong-arm approach
that PROs use to compel the purchase of blanket licenses. ASCAP and BMI
have been accused of using harassing tactics to compel the purchase of blanket
licenses by monitoring commercial establishments and threatening litigation.101
to broadcast music include recorded music or the services of a background music service
such as Muzak. If businesses could conclusively ascertain the songs in each PRO's
repertory, they could purchase a license to perform recorded music from a single PRO or, in
theory, negotiate a license directly with the music copyright owners.
95 See, e.g., 1994 Hearings, supra note 69, at 120-21 (statement of Michael Leonard on
behalf of Nat'l Licensed Beverage Ass'n); id. at 127 (statement of John Deion, on behalf of
Nat'l Restaurant Ass'n).
96 See, e.g., 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 4-5 (statement of Rep. Coble); id. at 229
(statement of Peter Kilgore, General Counsel, Nat'l Restaurant Ass'n) (arguing that "for a
business in California or in Florida or Indiana, or virtually any other place, to resolve this
issue by going to the rate court in New York is cost-prohibitive").
97 See Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. at 763, 767-72 (noting advantages of blanket
licensing and rejecting night club owner's alternative licensing proposals based on use); see
also 1994 Hearings,supra note 69, at 22 (statement of Morton Gould, President Emeritus,
ASCAP) (asserting that blanket licenses. are "tailored for the industry being licensed").
98 See 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 131 (statement of Mac Davis, on Behalf of
BMI).
99 See e.g., 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 122 (statement of Patrick Collins, Senior

Vice President for Licensing, SESAC, Inc.); 1994 Hearings,supra note 69, at 336-37 (BMI
response to Guy Gregg); Music Listening Copyright Proposals,supra note 62, at 24.
1oo See Music Listening Copyright Proposals,supra note 62, at 24.
'0' As one commentator described ASCAP's approach earlier this century: "An ASCAP
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Other alleged acts of harassment and overreaching include burdensome and
repetitive requests to prove music usage, confusing billing practices,
solicitations containing misrepresentations and undercover surveillance
tactics. 102
Each of the PROs disputes this characterization of their activities and offers
alternative narratives that emphasize the repeated and unjustified efforts by
users to avoid payment of license fees. 103 They also stress their attempts to
seek "cooperation and partnership in the licensing process" by negotiating with
industry-wide business associations. 10 4
II. IDENTIFYING RENT SEEKING AND MARKET FAILURES: LEGAL
REGULATION OF SECONDARY USES OF BROADCAST MUSIC IN THE UNITED
STATES

Given the competing distributional and fairness arguments invoked by
copyright owners and users, it might be expected that these groups would turn
to Congress and the courts seeking favorable regulation of secondary uses of
broadcast music. In fact, the history of music licensing in the United States
reveals that both copyright owners and users have actively engaged in just such
rent seeking. Although legislative and judicial battles over the contours of
United States copyright law are hardly unique to in-store performances of
music, what distinguishes this narrow slice of the public performance right
from other copyright battles is the comparative success that copyright users

have enjoyed in convincing Congress and the courts to adopt their position.
Whereas other areas of United States copyright law reflects an expansion of

copyright owners' statutory rights, 10 5 the legal regulation of secondary uses of
representative would first offer to sell a blanket license. When the business refused to
purchase one, ASCAP's representatives would monitor the business, document its
performance of ASCAP songs, and then sue for infringement. Many businesses chose to
purchase licenses to settle the litigation." Jessica D. Litman, Copyright Legislation and
Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 291 n.83 (1989) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright
Legislation].
102See, e.g., 1994 Hearings, supra note 69, at 123-24 (statement of Michael Leonard,
Nat'l Licensed Beverage Ass'n); id. at 137 (statement of Guy Gregg, Nat'l Restaurant
Ass'n); see also id. at 199 (statement of Jerald Jacobs, American Society of Ass'n of
Executives) (complaining of unfounded accusations of copyright infringement, litigation
threats, and demands for on-the-spot signing of licenses).
103See, e.g., 1994 Hearings, supra note 69, at 22-23 (statement of Morton Gould,
ASCAP) ("We carefully train and instruct our field representatives in ASCAP's operation in
the law and in the proper and courteous way to approach [users] .... ASCAP is always
happy to talk with users." ); id. at 332-38 (BMI response to Guy Gregg); 1997 Hearings,
supra note 19, at 110 (statement of Patrick Collins, SESAC, Inc.) ("The licensing
organizations did not wish to be viewed as litigious and ... filed lawsuits only as a last
resort.").
104 1997 Hearings,supra note 19, at 111 (statement of Patrick Collins, SESAC, Inc.).
105See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 57, at 238 ("[T]he history of United States copyright law
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broadcast music reveals something different: the slow but steady growth of a
free use exemption benefiting commercial establishments.
This Part first briefly explains why copyright owners and users engage in
rent seeking and the economic inefficiencies that rent-seeking creates as
compared to private bargaining. It then traces the history of the exemption for
secondary uses of broadcast music, illustrating how rent seeking and market
failures have affected the formation and scope of that exemption since the
advent of radio broadcasting in the early 1920s.
A.

Copyright Rent Seeking in Congress and the Courts
Public choice theorists teach that individuals and interest groups will devote

significant resources to lobbying legislatures and litigating for legal change in
courts '0 6 if doing so allows them to acquire a transfer of wealth through
10 7
government regulation that is unavailable in the private marketplace.
Although the purpose of such "rent seeking"' 10 8 is to increase private gain at the

expense of other members of society, rent seeking is not objectionable from an
efficiency perspective for this reason. Rather, it is generally perceived as
inefficient because it "consumes resources without adding to the net social
product."' 0 9 Resources "which could have been invested elsewhere in new
suggests that its operation will be shaped largely by special-interest lobbying. For most of
the last century, that lobbying has been done almost exclusively by the copyright industries,
and the resulting copyright legislation reflects this imbalance."); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric
and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1197 (1996) (noting arguments used
to justify "two centuries of copyright expansion").
1o Although most of the public choice literature focuses on legislative lobbying, courts
are frequently "the target of the same interest-group rent-seeking that plagues legislatures,"
particularly by "interest groups who are unable to prevail in the political process." A.C.
Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding The Constitution: An Economic Analysis of
Tradition'sRole in ConstitutionalInterpretation,77 N.C. L. REV. 409, 494 (1999).
107 See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 W. ECON.
J. 224, 230 (1967).
1o8The "rents" referred to in rent seeking are the private benefits created through
government regulation "that were unavailable other than through politics, or were more
cheaply available through politics."

FRED S. MCCHESNEY,

MONEY FOR NOTHING:

(1997). See also Lanier
Saperstein, Copyrights, CriminalSanctions and Economic Rents: Applying the Rent Seeking
Model to the Criminal Law Formulation Process, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1470,
1483 (1997) (defining "rents" as "that part of the payment to an owner of a resource over
and above that which the resource could command in its next highest use").
'09Fred S. McChesney, Boxed In: Economists and Benefits from Crime, 13 INT'L REV.
L. & ECON. 225, 229 (1993) [hereinafter McChesney, Boxed In]. In theory, rent seeking can
be efficient where it is used to block the enactment of an inefficient law or to achieve the
enactment of an efficient one. However, efficient rent seeking exists only in the very
limited situation where: (a) the law transfers ownership of noncash goods from one party to
another, (b) the recipients value the good more than those from whom the good is taken, and
(c) "the indirect costs of the rent seeking are lower than the transaction costs of the [good's]
POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL EXTORTION 10
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forms of production or innovation [are] instead spent lobbying government
officials," producing a substantial dead-weight loss. 110 The greater the
advantages accruing from rent seeking as compared to other activities, the
greater the resources that will be devoted to it." 'I
Because copyright's governmentally-conferred exclusive rights offer
substantial economic benefits to the owners of protected works, copyright law
naturally generates rent seeking behavior both by those favoring and those
opposed to copyright protection. Professor Jessica Litman's detailed historical
studies of the 1909 Act and 1976 Act revisions demonstrate the paramount role
that interest group advocacy played in shaping United States copyright
statutes.11 2 During these interest group battles, copyright owners lobbied for
expansive definitions of their exclusive rights while copyright users sought
or compulsory licenses that benefited
specially tailored free use exemptions
3
their respective industries.'"
A Congressional grant of certain statutory entitlements to copyright owners
does not, however, guarantee that copyright users will bargain with owners for
the right to use those entitlements. To the contrary, wealth dissipating rent
114
seeking by copyright users and other interests groups is likely to continue.
The degree to which copyright users engage in such rent seeking will depend
in part on the benefits that flow from rent seeking as compared to bargaining
with copyright owners. Because "some sets of actors in the IPR [Intellectual
Property Rights] field, as elsewhere, possess ... a degree of influence in the

legislative arena that is disproportionate to their economic leverage in purely
private transactions," these actors can sometimes obtain legislation that
contains "a better deal than they could negotiate directly" with copyright
For this reason, copyright users' perceptions about the
owners." 5
sales." Hasen & McAdams, supra note 80, at 370 n.8. It is unlikely that all of these
conditions hold in the context of rent seeking over the Copyright Act.
'10 Saperstein, supra note 108, at 1491.
" See id. at 1489 (arguing resources will be invested in rent seeking "until rates of
return are similar to other investments").
112 See Jessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 29

(1994) [hereinafter Litman, Exclusive Right]; Jessica Litman, Copyright and Information
Policy, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1992 at] 85 (1992) [hereinafter Litman, Copyright
and Information Policy]; Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 101; Jessica Litman,
Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (1987)
[hereinafter Litman, Compromise].
"' See Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 101, at 321 (demonstrating that during
1976 Act revisions, interest groups reached a consensus which "jelled around a strategy of
granting broad rights in an expansive field of copyrightable works and subjecting the rights
to specific, narrowly tailored exceptions").
114 See Saperstein, supra note 108, at 1492 ("Once the monopoly is granted, other
interests do not sit passively by. Rather, they continue their rent seeking efforts.").
115 Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 34, at 1313 (discussing examples
of compulsory licenses and legislative efforts to limit ASCAP's powers).
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receptiveness of legislatures and the courts to reshaping copyright law in their
favor can influence their resistance to copyright owners' licensing efforts and,
in turn, affect the scope of market failures. 116 Although user resistance to
PROs is not in itself a form of rent seeking, it interacts dynamically with rent
seeking to distort market transactions.
B.

Tracing the History of Music Licensingfor Commercial Establishments

The history of legal and licensing battles over the secondary uses of
broadcast music is long and tortuous. 117 What commentators have not
explored, however, is the relationship between the legal rules in force during
different periods of time and the development'of a licensing market for in-store
performances during those periods. The sections that follow trace that
relationship and then summarize it in chart form. For each time period, the
discussion identifies the licensing and enforcement efforts by PROs, the
resistance by copyright users that those efforts engendered and the market
failures that resulted. It then documents how Congress and the courts
responded to those failures and ultimately created an increasingly broad
licensing exemption that set the stage for the EC's complaint to the WTO.
1. 1920s to 1931: The Initial Battle Over a Licensing Market
Congress first granted copyright owners the right to control public
performances of their music in 1897. But it was the medium of radio
broadcasting, which first entered into widespread use in the 1920s, that
significantly enhanced the economic value of the public performance right. 118
At the same time, radio broadcasting made it essential for music copyright
owners to adopt collective licensing and enforcement practices to control this
new technology. In 1914, a group of composers and music publishers formed
ASCAP to combat the culture of free music use that had developed among
many commercial copyright users in the United States. 119 A decade later,
ASCAP expanded its activities to include the fledging radio industry. After a
116 See Ralph Oman, Source Licensing: The Latest Skirmish in an Old Battle, 11

COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 251, 273 n. 111 (1987) (former Register of Copyrights analyzing
dispute between PROs and television broadcasters over licensing structure and noting that
"[o]f course, it would have made no sense to negotiate while [broadcasters] had the chance
to prevail in the courts or in Congress").
u7 For doctrinal analyses, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 5.8.1, at 5:150 to 5:156;
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 8.18[C], at 8-208 to 8-220; Burt A. Lazar, Mere
Reception in Public Under the Copyright Act of 1976: Exempt or Extinct, I ALB. L.J. Sci. &
TECH. 97, 113-19 (1991); David M. Lilenfeld, Note, Why Congress Should Eliminate the

Multiple PerformanceDoctrine, 58 OHIO ST. L. J. 695, 716-25 (1997).
18 See Jerome H. Remik & Co. v. American Auto. Accessories Co., 5 F.2d 411,412 (6th
Cir. 1925).
119 See Ruth Charles, ASCAP-A Half Century of Progress, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
USA. 133 (1964).
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brief period of permitting free use, ASCAP vigorously enforced the rights of
its members, quickly winning a series of court cases against radio stations who
120
refused to pay for the right to broadcast music over the airwdves.
ASCAP then turned its attention to the secondary users of broadcast musicthe hotels, stores and restaurants that used the new technology to attract and
entertain their customers. As a result of an earlier judicial victory by ASCAP,
these businesses could not use live music for this purpose without purchasing a
performance license. 121 Naturally, they. turned to broadcast music as a
substitute. 122 ASCAP challenged this practice, actively seeking to license this
new and potentially lucrative market. Where its licensing efforts were
unsuccessful, ASCAP used the judicial process to enjoin infringers and compel
them to negotiate for the right to perform broadcast music in their
establishments. Copyright users stridently resisted both of these efforts,
refusing to submit voluntarily to ASCAP's licensing demands, defending
charges of infringement in court and introducing bills to abolish ASCAP and
123
narrow the public performance right.
As a result of these heated disputes, the market for secondary use licenses
from the early 1920s to 1931 was unstable and still in a formative stage.
Although both copyright owners and users might have achieved significant
cost savings by negotiating industry-wide agreements over licensing rates, both
found greater advantage in using their resources in other ways. For the newly
created ASCAP, resources expended on compliance and enforcement made
long-term economic sense because these efforts enhanced the organization's
reputation, encouraged new members to join, and weaned businesses from a
culture of free use. From the business users' perspective, resisting ASCAP and
its licensing practices was equally sensible because it held out the prospect that
the courts or Congress might sanction some free use of broadcast music.

120

See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 34, at 1333 (outlining

ASCAP's enforcement strategy against radio broadcasters).
121In an early and influential decision under the Copyright Act of 1909, ASCAP
convinced the Supreme Court to interpret the "for profit" limitation on the public
performance right to include performances that provided only an indirect financial benefit to
users. See Herbert v. Shanley, 242 U.S. 591 (1917). After this ruling, businesses were
required to purchase a license even if they did not charge their patrons a separate fee for
hearing the music.
122 See Kernochan, supra note 81, at 393.
123See, e.g., Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 101, at 291 & n.83 (noting users
refusal to purchase a blanket performance license until after litigation commenced by
ASCAP); Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 34, at 1333 (ASCAP

commenced a "series of lawsuits" against "early commercial users of radio - mostly retail
stores and hotels - and helped ASCAP establish the right for compensation to all music
played over the radio").
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2. 1931 to 1975: Market Failure Emerges
In these early legal battles, it was ASCAP who ultimately prevailed. In
1931, the organization convinced a unanimous Supreme Court in Buck v.
Jewell-La Salle Realty Co. 124 that a hotel using a radio receiver and
loudspeakers to transmit an unlicensed radio broadcast to its public and guest
rooms was performing the music contained in the broadcast. 25 The decision
endorsed a "multiple performance" approach to the Copyright Act, granting
copyright owners the right to control and collect royalties not only for an initial
of that broadcast
broadcast by a radio station, but also for any retransmissions
126
by the commercial establishments receiving it.
By clarifying the legal landscape in favor of music copyright owners,
Jewell-La Salle confirmed the PROs' right to control secondary uses of
broadcast music. The decision became the basis for a widespread licensing
practice under which ASCAP (and later BMI and SESAC, Inc.) collected
royalties from commercial establishments that used loudspeakers to receive
127
radio and television broadcasts.
The PROs' licensing efforts did not go unchallenged, at least initially.
Copyright users seized upon two statements made by the Court in Jewell-La
Salle, both of which suggested that an exemption for secondary uses of
broadcast music might be justified under different facts. First, the Court
limited its holding to situations where the radio station had not received a
license to broadcast ASCAP members' music to the public. Had such a license
been obtained, the Court suggested, it might well have encompassed secondary
uses by persons tuning into the broadcast. 28 Second, the Court implied that
copyright owners
Congress could exempt secondary uses altogether once
129
gained adequate control over licensing radio broadcasts.
124

283 U.S. 191 (1931)

125

See id. at 197-98.

126

Id. at 198 ("[N]othing in the [Copyright] Act circumscribes the meaning to be

attributed to the term 'performance,' or prevents a single rendition of a copyrighted
selection from resulting in more than one public performance for profit.").
127 See ROTHENBERG, supra note 69, at 24; Bernard Korman, Performance Rights in
Music Under Sections 110 and 118 of the 1976 Copyright Act, 22 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 521,
528 n.32 (1977); see also infra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (discussing PRO
licensing practices during the 1960s and 1970s).
128 Jewell-La Salle, 283 U.S. at 199 n.5 ("If the copyrighted composition had been
broadcast by [the radio station] with plaintiffs' consent, a license for its commercial
reception and distribution by the hotel company might possibly have been implied.").
129 The Court stated:

It may be that proper control over broadcasting programs would automatically secure
to the copyright owner sufficient protection from unauthorized public performances by
use of a radio receiving set, and that this might justify legislation denying relief against
those who in using the receiving set innocently invade the copyright, but the existing
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Each of these statements became the fulcrum for disputes between copyright
owners and users over secondary uses of broadcast music during the 1930s and
early 1940s. The PROs responded to the Court's suggestions by continuing to
collect royalties from commercial establishments tuning in to broadcasts and
by redrafting their license agreements with radio (and later television) stations
to preclude the possibility of an implied license flowing from the stations to the
establishments. 130 Copyright users did not resist these licensing efforts in the
courts. 13 1 Instead, they adopted a legislative strategy, introducing a flurry of
bills in the years immediately following Jewell-La Salle to eliminate the

multiple performance doctrine or to privilege the secondary use of broadcast
music in some manner. 132 Between 1931 and 1937, thirteen different bills
were introduced which would have reversed the holding in Jewell-La Salle.
None of these bills was enacted, however. 133 Moreover, when in 1961 a
Copyright Office study proposed applying a "through to the viewer" license to
the PROs criticized
business users receiving radio and television broadcasts,
34
this proposal, and the Copyright Office abandoned it.1

statute makes no such exception.
Id. at 199 (footnotes omitted).
130 ROTHENBERG, supra note 69, at 24-25 (reproducing licenses).
131Between 1931 and 1975, there are only two published cases dealing with secondary
uses of broadcast music. See Society of European Stage Authors & Composers, Inc. v. New
York Hotel Statler Co., 19 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (finding that hotel used master
receiving set to broadcast song and relay it to speakers in private rooms; court rejected
hotel's attempt to distinguish Jewell-LaSalle on ground that original radio broadcast was
licensed); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (rejecting multiple
performance doctrine and narrowing Jewell-LaSalle solely to unlicensed broadcasts); see
also Leo Feist, Inc., v. Lew Tendler Tavern, Inc., 117 U.S.P.Q. 272 (E.D. Pa. 1958)
(applying Jewell-LaSalle to enjoin defendant who used unlicensed background music
service to entertain customers). These cases do not, of course, reveal whether PROs took
judicial enforcement actions which settled or did not result in the publication of an opinion.
132 In addition, "the Copyright Office received numerous complaints from small
businessmen who were being contacted by representatives" of PROs seeking to license their
secondary use of broadcast music. Lazar, supra note 117, at 106-07.
"' Korman, supra note 127, at 531 & n.50 (citing bills introduced in Congress after
Jewell-la Salle and before 1957). In 1932, for example, six bills were introduced, each of
which would have exempted the reception of any copyrighted work "by the use of receiving,
reproducing, or distributing apparatus" in the absence of an admission charge. See, e.g.,
H.R. 10364, 72d Cong. § 12 (1932). For a detailed discussion of the bills introduced to
overturn Jewell-La Salle, and unsuccessful bills introduced in 1940, 1941 and 1957 to
circumscribe the case in other ways, see Brief for Petitioners at 30-32, Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (No. 74-452).
114 Compare STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW
REVISION, REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN. REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGHT LAW at 30-31 (Comm. Print 1961) [hereinafter 1961 REGISTER REPORT]

(arguing that any revised copyright statute "should exempt the mere reception of broadcasts
from the public performance right, except where the receiver makes a charge to the public
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Although copyright users' legislative reform efforts were not successful,
their resistance appears to have affected their relationships with PROs outside
of the legislative and judicial arenas. Between 1931 to 1975, PROs voluntarily
refrained from enforcing the multiple performance doctrine to its full extent,
declining to seek licenses from smaller businesses playing broadcast music.
The scope of this licensing forbearance is uncertain, however. According to
the PROs, this voluntary exemption covered only small commercial businesses
using a radio receiver with a single built-in speaker. 135 Other sources,
however, suggest that some larger commercial businesses using more than one
136
speaker were also exempt.
Whatever the exemption's precise scope, its existence is a clear
manifestation of a market failure for licensing secondary uses of broadcast
music. As ASCAP's General Counsel explained the organization's licensing

practices during these years:
for such reception") with STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG.,
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 2, DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE
REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN. REVISION OF UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW 283
(Comm. Print 1963) [hereinafter PART 2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS] (criticizing Register's
proposal as "wholly unwarranted" because it would "appropriate the creations of authorship
for the benefit of a special class of commercial users"). By 1964, the Copyright Office had
retreated from its initial position and advocated instead an exemption only where a
broadcast was retransmitted to a hotels private, not its public, rooms. See STAFF OF HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 3, DISCUSSION AND
COMMENTS ON REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GEN. REVISION OF

UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW 238-41 (Comm. Print 1964) (statement of Barbara Ringer).
135 See PART 2 DISCUSSION AND COMMENTS, supra note 134 at 290; id. at 283.
136 See 1961 REGISTER REPORT, supra note 134, at 30-31 (stating Registers'
understanding that PROs "have generally followed the policy of confining their demands for
license fees to those establishments, such as the hotel in the Jewell-La Salle case, that
retransmit broadcasts to their various rooms. Other similar organizations, however, may not
have the same policy. And there have been complaints from some small establishments that
they were asked to obtain performing licenses for the mere operation of receiving sets.").
See also Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 405 n.3 (1968)
(Fortas, J., dissenting) ("Nimmer, a leading authority in the copyright field, states that
although 'the two major performing right societies, ASCAP and BMI, do not choose to
enforce the Jewell-La Salle doctrine to its logical extreme in that they do not demand
performing licenses from commercial establishments such as bars and restaurants which
operate radio or television sets for the amusement of their customers .... such demands are
made of hotels which operate in the manner of the LaSalle Hotel.' NIMMER, COPYRIGHT §

107.41, n.204 (1968).").
Professor Nimmer later conceded that this footnote was
"misleading." See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 133, at 8; see also Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 356 F. Supp. 271, 274 n.4 (W.D. Pa. 1973) ("Herman Finkelstein, a
witness for ASCAP, disputes the comment in Nimmer... that licenses have not been
required from commercial establishments such as bars and restaurants which operate radio
sets for the amusement of the customers ....

We credit the testimony of Mr. Finkelstein

that Nimmer is incorrect and that ASCAP has in fact been requiring licenses in many of
these situations.").
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As a matter of business policy, ASCAP did not attempt to license
establishments which used only a home-type receiver with no further
loudspeaker installation. In these instances, very small establishments of
the "Mom and Pop" variety were treated as de minimis users. Indeed,
ASCAP's experience with small establishments which had one or two
loudspeakers has been that many would refrain from using any music
rather than pay even the minimum license fee of $60 per year which
137
ASCAP asked for such uses.

This statement reflects the common sense proposition that where the
financial benefits accruing to small businesses that perform broadcast music
are minimal, licensing those businesses is not cost effective for PROs. Even if
some of these businesses were willing to pay a nominal license fee, the
transaction costs required to collect it would outweigh such a fee.
Faced with this market failure for in-store performance licenses, Congress
intervened. The Register of Copyrights, troubled by the prospect of leaving
"the free use of receiving sets ... to the grace or forbearance of the performing

rights organizations,"' 138 drafted a proposal in 1965 to codify the PROs'
voluntary licensing practices. 139 The Register urged that the Copyright Act
should exempt businesses who transmitted broadcasts using "ordinary" radio
sets like those sold for "private [home] use" from paying license fees. 40 This
proposal, with only slightly modified language, was included in several
14 1
copyright revision bills that received widespread Congressional support.
Before these bills could be enacted, however, the Supreme Court altered the
legal landscape.
3. 1975 to 1977: The Multiple Performance Doctrine Briefly Repudiated
Two years before a long overdue overhaul of the Copyright Act could be
completed, the Supreme Court effectively repudiated the multiple performance
137Korman, supra note 127, at 528 n.32 (citing Brief for Petitioners, supra note 133, at
8, 9); accord GOLDSTEIN, supra note 50, § 5.8.1, at 5:155 ("There will be many uses for
which even the costs of negotiating a blanket license will prove to be disabling.").
1381961 REGISTER REPORT, supra note 134, at 31.
139 See Korman, supra note 127, at 531 (stating that this exemption "would have codified
the holding of Jewell-La Salle and ASCAP's post-Jewell-La Salle licensing practice").
140See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 89TH CONG., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PT. 6:
SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF
THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW: 1965 REVISION BILL XIX, 44 (Comm. Print 1965).

141 See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 133, at 31-32 (discussing the legislative history
of copyright revision bills).
The exemption contained in the bills privileged the
"communication embodying a performance or display of a work by the public reception of
the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private
homes," unless a direct charge was "made to see or hear the transmission; or the

transmission [is] further transmitted to the public." Id. at 32 (quoting S. 1361, 93d
Cong.(1974)). This was later adopted as the so-called "homestyle exemption" in section
110(5) of the Copyright Act of 1976.
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doctrine. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken 142 concerned a small fast
food franchise operator who installed four speakers in the ceiling of his
business to play radio broadcasts for his employees and customers. Aiken had
refused to purchase a license from ASCAP, which then brought an
infringement action against him seeking to enjoin his unauthorized
performances. 143 Although the Court acknowledged that ASCAP had, in
reliance on Jewell-La Salle, issued more than 5100 licenses to commercial
establishments across the United States to play broadcast and recorded
music, 144 it nevertheless concluded that Aiken had not "performed" the musical
145
works when he turned on the radio receiver in his establishment.
The Court's decision was animated by a desire to grant copyright owners
limited monopoly powers over their creative works in order to serve
copyright's overarching purpose of "promoting broad public availability of
literature, music, and the other arts."' 146 Licensing secondary uses of broadcast
music did not serve this broad policy objective, since it authorized copyright
owners to exact "multiple tribute" from both radio stations and commercial
establishments that "would go far beyond what is required for the economic
protection of copyright owners, and would be wholly at odds with the balanced
congressional purpose" underlying the public performance right.147 The Court
buttressed its conclusion by asserting that a contrary decision would be both
48
inequitable and unenforceable as a practical matter.
The Court's decision in Aiken, if implemented, would have prohibited PROs
from collecting license fees for any secondary uses of broadcast music-a result
far more sweeping than the narrow homestyle exemption that Congress was
then considering. 149 PROs did not allow Aiken to survive for long, however.
142 422
143

U.S. 151 (1975).

Aiken's refusal to purchase a license provides an apt example of resistance by

copyright users. His decision was based not on financial considerations, but rather on a
fairness objection to paying for the use of broadcast music. See Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken at 61 A (trial testimony of George Aiken) ("I could easily well pay the
license but I think there comes a time in a business you have to say well is it really a law or
isn't it.").
144Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162 n.12.
14"See id. at 155.
146 Id. at 156.
147Id.

at 163 (footnote omitted).
148The inequity argument was premised on the belief that businesses would have "no
sure way of [protecting themselves] against copyright infringement" from music copyright
owners whose compositions were not controlled by ASCAP except by turning the radio off.
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 8.18[A], at 8-204 to 8-205. The unenforceability
argument was premised on the Court's belief that any "evenhanded effort [by] copyright

owners to license even a substantial percentage" of the many commercial establishments
playing radio and television broadcasts would be futile. Aiken, 422 U.S. at 162.
141It is unclear whether PROs refrained from enforcing their licenses with commercial
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They had already secured language in copyright revision bills to codify the
multiple performance doctrine. 50 PROs now moved to repudiate the Aiken
decision entirely by clarifying that secondary uses of broadcast music were
licensable public performances unless they fell within the homestyle
15 1
exemption's narroW confines.
In effect, the PROs sought to restore the status quo found in all of the
copyright reform bills introduced between 1966 and 1975. Examining only the
statute's text, they appear to have succeeded; the exemption codified in section
110(5) of the 1976 Copyright Act is identical to the versions the PROs had
agreed to prior to Aiken. The legislative history, however, belies this victory

by adding significant ambiguities concerning the exemption's scope. Whereas
the PROs appear to have intended the words "single receiving apparatus of a
kind commonly used in private homes" to encompass a receiver with only a
single built-in speaker, 152 Congress intended this phrase to be construed more
broadly. According to the House Report, "the outer limit of the exemption"
would be "the particular fact situation in the Aiken case," that is, "a small
commercial establishment and the use of a home receiver with four ordinary
loudspeakers grouped within a relatively narrow circumference from the
set."' 153 This language vitiated the Court's reasoning in Aiken, while affirming

its judgment for the restaurant owner based on the case's specific facts.
establishments in the two years between the 1975 Aiken decision and the entry into force of
the Copyright Act of 1976 on January 1, 1978. See Korman, supra note 127, at 531-32
(discussing PROs' response to Aiken without mentioning whether PROs altered their
licensing practices during this period). A search of the case law does not disclose any
decision in which the PROs took enforcement action against commercial establishments
during this period.
150 See Korman, supra note 127, at 531.
151As the House Report on the Copyright Act of 1976 explains:
The majority of the Supreme Court in the Aiken case based its decision on a narrow
construction of the word "perform" in the 1909 statute. This basis for the decision is
completely overturned by the present bill and its broad definition of "perform" in
section 101. The Committee has adopted the language of section 110(5), with an
amendment expressly denying the exemption in situations where "the performance or
display is further transmitted beyond the place where the receiving apparatus is
located"; in doing so, it accepts the traditional, pre-Aiken, interpretation of the JewellLaSalle decision, under which public communication by means other than a home
receiving set or further transmission of a broadcast to the public, is considered an
infringing act.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1975).
152 See Korman, supra note 127, at 528 n.32, 531.
"I H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 87 (1975); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1733, at 75
(1976) ("It is the intent of the conferees that a small commercial establishment of the type
involved in [Aiken], which merely augmented a home-type receiver and which was not of
sufficient size to justify, as a practical matter, a subscription to a commercial background
music service, would be exempt. However, where the public communication was by means
of something other than a home-type receiving apparatus, or where the establishment
actually makes a further transmission to the public, the exemption would not apply.").
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4. 1978 to Early 1990s: Litigating the Homestyle Exemption
With the codification of a slightly broader version of the PROs' license
forbearance practices, it seemed that Congress had remedied the market failure
that prevailed prior to 1978 by expressly sanctioning the PROs' right to
demand royalties for in-store performances, while permitting the free use of
broadcast music for those small business users that would not have purchased
licenses because of transaction costs.
In fact, however, Congress'
transformation of a decision by private parties to forebear the collection of
royalties into a statutory free use mandate had precisely the opposite effect; it
led copyright users to engage in fresh acts of resistance and to seek an
expansion of the homestyle exemption to an ever wider array of businesses.
Between 1978 and the early 1990s, section 110(5) became "the most
litigated exemption of the Copyright Act," 154 as PROs brought numerous
infringement claims against businesses that failed to purchase licenses for their
secondary use of broadcast music. Significantly, nearly all of the cases litigated
during this period involved businesses whose sophisticated sound systems
clearly disentitled them to the exemption. 155 Why, then, did these businesses
litigate? Professor Jessica Litman suggests one reason why compliance with
the law was "grudging at best," even though "licenses are sold relatively
cheaply."
People perceive the law to be grossly unfair, partly because enforcement
is incomplete and uneven; there's no guarantee that the business down the
street is licensed, and who wants to be a chump? Then there are all of the
exceptions in section 110, which don't make any sense. How come a bar
with one 27" television doesn't need a license, while another bar with two
13" televisions does? Copyright lawyers might understand that the
reason for this is that the words in section 110(5) say "[single] receiving
apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes," but there is
nothing intuitively appealing about the distinction. Some prospective
licensees fail to buy licenses because they believe the law could not
possibly have been intended to apply to their situation; others find its
complex provisions arbitrary and incomprehensible, and, therefore,
unfair. And, every single year, despite the fact that the liability of
unlicensed commercial establishments is well settled, people choose to
156
litigate ratherthan pay up. And, of course, they lose.

Litman's colorful statement suggests that resistance by commercial
154 140 CONG. REC. E1700-03 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1994) (statement of Rep. Jack Reed).
155 See Brief for Appellee at 49, Edison Bros. Stores, Inc. v. BMI, 954 F.2d 1419 (8th

Cir. 1992) (providing a chart with a comparison of Edison Bros.' relatively simple
equipment with the equipment in stores which were denied a section 110(5) exemption);
1994 Hearings,supra note 69, at 33, 42-47 (statement of Morton Gould, ASCAP)(providing
synopsis's of cases in which the outer-limit of the exemption was surpassed).
156 Litman, Exclusive Right, supra note 112, at 49-50 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
added).
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establishments to PROs' licensing practices increased rather than diminished
after Congress codified the PROs' voluntary exemption. 57 With this renewed
existence came a widening of the market failure for secondary uses of
broadcast music. According to the EC, it was during this period of intensive
litigation that PROs in the United States began to face "strong resistance when
attempting to license small to medium size[d] premises which do not benefit
from the exemption."' 158 This resistance raised transaction costs, causing PROs
to "refrain[] from licensing such business[es]."' 159
5. Early 1990s to 1998: Users' Judicial and Legislative Resistance
Increases
During the early 1990s, users' efforts to resist paying performance license
fees expanded in two ways.
First, large commercial establishments
successfully advocated a broad construction of the homestyle exemption based
on the text of the statute rather than its legislative history. Second, business
associations lobbied Congress to privilege all or nearly all secondary uses of
broadcast music. The result of these expanded resistance efforts, according to
the EC, was that PROs in the United States "abandoned the field, and [did] not
even try to license small and medium
size[d] businesses" that did not qualify
160
for the homestyle exemption.
a.

JudicialExpansion of the Homestyle Exemption

The homestyle exemption generated a large volume of litigation not only
because of user resistance, but also because of the dissonance between the text
of the exemption and its legislative history. The text focuses solely on three
factors-the nature of the receiving equipment, the further transmission of the
broadcast to the public and the collection of a direct charge to see or hear the
broadcast.' 6' The legislative history, however, urged courts to focus on two
additional factors: a comparison of the size of the commercial establishment
with that in Aiken and the establishment's ability to afford a background
commercial music service. 62 During the exemption's first decade, nearly all
courts relied on both the statute and its legislative history to determine whether
157 See supra note 131 (only two published cases involving infringing secondary uses of
broadcast music were decided between 1931 and 1975).

158 European Commission, Examination Procedure Regarding the Licensing of Music

Works in the United States of America, LE.3/JVE D(98), Feb.23,1998 at 30 [hereinafter
Examination Procedure].
159Id.
'60 Id. at31.

16117 U.S.C. § 110(5) (1994).
162 See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 8.18[C][2] at 8-214 to 8-217. See also
Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., v. BMI, 954 F.3d 1419, 1422 (8th Cir. 1991) (noting that the
restaurant in Aiken contained a total of 1055 square feet, with 620 square for public use, but
refusing to consider size of establishment as a factor in analyzing homestyle exemption).
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a business was required to purchase a license. However, beginning with a pair
of appellate court decisions rendered in the early 1990s, several courts shifted
63
ground to focus almost exclusively on the statute's text.1
These decisions markedly expanded the homestyle exemption. Whereas
under prior rulings commercial establishments larger than the restaurant in
Aiken were unlikely to be found exempt, under the strict statutory construction
approach even large and highly profitable chain stores could avoid the PROs'
licensing demands by using a receiver and four or fewer speakers. 164 This
configuration of equipment enables customers and employees to hear music in
65
businesses up to four times the size of the Aiken restaurant.
b.

Legislative Expansion of the Homestyle Exemption

The dissonance between the statutory and legislative history approaches to
the homestyle exemption created ambiguities that encouraged businesses to
litigate rather than acquiesce in paying blanket licensing fees. But even after
obtaining a favorable construction of section 110(5) from several courts,
businesses continued to resist PROs' licensing66 efforts, turning from the
judiciary to Congress to seek even broader relief. 1
1) Early Licensing Reform Bills
Beginning in the fall of 1993 and continuing into 1995, a broad cross section
of business associations, including restaurants, bars and retail stores, gave their
support to bills introduced in the 103d and 104th Congresses to repeal section
110(5).167 These bills, the Public Accommodations Exception Act of 1993 and
163 See,

e.g., Edison Bros. Stores, Inc., 954 F.2d at 1425; BMI v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc.,

949 F.2d 1482, 1493 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he job of this Court is to apply the laws passed by
Congress, and not to enforce a generalized and vague notion of intent. In any event,
Congress' intent to limit the exemption to financially small organizations is far from
clear.").
164 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 8.18[C][2] at 8-218 (noting that
construction of exemption that focuses exclusively on statutory factors causes music
copyright owners to lose cases "that, under the legislative history method, they would have
won."). Even the placement of speakers in the ceiling would not vitiate the exemption. See
Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d at 1493 (holding that other factors, besides only
placement of speakers, can lead to a store qualifying for the homestyle exemption).
165 See John Wilk, Note, Seeing the Words and Hearing the Music: Contradictionsin the
Construction of 17 U.S.C. Section 110(5), 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 783, 805 & n. 110 (1993)
(citing studies demonstrating that businesses as large as 4000 square feet "can provide
adequate background music using ordinary home equipment").
166 Litigation over the homestyle exemption became increasingly less active starting in
the mid 1990s. LEXIS and WESTLAW searches reveal no published or unpublished cases
interpreting or applying section 110(5) after May 1996. This is consistent with the EC's
claim that PROs "abandoned the field" in licensing many non-exempt businesses during this
period. See Examination Procedure,supra note 158, at 31.
167 Supporters of the bills referred to themselves as the Music Licensing Fairness
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the Fairness in Music Licensing Acts of 1994 and 1995,168 sought to privilege
"incidental" performances of licensed broadcast music regardless of the size of
the establishment or the type of equipment used. 169 Proponents of these bills
raised the arguments identified above in opposing the right of PROs to collect
licenses for in-store performances, including double dipping, abuse of
monopoly power and overly aggressive licensing and enforcement practices.
The PROs challenged these arguments and defended their right to collect
170
royalties for in-store performances.

Coalition. See 1997 Hearings,supra note 19, at 303.
168 The proposed Public Accommodations Exception Act, H.R. 3288, 103d Cong. § 2

(1993) would have added a new subsection to section 110 to exempt the:
communication of a transmission, by radio or television, embodying a performance or
display of a work by the public reception of the transmission on a receiving or
recording apparatus in a restaurant, tavern, or other commercial establishment serving
food or drink, the performance of which is incidental to the main purpose of the
restaurant, tavern, or other commercial establishment, unless a direct charge is made to
see or hear the transmission.
The proposed Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1995 would have amended section 110(5)
to exempt the
communication by electronic device of a transmission embodying a performance or
display of a work by the reception of a broadcast, cable, satellite, or other transmission,
unless(A) an admission fee is charged specifically to see or hear the transmission, or
(B) the transmission is not properly licensed,
except that this paragraph shall apply in the case of a performance or display in a
commercial establishment only if the performance or display is incidental to the main
purpose of the establishment.
H.R. 789, 104th Cong. § 2; see also Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1994, S. 2515, 103d
Cong. § 2 (containing a nearly identical exemption); H.R. 4936, 103d Cong. § 2 (1994)
(containing similar exemption "unless a direct or indirect charge is made to see or hear the
transmission").
169 Except for excluding from the exemption's purview businesses that collected a charge
or admission fee to see or hear the performance, the bills did not define the term
"incidental." However, witness testimony at hearings held before the House Judiciary
Committee's Subcommittee on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration in
February 1994 and the House Committee on Small Business in May 1996 suggested that the
exemption would apply to all performances of "background" music not directly used to
attract customers. See, e.g., 1994 Hearings,supra note 69, at 137 (statement of Guy Gregg,
Nat'l Restaurant Ass'n) (conceding that proposed exemption would not be applicable to a
business that advertised its performance of music); 1996 Hearings, supra note 85, at 35
(statement of Marvin Berenson, General Counsel for BMI) (contesting claim that
background music provides only an incidental business benefit).
170 See supra Part I.B; see also Raines, supra note 86, at 187-97 (summarizing the
arguments of the bills' proponents and opponents).
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2) The Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1997
When these bills died in committee, similar legislative proposals were
reintroduced in the House and Senate at the beginning of the 105th Congress.
Titled the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1997, these bills were broader
than their earlier incarnations in that they eliminated the requirement that
businesses derive only an incidental benefit from the music. 17' They proposed
to amend the Copyright Act to exempt any communication "of a nondramatic
musical work by the reception of a broadcast, cable, satellite, or other
transmission." 172 Only if the individual or business charged an admission fee
"specifically to see or hear the transmission," or if the transmission "was not
properly licensed" could royalties be collected. 173
Hearings on the House version of the bills were held before the House
Judiciary's Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property in July 1997.174
In addition to reiterating arguments previously raised by both sides supporting
and opposing earlier exemption bills, the Subcommittee received testimony
from government officials who warned of the dangers that the exemption
posed for the United States' treaty obligations and international trade
75
relations. 1
The testimony of Marybeth Peters, the Register of Copyrights, was
particularly illuminating. 176 The Register stated that the homestyle exemption
represented a "careful balancing of interests between rights-holders and users"
which was "narrowly drawn to ensure that [itdoes not] substitute for a
meaningful commercial exploitation."' 177 The proposed exemption, by
contrast, would permit "businesses of any size, including large, national
chains, [to] use copyrighted music for free in order to entertain their customers

171

H.R. 789, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997); S. 28 105th Cong. § 2 (1997). In addition, two

somewhat more moderate exemption proposals were introduced in the Senate by Senators
Hatch and Brown in 1996. See S.1619, 104th Cong. (1996); S.1628, 104th Cong. (1996).
It does not appear, however, that hearings were ever held on either of these of these bills.
172

See H.R. 789 and S.28.

173Id.

174See 1997 Hearings, supranote 19, at 1.

See id. at 16, 19 (statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, Copyright
Office of the United States) ("The breadth of the proposed amendment to Section 110(5)
goes much further than any exemption that has been considered as a small exemption or
minor reservation permitted by the Berne Convention."). Bruce Lehman, Assistant
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, also testified against the bill because of these
treaty concerns. See id. at 44 ("Our trading partners are likely to allege that several of the
changes to the copyright law proposed in section two of the proposed bill may be
inconsistent with our obligations under the Berne Convention and [TRIPs]."). For a detailed
treaty analysis of both the homestyle exemption and the FIMLA as ultimately enacted, see
infra Part III.
176 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 16.
177Id.
175
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and thereby stimulate sales of their own goods or services."' 78 Given this
breadth, the Register predicted the exemption "would lead to claims by other

countries that the United States was in violation of its obligations" under the
Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement and create a "difficult case" for
the United States at the WTO. 179 She argued, however, that the existing
homestyle exemption was consistent with the treaties and, in addition, that the
Copyright Office could help the Committee draft a narrower exemption that
would survive a WTO challenge. 180
3)

The NLBA Agreement

Although the Register did not describe this narrower exemption, she may
have bean referring to a private agreement previously reached between the
PROs and the National Licensed Beverage Association ("NLBA"). This
agreement was negotiated after members of the House subcommittee urged the
parties to structure their own licensing arrangement rather than to force
Congress to amend the Copyright Act. 18' With the fate of the music licensing
bills still uncertain in 1995, the two sides reached a solution that differed
significantly from the exemptions proposed in the bills and created numerous
benefits for both music copyright owners and for the taverns, restaurants and

retail stores who comprise NLBA's membership.
Several facets of the NLBA agreement are noteworthy. First, the agreement

78 Id. at 17, 18; see also id. (claiming that expanded exemption could supplant market

for background music services).
179 Id. at 32 ("An exception this broad appears to be outside the scope of the permissible
'small exceptions' to the Berne rights of public performance and communication. Allowing
virtually every business to play music to its customers through loudspeakers or audiovisual
devices would invite a difficult case against the United States for violating our TRIPs
obligations."). The Register's prediction of a future WTO dispute was not speculative. In
April 1997, the Irish Music Rights Organization ("IMRO") filed a complaint with the
European Commission asking it to investigate the trade distortions created by the homestyle
exemption. See Examination Procedure, supra note 158, at 1 (describing complaint of
IMRO). By June of 1997, a month before the hearings, the Commission had found
"sufficient evidence of the existence of obstacles to trade and adverse trade effects resulting
therefrom for the purpose of initiating an examination procedure." Id.
180 See id. at 19 ("a reasonable exemption which is narrow in scope and which complies
with the standards of Berne and TRIPs could be drafted"); see also id at. 46 ("I clearly
believe that existing section 110(5) does not violate the obligations that we have under the
Berne Convention.").
181See 1994 Hearings,supra note 69, at 110- 11 (statement of Rep. Carlos J. Moorhead)
("I think there is a very, very great need to get together and try to work this out without
having a legislative solution imposed on you .... It is always much better to work
something out than it is to have Congress impose something."); see also id. at 109
(statement of Fred Koenigsberg, counsel for ASCAP) ("If we could sit down and work
things out with the trade associations which represent the bulk of users here ... there would
be no need for Congress to address the issue.").
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used a combination of square footage and equipment requirements to
determine the exempt status of a commercial establishment. 182 These criteria
improved upon the homestyle exemption by eliminating the ambiguous
statutory and legislative history factors courts had used to interpret it and
183
supplanting them with a set of clear, detailed rules.
Second, the NLBA agreement contained numerous efficiencies not found in
the proposed exemption bills. These efficiencies were possible because all
three PROs and an industry-wide trade association of copyright users
negotiated the agreement. 84 The global nature of the negotiations thus
allowed the parties to resolve not only the broadcast music licensing dispute,
but an array of related issues as well.
For example, the agreement permitted businesses who did not qualify for the
exemption to pay a single, reduced annual fee for the privilege of performing
broadcast, recorded and live music controlled by all three PROs, rather than
the three separate and higher fees they had paid in the past. 85 In addition,
enforcement and monitoring costs were reduced by having NLBA members
deal only with the NLBA: businesses purchasing a license paid fees directly to
the NLBA (which then distributed them to the PROs), while other businesses
submitted proof of their eligibility for the exemption to the NLBA. 86 Under
182
183

See 1997 Hearings,supra note 19, at 99-100.
The exemption criteria contained in the NLBA Agreement were as follows: For

eating and drinking establishments: (I) All businesses 3500 square feet of gross leasable
space or larger are totally exempt provided that they use no more than: (a) six external radio
and/or TV speakers with no more than 4 in any one room, and (b) three televisions with
screen sizes of 55 or smaller with no more than two televisions in any one room. (2) All
businesses smaller than 3500 square feet are totally exempt from any music licensing fees
for radio and TV use. For retailestablishments: (1) All businesses with 1500 square feet of
gross leasable space or larger are totally exempt provided that they use no more than: (a)
four external radio or TV speakers, and (b) two televisions with screen sizes of 55 inches or
smaller. (2) All places smaller than 1500 square feet are totally exempt from any music
licensing fees for radio and TV use. See 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 99-100
(statement of Debra Leach, Executive Director of NLBA). The exemption did not apply if a
business charged customers a fee or if the transmission was further transmitted beyond the
establishment. See Johnson, supra note 19, at S-I1. NLBA members qualifying for the
exemption were required to pay a $30 administrative fee for the NLBA. See 1997 Hearings,
supra note 19, at 332 (statement of Debra Leach, NLBA).
"8 See 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 101. For additional details on the NLBA
Agreement, see NLBA and Performing Rights Organizations Finalize Licensing Plan,
(visited Dec. 4, 1999) <http://nlba.org/nlba/music.html> [hereinafter Licensing Plan].
"' See Licensing Plan, supra note 184, at 3; 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 101
(statement of Debra Leach, Executive Director of NLBA) (describing "discounted fees" for
businesses who chose to adopt the agreement).
86 See 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 183 (supplementary letter from ASCAP)
(NLBA agreement "includes an important provision in which they are responsible for
collecting fees from their members"); see also The NLBA Performance License Application,
(visited Nov. 30, 1999) <http://nlba.org/nlba/musicapp.html> (requiring members to submit
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this arrangement, compliance with the agreement would be supervised by an
organization of copyright users rather than by the PROs, whose heavy-handed
enforcement measures were cited as a principal reason for music licensing
reform. The PROs also agreed to share information with NLBA members on
ways to use music to enhance their business, and the NLBA agreed to educate
187
its membership about their obligation to comply with the copyright law.
Finally, the parties negotiated a three-year initial period for the agreement,
to modify its terms in light of experience or changed market
allowing them
188
conditions.
4) The Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998
Had other associations of copyright users negotiated licensing arrangements
similar to the NLBA agreement, Congress might have avoided altering the
homestyle exemption altogether. Not all associations were willing to conclude
such agreements, however. The National Restaurant Association ("NRA") 89was
It
particularly resistant to efforts by PROs to negotiate a private agreement.
continued to demand that Congress incorporate a revised exemption into the
Copyright Act, 190 notwithstanding statements by several legislators that a
private solution to the licensing dispute would be preferable. 191
Faced with the NRA's intransigence, Congress attempted to broker a
compromise. As with the homestyle exemption before it, Congress turned to
private licensing practices as a template for its legislation. 92 Thus, the
Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, passed by the House in March 1998,
adopted square footage and equipment requirements modeled on those used in
the NLBA agreement to determine the exempt status of a commercial

official documents demonstrating gross square footage of establishment)
187See Licensing Plan, supra note 184, at 2.
188 See 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 161 (statement of Fred Koenigsberg, counsel for
ASCAP). The NLBA hoped to negotiate lower license fees if most of its members signed
up for the initial agreement. See Licensing Plan, supra note 184, at 5.
189 The NRA's stated reasons for opposing a private agreement included a desire to
eliminate the homestyle exemption's uncertainties and a concern that the agreement would
not be permanent. In addition, the NRA strongly favored legislation to compel the PROs to
identify their entire repertories and to require local arbitration of rate disputes rather than the
prohibitively expensive litigation before the New York rate court. See 1997 Hearings,
supra note 19, at 230, 242 (statement of Peter Kilgore, General Counsel of NRA).
190 See id. at 245.
191See 1996 Hearings, supra note 85, at 18 (statement of Marvin Berenson, General
Counsel for BMI) (stating that offers "to increase the size of commercial establishment[s]
qualified for exemption from licensing requirements, increase the size and types of
equipment and other offers, were unacceptable to the NRA"); see also id. at 31-32
(statements of Reps. Kelly and Bono) (questioning whether agreement between PROs and
Nat'l Restaurant Ass'n was possible).
192 See H.R. 2589, 105th Cong. § 202 (1997).
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establishment. 193 The Congressional Research Service reported that adopting
these requirements would exempt 65.2% of all eating establishments and
194
71.8% of all drinking establishments from any licensing obligations.
Negotiations over the scope of the exemptions continued during the next
several months, with supporters pressing for the FIMLA to be included in the
copyright term extension bills then pending before Congress. 195 The final
version of the FIMLA that emerged from these negotiations and passed both
houses of Congress on October 7, 1998 resembled the NLBA agreement even
more closely. It adopted the agreement's distinction between eating and
drinking establishments and retail businesses, as well as slightly enlarged
96
versions of its square footage and equipment criteria.1
6.

Implementing the FIMLA: Continued User Resistance?

With the adoption of the FIMLA, Congress repeated the pattern it followed
twenty years earlier, codifying licensing arrangements that private parties had
voluntarily adopted or negotiated. 97 Although it is too soon to determine
whether the statute, as the homestyle exemption before it, will encourage nonexempt commercial establishments to resist paying license fees, early
indications suggest that the PROs are concerned that the compliance gap may
widen. In the months after the FIMLA's effective date in January 1999, BMI
and ASCAP adopted new marketing campaigns to educate non-exempt
businesses about the advantages of obtaining a license. 198 Both organizations

' See id. H.R. 2589 was broader than the NLBA agreement, since it exempted all types
of commercial establishments whose premises contained less than 3500 square feet of
publicly accessible space. Larger establishments were exempt if they used less than a
specified number of audio speakers or televisions. See id. § 202(a). These equipment
requirements were identical to those found in the NLBA agreement, except that they would
have permitted businesses to use only two television sets rather than three. See id.
' See 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 81 (statement of Wayland Holyfield on behalf
of ASCAP) (reviewing findings of Congressional Research Service).
195 See, e.g., Charles Schumer, Exemption Weakens Ideas-FueledEconomy, BILLBOARD,
Apr. 10, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, BILLBOARD file (noting that FIMLA was
added as an amendment to bills extending the term of copyright protection).
196 The FIMLA increased the NLBA's square footage limits from 3500 square feet to
3750 square feet for bars and restaurants, and from 1500 square feet to 2000 square feet for
other establishments. It also slightly increased the number of loudspeakers and televisions
each type of business could employ. Compare 17 U.S.C. § 1 l0(5)(B) (1999) (defining
square footage and equipment requirements under FIMLA), with 1997 Hearings, supra note
19, at 99-100 (statement of Debra Leach, Executive Director of NLBA) (describing
exemptions based on square footage for retail and eating establishments under the NLBA
agreement).
197 See supra Part II.B.2-3.
98 See Irv Lichtman, BMI Bows Customer-Outreach Plan, BILLBOARD, Mar. 6, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 10038128 (describing BMI's efforts to educate restaurants and bars
on using music to improve revenues and "provid[ing] information about general music

HeinOnline -- 80 B.U. L. Rev. 138 2000

2000]

FAIRNESS IN MUSIC LICENSING ACT

also revised their fee structures to make licensing more attractive and
affordable. 199 One objective of these campaigns is to generate royalties from
non-exempt businesses to offset royalty losses caused by the FLMLA. 200 But
an equally important aim is to curb resistance1 from those businesses to paying
20
any license fees for performances of music.
C. Summarizing the HistoricalEvidence
As discussed in this section and summarized in the chart below, the legal,
regulation of secondary uses of broadcast music in the United States has
evolved significantly since the Copyright Act first recognized the right of
music copyright owners to control the public performances of their works. In
particular, Congress and the courts have recognized and slowly expanded an
exemption that permits commercial establishments, under specified conditions,
to transmit broadcast music without purchasing a license. The exemption
seeks, at least in part, to correct market failures created by the high transaction
costs associated with licensing businesses, including the costs of user
resistance to paying license fees.
Although attempts to correct these market failures would seem justified
under the economic efficiency approach discussed in Part I, this Part has
shown that revising the copyright law has had the effect of diverting the
resources of copyright users away from reaching private licensing
arrangements with PROs and toward more intensive acts of resistance and rent
seeking in Congress and the courts. In short, legislative and judicial
intervention, rather than correcting failures in the licensing market, actually
exacerbated those failures by encouraging users to contest PROs' licensing
efforts and to devote resources toward seeking a further widening of the
exemption.
Whether this trend will be repeated under the FIMLA's new exemption rules
cannot, however, be predicted by analyzing United States copyright law alone.
Congress and the courts no longer have an entirely free hand to revise or
interpret the Copyright Act when doing so clashes with the United States'
treaty obligations. The crucial question, then, for both legislators and for
copyright owners and users, is whether the WTO dispute settlement bodies will
find that the licensing exemptions violate these treaties. It is to that issue that I
now turn.

licensing").
199 Id.

200 See id. (ASCAP anticipates seven percent decline in revenues as a result of FIMLA).
201 See Carrington Nelson, No Longer the Same Old Song: Performance Rights Groups
BMI, ASCAP Launch Campaigns to Soften Images, THE TENNESSEAN, Apr. 9, 1999 at IE,
available in 1999 WL 5764187 (noting continued "resentment" from businesses over paying
license fees).
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ANALYZING THE

FIMLA

AND HOMESTYLE EXEMPTIONS UNDER THE

BERNE AND

TRIPS TREATIES

In the complaint pending before the WTO dispute settlement panel, the EC
has alleged that both the FIMLA and the "homestyle" exemption violate the
TRIPs Agreement and the Berne Convention. This Part analyzes the EC's
allegations in favor of finding a violation of the treaties and the arguments the
United States has raised and can raise in response. It highlights the ways in
which the FIMLA dispute differs from past TRIPs cases and identifies those
legal issues that will be the most difficult and controversial for WTO jurists to
resolve. The Part concludes with a prediction that both the panel and the
Appellate Body will accept the EC's claim that both statutes violate Berne and
TRIPs and will recommend that the United States revise the Copyright Act to
bring it into compliance with the treaties.
A.

Framingthe FIMLA Dispute: A MethodologicalNote

The FIMLA dispute raises two discrete questions for WTO jurists: first,
whether the FIMLA and the homestyle exemption violate the exclusive
"minimum rights" guaranteed under Bere and TRIPs; and second, if such a
violation exists, whether it can be justified under the exceptions or limitations
clauses of the two treaties. The first question is quite straightforward, whereas
the second is far more complex and will be the most difficult to resolve.
To answer each of these questions, WTO jurists will apply the rules of treaty
interpretation set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 20 2 The
Vienna Convention's rules give primacy to a treaty's text, which must be
20 3
interpreted in its "context" and in light of the treaty's "object and purpose."
Subsequently concluded treaties and "subsequent practice" by the parties to the
treaty that establish the text's meaning may also be considered. 2°4 However,
unlike the interpretive methodologies applied by United States courts, the
Vienna Convention restricts use of extra-textual means to interpret treaties,
20 5
including reliance on a treaty's traveaux preparatoiresor drafting history.
202 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 341 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. In its first decision, United States
- Standard for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 35 I.L.M 603 (May 20, 1996),
the WTO Appellate Body held that all WTO treaties would be interpreted according to the

rules found in the Vienna Convention.
203 Vienna Convention, supra note 202, art. 31(1). The "context" of a treaty includes,
inter alia, the text of the entire agreement, including its preamble and annexes. See id. art.
31(2).
204 See id. art. 31(3). "Subsequent practice" is often found in the manner in which State
parties to a treaty incorporate its provisions into their national laws. For a discussion of how
WTO jurists should use national legislation to aid in interpreting the TRIPs Agreement, see
Heifer, supra note 29, at 426-31.
205 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §

325 cmt. g (1987) (noting that United States courts are "more willing than those of other
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Jurists may consult these sources only "to confirm the meaning" resulting from
a textual, contextual and purposive analysis, or to "determine the meaning"
when such analysis leaves the treaty's meaning "ambiguous or obscure" or
leads to a result that is "manifestly absurd or unreasonable. '20 6
As explained below, the Vienna Convention's interpretive rules will play a
significant role in shaping the resolution of the FIMLA dispute. In particular,
they may provide a means for WTO jurists to rule on the EC's complaint
without considering the policy-oriented economic and distributional arguments
identified in Part II that the United States may raise in defense of the music

licensing exemptions.
B.

The Violation of Berne/TRIPs' Exclusive Rights

The first issue that WTO jurists must address is whether the FIMLA and
homestyle exemptions violate the exclusive rights guaranteed to musical works
of foreign origin under international copyright law. 20 7 The EC has not alleged
that any exclusive rights guaranteed by TRIPs itself have been violated; rather
it has invoked article 9(1) of TRIPs which incorporates the Berne Convention
by reference. 20 8 Thus, to determine whether the United States has violated
TRIPs, WTO jurists will need to analyze the text of Berne-the first time WTO

dispute settlement bodies will have interpreted this foundational copyright
treaty.2 09

states to look outside the [treaty] to determine its meaning").
206 Vienna Convention, supra note 202, art. 32.

See IAN

SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 141 (2d ed. 1984) (explaining primacy of textual and
contextual analysis and secondary role accorded to drafting history in Vienna Convention's
hierarchy of interpretive rules).
207 The Berne and TRIPs treaties impose obligations on their signatories only with
respect to copyrighted works whose country of origin is another Berne or TRIPs member
State. The treaties do not require that signatories grant protection to works of domestic
origin. Copyrighted works entitled to protection under this standard include: (1) works first
published in another member State; (2) works first published simultaneously in the United
States and another member State that gives a shorter term of copyright protection; and (3)
works first published in a non-member State whose author is a national of a member State
other than the United States. See Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S.
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 10 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 513, 529 (1986)
[hereinafter Final Report].
208 See First Submission of the European Communities and their Member States to the
Panel,United States - Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act, WTO Doc. WT/DS 160 at

71 (Oct. 5, 1999) [hereinafter First EC Submission] (copy on file with the author) (citing

TRIPs, supra note 16, article 9(1), which "stipulates the principle that WTO Members have
to comply with the substantive provisions of the Beme Convention").
209 See Allen N. Dixon, TRIPs Case Law Developments in the WTO: A Review and
Analysis, FORDHAM UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, 7TH ANNUAL CONF. ON INT'L INTELL. PRP. L. &

POL. 1, 12 (Apr. 8-9, 1999) (unpublished conference paper on file with author) (reviewing
past TRIPS cases).
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The Beme Convention's provisions concerning broadcast music are clear
and unequivocal. Since the 1948 Brussels revision, the Convention has
granted to copyright owners both the right to control the broadcast of their
works by radio and television, and the separate and distinct right to control
secondary uses of those same broadcasts.
Specifically, Beme article
1lbis(1)(iii) provides that
[a]uthors of literary and artistic works shall enjoy the exclusive right of
authorizing:
(i) the broadcasting of their works or the communication thereof to the
public by any other means of wireless diffusion of signs, sounds or
images;

...

(iii) the public communication by loudspeaker or any other analogous
instrument transmitting,by signs, sounds or images, the broadcastof the
210
work.

Under United States copyright law, restaurants, bars and commercial
establishments are indisputably "public" places. 211 When these businesses use
stereo systems and televisions to play the copyrighted music contained in radio
and television broadcasts to customers or employees located on their premises,
they are "communicat[ing]" or "transmitting" a "broadcast" of the music "by
loudspeaker or any other analogous instrument." For this reason, both the
FIMLA and the homestyle exemption authorize U.S. businesses to engage in
precisely the activity that Beme consigns to the copyright owners' exclusive
control.
Given the clarity of this textual and contextual analysis, WTO jurists need
not even consult Berne's drafting history to find that the United States has
210 Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 1 lbis(l)(i), (iii) (emphasis added).

The EC has also alleged that the United States" licensing laws violate article 1 l(ii)
of the
Berne Convention to the extent that they permit businesses to use wired cable transmissions
in their establishments. See First EC Submission, supra note 208, at I 90-92. Article
11 (ii) grants copyright owners the exclusive right to control cable transmissions of musical
works to the public when the entire transmission is by wire. See World Intellectual Property
Organization [hereinafter WIPO], GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION
OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 65 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 WIPO GUIDE].
211 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1999) (defining public performances to include any
performances "at a place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of
persons outside of a normal circle of family and its social acquaintances is gathered").
Under the Berne Convention, "[t]he law of the country of protection determines when the
communication is public." WILHELM NORDEMANN ET AL, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBORING RIGHTS LAW: COMMENTARY WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE EUROPEAN

COMMUNITY 127 (1990). By contrast, the treaty does not grant copyright owners the right to
control "private" communications, broadcasts or performances of their works, which are
generally limited to works received in the company of family members and friends. See
SAM RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC

WORKS: 1886-1986, 432-33 (1986).
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violated article Ilbis(1)(iii). However, in the event that the jurists refer the
preparatory work to "confirm" the meaning of the text, 2 12 they will find ample
additional evidence to support this conclusion.
The drafting history of article llbis(1)(iii) indicates that Berne member
States were concerned about the significant increase in the size of the listening
audience that could result when broadcasts of copyrighted works were
transmitted over loudspeakers located in public places. Prior to 1948, member
States' laws were in disharmony over whether such secondary transmissions
were subject to the copyright owner's control, prompting a move to revise the
2 13
treaty.
According to the drafting history of the 1948 Brussels conference, there was
"no significant opposition" by member States to adding an express right for
copyright owners to control the retransmission of broadcasts in public
places. 214 Although the drafters did not seek to draw a definitive boundary
between public and private broadcasts (the latter of which are beyond the
copyright owner's control), they did provide examples of locations that they
considered to be public. 215 These included "'above all, places where people
meet: in the cinema, in restaurants, in tea rooms, railway carriages,"' as well
as "places where people worked and conduct their business, such as factories,
'216
shops, and offices.
Further guidance on the scope of article I lbis(1)(iii) is found in the World
Intellectual Property Organization's 1978 official guide to the Berne
Convention. 2 17 Emphasizing the distinction between copyright owners' right to
authorize radio and televisions broadcasts and the separate right to authorize
secondary uses of those broadcasts, the guide states:
In places where people gather (cafes, restaurants, tea-rooms, hotels, large
shops, trains, aircraft, etc.) the practice is growing of providing broadcast
program[s].... The question is whether the license given by the author
to the broadcasting station covers, in addition, all the use made of the

22 See Vienna Convention, supra note 202, art. 32.
213 See RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 452; see also I STEPHEN P. LADAS, THE

48-81 (1938) (noting
divergence in national court case law as to copyright owners' control over secondary uses of
broadcast music).
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY

214 Report by the Sub-Committee on Broadcastingand Mechanical Instruments, June 13,
1948, reprinted and translatedin WIPO, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF

LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS FROM 1886 TO 1986, 185 (1986).
2l5 See RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 453 (providing examples of public locations).
216 Id. (quoting Comments in program for the Brussels Conference to the Berne,

Documents de la Conference reunie a Bruxelles du 5 au 26 Juin 1948 at 266) [hereinafter
Brussels Conference Comments]. Accord NORDEMANN ET AL, supra note 211, at 127 (citing
similar public places); STEPHEN M. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
NEIGHBORING RIGHTS 125 (2d ed. 1989) (same).
2.7

See 1978 WIPO

GUIDE,

supra note 210, at 68-69.
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broadcast, which may or may not be for commercial ends.
The Convention's answer is 'no." Just as, in the case of a relay of
broadcast by wire, an additional audience is created ... so, in this case
too, the work is made perceptible to listeners (and perhaps viewers) other
than those contemplated by the author when his permission was given.
Although, by definition, the number of people receiving a broadcast
cannot be ascertained with any certainty, the author thinks of his license
to broadcast as covering only the direct audience receiving the signal
within the family circle. Once this reception is done in order to entertain
a wider circle, often for profit, an additional section of the public is able
to enjoy the work and it ceases to be merely a matter of broadcasting.
The author is given control over the new public performance of his
work.2 18
Given Berne's text and its drafting history, the United States cannot defend
the FIMLA's broad secondary use licensing exemption as compatible with
article 1 lbis(1)(iii). To the contrary, prior to the United States' ratification of
the Berne Convention in 1989, the Ad Hoc Working Group on the United
States Adherence to the Berne Convention acknowledged that "the principal
concern of [Berne's] drafters" in enacting article 1lbis(l)(iii) was the "use of a
loudspeaker in a public place to communicate the contents of a broadcast
work," an act which "constituted a new use of a broadcast to reach a new
219
public."
Although the FIMLA is unmistakably incompatible with article 11 bis(1)(iii),
the legality of the homestyle exemption is marginally more uncertain. In its
1986 report, the Ad Hoc Working Group concluded that the homestyle
exemption was permissible under the treaty. It relied on a distinction in
Berne's drafting history between "lower-amplification home receivers" (the
use of which did not require authorization from copyright owners) and
"loudspeakers" (which involved a "qualitatively different" technology and thus
220
required such authorization).
There is some support for this distinction in the drafting history. 22'

218

Id.

219

See FinalReport, supra note 207,

at 529.

220 Id.
221 At the Brussels conference, the drafters of Article 1 ibis stressed the copyright
owner's right to control performances of music in public places and noted the difference
between "receivers" and "loudspeakers." However, the drafters also questioned whether the
type of receiver used should make a difference in deciding whether an additional license
was required:
Why make a legal difference depending on whether the amplifier is weak and solely
intended for private usage, or sufficiently strong to work for the satisfaction of a more
or less large public? The sounds made by the receiver (even if they are amplified by a
loud speaker) constitute only the continuation and the achievement of the program;
consequently the authorization to broadcast [given by the copyright owner] includes
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Nevertheless, WTO jurists should invoke the primacy given to textual and
purposive analysis in the Vienna Convention and should eschew reliance on
this distinction as a basis for upholding the homestyle exemption.
First, article 1lbis(1)(iii) expressly refers to "communication by loudspeaker
or any other analogous instrument... ",222 This language precludes any
distinction based on the type of equipment used to transmit broadcast music
where the technology used is sufficiently powerful to reach a significant
number of listeners or viewers located in commercial establishments. This is
so even if individuals who receive the broadcasts in their private homes use the
same technology. 223 Moreover, the EC can point to at least one judicial
interpretation of the homestyle exemption to demonstrate that United States
courts have sanctioned some augmentation of standard home receiving
equipment as technology available to private consumers has become more
224
sophisticated over the years.
Second, the purpose underlying article 1lbis(1)(iii) is to grant to copyright
owners a distinct right to control secondary uses of broadcast music in a
variety of public venues, including in particular bars, restaurants and
commercial establishments. 225 As PROs in the United States have long argued,
secondary uses of broadcast music in these locations are not encompassed
within the license given to radio and television stations to transmit music to
individuals receiving the broadcast in private. 226 Thus, even the use of
homestyle receiving equipment by businesses allows broadcast music to reach
also the authorization to communicate the program to all listeners which the receiving
set can reach.
Brussels Conference Comments, supra note 216, at 266 (English translation on file with
author). But see LADAS, supra note 213, at 480 (characterizing this argument as
"specious").
222 Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 1 lbis(1)(iii).
223Recall that contemporary "homestyle" receiving equipment is sufficiently powerful to
enable businesses to transmit background music in stores as large as 4000 square feet. See
Wilk, supra note 165, at 805 & n.110.
224 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1493 (7th Cir.
1991) (analyzing factors including "number of speakers used, manner in which the speakers
are installed, use of concealed wiring, distance of speakers from the receiver, and integration
of the stereo system with other technologies" and holding that "hiding of the speakers in a
dropped ceiling and the concealment of the speaker wires" did not vitiate exemption); see
also Examination Procedure,supra note 158 at 5 ("Technology is under constant evolution
and the household radio technology of the 70s has been superseded several times, increasing
the scope of the homestyle exemption."); Johnson, supra note 19, at S-6 (noting that
consumers are used more sophisticated electronic equipment today compared to date when
statute was enacted).
225 See 1978 WIPO GUIDE, supra note 210; LADAS, supra note 213, at 480-81 ("The
diffusion by loud speaker is a new and distinct communication to the public, jurisdictionally
independent of the original broadcasting.").
226 See 1994 Hearings, supra note 69, at 275; see also ROTHENBERG, supra note 69, at
24-25.
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an additional public audience and thus requires the copyright owners' prior
authorization.
For these reasons, WTO dispute settlement jurists should conclude that both
the FIMLA and the homestyle exemption are prima facie violations of the
minimum standards of copyright protection guaranteed by the Berne and
TRIPs treaties.
C.

Exceptions and Limitations Defenses: Choosing the Correct Legal
Standard

The exclusive rights guaranteed to authors and copyright owners are not
unlimited. To the contrary, members of the Berne Union have long enjoyed
significant discretion to curb those rights by adopting exceptions and
limitations in the form of free use exemptions or compulsory licenses. These
copyright-limiting tools allow member states to balance the rights of copyright
owners against the interests of the public at large and to achieve other
important social objectives. The heart of the FIMLA dispute, therefore turns
on whether the United States can invoke any of the "exceptions and
limitations" clauses contained in either the Berne Convention or the TRIPs
Agreement to justify its music licensing laws.
A preliminary issue of vital significance for resolving the FIMLA dispute is
the relationship between the exceptions and limitations found in Berne and
those set forth in TRIPs. Unlike Berne, which attaches different exceptions
and limitations to each exclusive right enjoyed by copyright owners, 227 TRIPs
article 13 contains a single standard for measuring all such restrictions.
According to this standard, each treaty party must "confine limitations or
exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict
with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the
22 8
legitimate interests of the right holder."

The proper construction of article 13's "three-step" test 229 is among the most
uncertain and contested issues in international copyright law. The test was
transplanted from a provision of the Berne Convention permitting member
States to impose free use limitations on copyright owners' reproduction
right. 230 Although member States unanimously adopted the three-step test in
227 See Paul Edward Geller, International Copyright: An Introduction

§ 5[5][b][ii] at

INT-202 [hereinafter Geller, International Copyright] in I INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE (Paul Edward Geller & Melville B. Nimmer eds. 1998) [hereinafter INT'L

LAW]; see also Heifer, supra note 29, at 370-71 & n.52 (identifying Berne
exceptions and limitations).
228 TRIPs, supra note 16, art. 13 (emphasis added).
COPYRIGHT

229 See Thomas Heide, The Berne Three-Step Test and the ProposedCopyright Directive,
21 EUR. INTELL. PRP. REV. 105, 105 (1999).

230 Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 9(2) ("It shall be a matter for legislation in the
countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of [literary and artistic] works in certain
special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation

HeinOnline -- 80 B.U. L. Rev. 147 2000

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 80:93

the diplomatic conference preceding the most recent revision of Berne, they
could not agree on how each of the three steps in the test should be interpreted

or applied. 23 1 As a result of this lack of consensus, Berne's signatories have
enjoyed broad discretion to decide which cases are "special," what exploitation
is "normal" and whether "unreasonable prejudice" results from a particular
free use. 232 With that discretion, a wide divergence of approaches among
233

domestic legal systems has evolved.
Whether member States' broad discretion continues under the TRIPs
Agreement is uncertain, however. In particular, it is unclear whether article
13's three-step test contains a stricter standard for measuring the treatycompatibility of national law exceptions and limitations than the multifarious
standards found in Beme. 234 Commentators have argued,. however, that such a
strict construction of article 13 would be unwise as a matter of copyright policy
235
and should be avoided by WTO jurists.

of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.")
(emphasis added).
231 See Heide, supra note 229, at 105 ("[T]here is still considerable dispute as to [the
three-part test's] scope, with notes to the Conference [at which the test was drafted] offering
no guidance as to the meaning of the various conditions constituting the test."); Helfer,
supra note 29, at 372 ("[T]here is little common ground to interpret these 'vague' and
'elusive' phrases" of the three-part test, and noting that "the treaty's preparatory work sheds
little light on their meaning") (footnotes and citations omitted).
232 See NORDEMANN ET AL, supra note 211, at 17 (stating that it is "predominantly the

case" that Berne leaves "to domestic law to enact general limitations or limitations covering
certain cases or the details of execution"); RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 483 (finding that
normal exploitation "will be a matter for national legislation, and ultimately national
tribunals, to determine"); id. at 484 (showing that the unreasonable prejudice standard is
"ultimately determined by each national law"); id. at 487 (finding that article 9(2) "leaves a
considerable area of discretion to national legislation"); STEWART, supra note 216, at 80
("[E]ach member country has to decide what the legitimate interests of the author are,
whether the prejudice of these interests ... is reasonable or unreasonable, and what amounts
to a normal exploitation of the work which must be safeguarded.").
233 See Thomas Dreier, The Cable and Satellite Analogy in THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT IN

A DIGITAL ENVIRONMENT 57, 63 (P.Bernt Hugenholtz, ed. 1995) (describing national law

implementation of article 9(2) as in "total disharmony").
234 See Netanel, The Next Round, supra note 32, at 459 ("TRIPs article 13 arguably
circumscribes more narrowly than Berne the limitations and exceptions to copyright owner
rights that member states may allow.").
235 See Heifer, supra note 29, at 432-39 (arguing that WTO jurists should grant
significant deference to national legislatures when reviewing exceptions and limitations in
domestic copyright statutes). See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas Lowenfeld,
Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPs and Dispute Settlement Together,
37 VA. J.INT'L L. 275, 297 (1997) (advancing similar arguments for construing the TRPscompatibility of exceptions and limitations found in all intellectual property laws); Netanel,
The Next Round, supra note 32, at 449, 487-89 (advancing similar arguments based on
adoption of WIPO Copyright Treaty and international free speech principles).
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Although the question whether TRIPS constrains member states' discretion

to adopt exceptions and limitations is open to debate, the converse question of
whether TRIPs article 13 expands that discretion is not subject to dispute. By
virtue of TRIPs article 2(2), member States decided that nothing in TRIPs
could be interpreted as authorizing national governments to "derogate from
existing obligations" created by the Berne Convention. 236 Stated more
concretely, article 2(2) makes plain that no member state may invoke the
TRIPs Agreement to justify more expansive exceptions and limitations than
those already found in Berne. In effect, even with the adoption of a seemingly
unitary standard in TRIPs article 13, any narrower exceptions and limitations

236

TRIPs, supra note 16, art. 2(2) ("Nothing in Parts I to IV of this Agreement shall

derogate from existing obligations that Members may have to each other under" inter alia,
"the Berne Convention .... "). A similar prohibition is found in Berne itself. See Berne
Convention, supra note 15, art. 20 (reserving member states' "right to enter into special
agreements among themselves, in so far as such agreements grant to authors more extensive
rights than those granted by the [Berne] Convention, or contain other provisions not
contrary to this Convention") (emphasis added).
Further support for this interpretation is found in the recently-adopted WIPO Copyright
Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, CRNR/DC/94 (1996), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997) ("WCT"), an
international agreement adopted by the members of the Berne Convention in principal part
to extend copyright protection to the Internet. Article 10 of the WCT adopts a three-step
limitations and exceptions test identical to that found in TRIPs article 13, and it applies that
test to both the new exclusive fights recognized in the WCT and to the exclusive rights
already protected by the Berne Convention. See, e.g., WCT, supra art. 10(2) ("Contracting
Parties shall, when applying the Berne Convention, confine any limitations of or exceptions
to rights provided for therein to certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the
author."). Although this language provides little guidance on whether the three-step test
authorizes exceptions and limitations broader than those found in the Berne Convention, an
Agreed Statement adopted together with the WTC does provide an informative gloss on
how the three-step test should be interpreted:
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting Parties to carry
forward and appropriately extend into the digital environment limitations and
exceptions in their national laws which have been considered acceptable under the
Berne Convention. Similarly, these provisions should be understood to permit
Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the
digital network environment.
It is also understood that Article 10(2) neither reduces nor extends the scope of
applicabilityof the limitationsand exceptions permitted by the Berne Convention.
Agreed Statements Concerning the WIPO Copyright Treaty, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/96
(Dec. 20, 1996) (emphasis added). Although not entirely free from ambiguity, the Agreed
Statement strongly suggests that States may apply more generous exceptions and limitations
to exclusive rights "in the digital network environment," but must adhere to existing Berne
standards in non-digital media. Moreover, the Agreed Statement's gloss on the three-step
test in the WTC is also persuasive authority for interpreting the identical test in the TRIPs
Agreement. See Netanel, The Next Round, supra note 32, at 488 (arguing that WTO jurists
should look to Agreed Statement when deciding copyright disputes under TRIPs article 13).

HeinOnline -- 80 B.U. L. Rev. 149 2000

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:93

clauses contained in the Berne Convention will continue to serve237as a floor
below which national exceptions and limitations laws may not fall.
The insight that the Berne Convention constrains member States' power to
restrict copyright owners' exclusive rights provides a means for WTO jurists to
simplify the FIMLA dispute and to avoid deciding the case on the basis of the
contested three-step test. 238 Specifically, the jurists can use this insight to limit
the arguments that the United States can raise in defense of its music licensing
laws. The United States can argue that its laws are compatible with any of the
exceptions and limitations found in the Berne Convention itself. The United
States may not, however, defend the statutes as TRIPs-compatible based on an
autonomous construction of article 13's three-step test, if that construction
would result in upholding an exemption that is more expansive than the
exemptions permitted under the exceptions and limitations recognized by
Berne.

237

239

As Paul Geller has written, the three-step test contained in article 13 is "potentially

misleading" because it "purports to set out general parameters for all limitations and
exceptions to copyright," and therefore suggests that TRIPs member states' national laws
may contain exceptions and limitations broader than those permitted under the Berne
Convention. Geller, International Copyright, supra note 227, § 5[5][b][ii] at INT-202.
Such a construction of Article 13 is erroneous, he argues:
Berne rights are respectively subject to specific limitations and exceptions, and
countries would impermissibly derogate from these rights if they respected only
broader limitations or exceptions. Article 2(2) of the TRIPs Agreement categorically
precludes anything in the operative copyright provisions from derogating from
"existing obligations" under, inter alia, the Berne or Rome Conventions. A TRIPs
panel should therefore read Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement as further restricted by
such narrower limitations or exceptions as the Berne Convention specifically sets out to
its minimum rights.
Id. at INT-202 to INT-203. Accord DANIEL GERVAIs, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: A DRAFTING
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

45-46, 89-90 (1998) (construing TRIPs article 2(2) together with

article 13 to conclude that Berne imposes a constraint on permissible exceptions and
limitations); J.A.L. STERLING, WORLD COPYRIGHT LAW 550 (1999) (rejecting argument that
"Article 13 of TRIPS carries the implication that, as regards rights guaranteed under the
Berne Convention, limitations and exceptions additional to those permitted under the Berne
Convention may be introduced, provided the 'three step' test is applied"). For an early
articulation of this construction of the two treaties, see Mihaly Ficsor, InternationalNormsetting in the Field of Copyright and Neighboring Rights: A Growing Number of Unsettled
Problems at 66-67 (paper delivered at International Conference on Intellectual and
Industrial Property held by EC Commission, Athens, Apr. 11-13, 1994) (on file with
author).
238 See infra Part III.F (explaining why WTO jurists should frame their decision so as to
avoid applying the three-step test to judge the treaty-compatibility of the United States'
music licensing laws).
239 The United States' initial brief to the WTO fails to grasp this crucial point. Without
citing to or distinguishing TRIPs article 2(2) or Berne article 20, the United States argues
that "[tihe relevant issue in this case is not whether Berne rights are implicated, but whether
the provisions at issue are permissible exceptions under the standard of TRIPS Article 13."
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In the sections that follow, I identify two distinct Berne-based exceptions
and limitations arguments that the United States can raise in support of the
FIMLA and the homestyle exemptions. Neither of these arguments, however,
is likely to convince WTO jurists to uphold the exemptions. I then turn to a
third argument, one that may lead to a "back door" reintroduction of the threestep test and to the economic and distributional arguments that the test enables
the United States to raise.
D. Article 1lbis(2)-Imposing Conditions on the BroadcastRight
One argument in defense of United States music licensing laws is found in
the first sentence of Article 1lbis(2), which gives Berne signatories the
authority to enact "legislation... to determine the conditions under which the
'240
rights mentioned [the first paragraph of in Article 1Ibis] shall be exercised.
At first glance, this provision appears to give the United States wide latitude to
limit copyright owners' control over secondary use of broadcast music.
However, the word "conditions" is a term of art in Berne that authorizes
member States to enact compulsory licenses but not free use exemptions. 241
This is confirmed by the second sentence of article 1lbis(2), which emphasizes
that any conditions a member state imposes "shall not in any circumstances be
prejudicial to... [the author's] right to obtain equitable remuneration which,
in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority. '242
The reasons for allowing member States to impose conditions on the
broadcast right (including the right to control secondary uses of broadcast
music) can be traced back to fears about the monopoly powers of national
collective rights organizations "which controlled the performing rights in most
musical works, and which might be tempted to abuse these rights in relation to
the new medium of broadcasting. '243 However, States were divided over
exactly how to limit copyright owners' control over broadcast works. Some
governments favored exempting particular uses of broadcast works altogether,
FirstU.S. Submission, supra note 7, at 11.
2" Beme Convention, supra note 15, art. lIbis(2).
241 As Ricketson explains, "[t]he reference to 'conditions' in article 1 lbis(2) is usually
taken to refer to the imposition of compulsory licenses, but the form of these licenses if left
to national legislation to determine." However, "the power to impose conditions on the
exercise of rights does not carry with it the power to deny those rights." RICKETSON, supra
note 211, at 525.
242 Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 1lbis(2) (emphasis added); see also
NORDEMANN ET AL, supra note 211, at 128 ("If it had been the intention of the Berne

Convention to follow the domestic concepts of what is considered equitable in each and
every country of the Union ....then it could have spared itself the trouble of referring to an
equitable remuneration; for after all some countries consider a minimal or even no
remuneration at all, to be 'equitable.' The purpose of par. 2, however, is precisely to limit
the authority of the countries of the Union in this area, and it therefore proceeds from a
concept of what would be equitable all over the countries of the Union.").
243 RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 522; see also LADAS, supra note 213, at 405.
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whereas others opposed any form of restriction on copyright owners' licensing
powers. A compromise was ultimately reached under which national
governments could impose a system of compulsory licenses on all types of
broadcasts, but could not impose free use exemptions that244deny copyright
owners the right to receive payment for the use of their works.
Under article 1lbis(2), therefore, national governments enjoy wide
discretion to determine the form of compulsory licenses for secondary uses of
broadcast works, including the structure of the governmental bodies that
administer those licenses. 245 But they do not have the authority to remove an
entire category of uses from the copyright owner's control without providing
some form of compensation. Both the FIMLA and the homestyle exemptions
achieve precisely that result. 246 For this reason, WTO jurists should have little
trouble rejecting the music licensing laws as justified under article I lbis(2).
E.

Implied Exceptions to Broadcastand PerformanceRights

A more plausible argument for the United States to assert is that Berne
Convention signatories enjoy, outside of Article 1 lbis, the authority to restrict
copyright owners' public performance and broadcast rights even if no
compensation is paid. Nothing in the text of the treaty authorizes such
restrictions. But the Convention's preparatory work does recognize "a number
of exceptions that are to be implied and which, according to the wishes of
successive conferences of revision, will not be in conflict with the Convention
if they are embodied in national legislation of member countries. '247 The
question for WTO jurists to resolve is whether these implied exceptions are
broad enough to encompass the United States' music licensing laws.
As an initial matter, it might be argued that the absence of any textual
support for such copyright restrictions precludes WTO jurists from even
considering an implied exceptions argument by the United States. Had State
parties to the TRIPs Agreement wanted to validate these unwritten exceptions,
they could easily have done so by including a clause to that effect in the treaty.
This is particularly true given that TRIPs expressly clarifies other copyright
244 RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 523. In addition, article 1lbis(2) expressly states that

governments may impose compulsory licenses only in "the absence of agreement" between
copyright owners and users. For an argument on how the United States might structure a
compulsory license system to encourage such an agreement, see infra Part IV.C.3.
245 For a discussion of how the United States should capitalize on this discretion in
fashioning a solution to the FIMLA dispute, see infra Part IV.C.
246 See STEWART, supra note 216, at 125 ("[A]rticle I lbis(2) leaves the national
legislation a very wide discretion in the treatment of the broadcasting right including the
application of a compulsory licence system;" however, national laws cannot eviscerate the
"right to equitable remuneration ....
");
see also Examination Procedure,supra note 158, at
13 (stating that the homestyle exemption violates Article 1 lbis(2) because it "not only
abolishes the rightholders' right to authorise the use-of their music, it also deprives them of
all remuneration in respect of the use of their works").
247 RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 532.
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obligations that were ambiguous under Berne. 248 Nevertheless, the fact that
TRIPs incorporates the Berne Convention by reference rather than merely
reproducing its text within TRIPS itself strongly suggests that TRIPs' drafters
did not intend to divorce Berne's bare text from the historical and interpretive
2 49
context in which it was created and interpreted by courts and commentators.
In addition, the EC concedes that implied exceptions are part of the
Convention's "spirit, ' 250 and argues instead that the FIMLA and homestyle
exemptions are beyond the permissible scope of these exceptions. For these
theoretical and practical reasons, WTO jurists are likely to evaluate the implied
exceptions argument on its merits.
The power of BeMe member States to impose implied restrictions on the
exclusive broadcast and public performance rights arose from the step-by-step
historical evolution of the Convention's protected rights. Prior to the 1948
Brussels revision, the Berne Convention recognized only limited public
performance and radio broadcast rights. As a result, the domestic copyright
laws of most member States permitted certain unauthorized public
performances and broadcasts of copyrighted works. 25' With the addition of
more comprehensive broadcast and performance rights into Berne in 1948, the
252
question arose whether these laws were compatible with the treaty.
Member States discussed this issue extensively during the 1948 Brussels
revision of the Convention.
As an initial matter, the government
representatives do not appear to have understood these implied exceptions as
formal treaty "reservations. '253 Such a designation would have restricted the
exceptions' application to national laws already in force on the date that a State

248 See, e.g., TRIPs, supra note 16, art. 10 (clarifying that "computer programs... shall
be protected as literary works under the Berne Convention").
249 See Frederick M. Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Agreement on Trade-

Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in

INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE

GATTIWTO DisPuTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 421, 421 (1997); see also Netanel, The Next
Round, supra note 32, at 452 ("It is doubtful that the TRIPs drafters intended to incorporate
the Berne provisions in their strict textual form without any connection to the Berne
Convention's pre-existing interpretive framework.").
250 Examination Procedure,supra note 158, at 13; see also First EC Submission, supra
note 208, at
93-96 (noting the existence of implied exceptions but arguing that they do
not excuse United States licensing laws).
251 See LADAS, supra note 213, at 401-02 (identifying national laws permitting public
performances without payment to copyright owners prior to 1948 Brussels revision of Berne
Convention).
252 RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 437-38, 533.
253 See id. at 533 (noting that government delegates rejected an amendment to the Berne
Convention authorizing member States "to retain limitations presently existing in.their
national laws") (emphasis added); see also Ficsor, supra note 237, at 66-67 (noting that
these unwritten limitations on copyright owner's exclusive rights are "more precisely
characterized" as "minor exceptions" rather than "minor reservations").
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became a member of the Berne Union 254 and thus would have precluded the
United States, which ratified Berne in 1989, from defending the 1998 FIMLA
(but not the 1976 homestyle exemption) as an implied exception under the
treaty.
The drafters did, however, reject a proposal to incorporate an express
limitations clause into the treaty on two grounds. First, it was "impossible to
list all the exceptions exhaustively in the Convention as they were too varied."
Second, a more general reference to exceptions "presently existing in...
national laws" would encourage States to incorporate new exceptions into their
national laws before joining Berne. Yet the drafters also agreed that these
2 55
domestic laws did not violate the treaty.
Although the implications of these discussions are far from clear, substantial
evidence suggests that the drafters intended to permit national laws under an
"implied exceptions" theory only if they derogated insignificantly from
copyright owners' exclusive rights. In particular, the preparatory work (1)
characterized these exceptions as "minor reservations" that should be
interpreted restrictively, (2) stated that the exceptions could not be justified
merely if they were made "without the aim of profit" and (3) referred to
examples of acceptable exemptions as including public performances during
religious ceremonies, holidays, military parades and charitable functions as
well as performances furthering the needs of child and adult education. 256
According to a leading commentator on the Convention, this drafting history
compels the conclusion that
[implied] exceptions to the rights granted... must be concerned with
uses of minimal, or no, significance to the author.... The fact that [the

drafters] rejected the option of inserting in the Convention a provision
expressly reserving the right of national legislation to make such minor
exceptions also confirms these exceptions are acceptable only when they
are of a de minimis kind. If an express provision had been inserted, this
would make it far easier for member nations to assert that the Convention
recognised their right to make such exceptions and that they were
therefore free to go beyond those of a purely de minimis kind, for
example, because of a particular public interest that might justify the
257
abridgement of the authors' rights in these circumstances.
254 See RICKETSON, supra note 211,
at 764-79 (discussing reservations which
"grandfathered" a national law exceptions in force at the time a State ratified the Berne
Convention and the extent to which such reservations were authorized under different
revisions of the Convention).

255 See id. at 534.
256 See id. at 533-34.
257 Id. at 536 (emphasis added). It is clear from Ricketson's comments that the implied

exceptions do not require payment be made to copyright owners for unauthorized uses of
their works. But see NORDEMANN ET AL, supra note 211, at 126 (noting a dispute on this
point but arguing that remuneration must be paid when member states rely on implied
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This history and commentary impose a heavy burden on the United States to
justify either the FIMLA or the homestyle exemption as a permissible implied
exception to music copyright owners' exclusive broadcast and performance
rights. Both laws sanction the free commercial exploitation of copyrighted
music by a large segment of United States businesses, businesses that PROs in
the United States had once actively sought to license. 258 Furthermore, both the
EC and the United States sources have estimated that PROs will lose

significant licensing revenues as a result of the exemption's expansion in
1998.259 Thus, if WTO jurists rely solely on Berne's preparatory work to
analyze these implied exceptions, they will have ample authority to find both
laws in violation of article 1lbis(1)(iii) of the Berne Convention and thus in
violation of article 9(1) of the TRIPs Agreement.
Reintroducing the Three-Step Test Through the Back Door

F.

At this juncture, the WTO jurists hearing the F1MLA dispute should
conclude their legal analysis and issue a decision in favor of the EC. Although
the United States is defending the FIMLA and homestyle exemptions under an
autonomous construction of TRIPs article 13, that defense is foreclosed by of
the TRIPs article 2(2) which precludes member States from adopting copyright
exceptions and limitations broader than those permitted under the Berne
Convention. 260 In addition, this simple resolution of the FIMLA dispute would
avoid entangling WTO jurists in the complex and unresolved issues
surrounding the proper interpretation of the three-step test and would allow

limitations).
258

See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 8.18[C] [2] at 8-217 n.94.3 (noting that BMI

lost $40,000 per year from application of homestyle exemption in Claire's Boutique case to
retail chain stores); Examination Procedure, supra note 158, at 31 (stating that BMI
estimated a loss of $50,000 in licensing revenue from application of homestyle exemption in
Edison Brothers case to 1500 chain stores); Commission Decision of December 11, 1998
under the provisions of Council Regulation (EC) No. 3286/94 concerning section 110(5) of
the Copyright Act of the United States of America, 1998 O.J. (L 346) 60, 61 ("The
[homestyle] exemption is widely applied on a commercial basis [throughout] the United
States and the economic losses incurred by Community right-holders are important, ranging
between 13 percent to 24 percent of the United States performing rights organizationsannual distributions to Community collecting societies representing composers and
arrangers of music, lyricists and publishers."). See also Loren, supra note 7, at 26-30
(discussing PROs attempts to downplay homestyle exemption in their licensing literature).
259 See Pruzin, Three Countries Join, supra note 13, at 321 (noting that the Irish Music
Rights Organization estimated $30.3 million annual losses as a result of the United States
licensing laws); 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 81 (statement of Wayland Holyfield on
behalf of ASCAP) (reviewing findings of Congressional Research Service that FIMLA
would exempt 65.2 percent of all eating establishments and 71.8 percent of all drinking
establishments from any licensing obligations).
260 See First U.S. Submission, supra note 7, at 11; see also supra Part III.C.
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2 61
them to defer those issues to future dispute settlement proceedings.
Unfortunately, one argument advanced by the EC may impede this neat
conclusion to the case. In its February 1998 legal analysis of the music
licensing laws, The EC asserted that the three-step test in TRIPs article 13 is
inapplicable to the FIMLA dispute. 262 Yet in a somewhat perplexing move, it
adopted the same three-step test to judge the United States' implied exceptions
argument under the Berne Convention. More specifically, the EC asserted that
because the Berne Convention's drafting history does not provide a clear
standard to determine which national laws are permissible under an implied
exceptions theory, WTO jurists should import the standard found in article 9(2)
a.three-step
of the Berne Convention. 263 As noted above, article 9(2) contains
64
13.2
article
TRIPs
in
found
that
to
identical
test that is almost
This reintroduction of the three-step test is significant. At each step of the
test, the United States has a window to present the economic and distributional

261 In theory, the WTO jurists could apply TRIPs article 13 as a means of narrowing the
implied exceptions previously considered permissible under the Berne Convention. See
GERVAIS, supra note 237, at 90 ("When these [implied Berne] exceptions are invoked, they
may from now on be submitted to the general test of Article 13, which should be interpreted
on the basis of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention."). As I explain in Part II.F, however,
such a narrowing construction of article 13 is both unwise and unnecessary to resolve the
FIMLA dispute.
262 The EC argued that:

Article 13 of TRIPs cannot apply to the homestyle exemption because the homestyle
exemption denies equitable remuneration to the rightholder. Such a denial of equitable
remuneration is not a limitation or exception to an exclusive right; once conditions
have been placed on the exercise of the right so that only a right to remuneration exists,
that is no longer an exclusive right and there can be no further limitations.
Examination Procedure, supra note 158, at 19. The EC appears to reason that no treaty
party may invoke Article 13 to justify a restriction on a Berne Convention right which is
subject to compulsory licensing, because anyone may infringe such a right subject to the
payment of compensation. Thus, the right is exclusive in name only. This claim is a more
specific version of the point that TRIPs member States may not invoke article 13 to broaden
the exceptions and limitations found in the Berne Convention. See supra Part III.B.
263 See Examination Procedure, supra note 158, at 13 ("The problem is how to define the
criteria to which an exemption should respond to be regarded as minor. In this regard, the
criteria laid down in Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention may well provide an appropriate
yardstick."). In its initial submission to the WTO panel, the EC did not raise this argument
in detail, reserving its right to comment on all exceptions and limitations defenses after the
United States filed its initial submission to the panel. See First EC Submission, supra note
208, at 196.
264 Recall that the three-step test requires treaty parties to confine limitations or
exceptions (I) to "certain special cases," (2) which do "not conflict with a normal
exploitation of the work," and (3) "do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests" of
the author or right holder. Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 9(2); TRIPs, supra note
16, art. 13. However, the Berne Convention's drafting history offers no apparent support for
using Article 9(2)'s three-step test as the standard for measuring implied exceptions. See
supra Part III.E.
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arguments discussed in Part II. Given the lack of agreement among the treaty
parties over the three-step test's meaning, WTO jurists will be unable to
interpret and apply the test solely by applying the traditional methods of treaty
analysis set forth in the Vienna Convention or by consulting commentators'
writings. 265 They will also need to address broader policy-based issues,
including: (1) the importance of balancing copyright protection against the
public interest and other social objectives, (2) the need to grant national
legislators, administrators and judges discretion to strike that balance, (3) the
extent to which other Berne and TRIPs member States have enacted statutes
similar to the FIMLA and the homestyle exemption and (4) whether
international copyright law endorses a "market failure" approach to exceptions
and limitations.
If the WTO jurists choose to apply the three-part test to United States
copyright laws, 2 66 they will provide crucial guidance to interpret a standard by
which to judge the treaty compatibility of exceptions and limitations laws in all
135 TRIPs member States. 267 The construction of the three-part test will be,
therefore, one of the most important and contested issue in the dispute between
the United States and the EC. It thus requires extended analysis.
1. Step One-The "Special Cases" Requirement
As a threshold matter, member States can justify a limitation on copyright
owners' exclusive rights only in "certain special cases." According to
Ricketson, this first step of the test implies two distinct requirements. "First,
the use in question must be for quite a specific purpose: a broad kind of
exemption would not be justified. Secondly [sic], there must be something
'special' about this purpose, 'special' here meaning that it is justified by some
268
clear reason of public policy or some other exceptional circumstance."
a. Arguments for the United States
What arguments support the United States music licensing exemptions as a
special case? 269 For the FIMLA, the United States can argue that its provisions
111.(A), (C).
266 For a discussion of whether the jurists will apply the three-step test, see supra Part
265 See supra Parts

III.F.

267See Dixon, supra note 209, at 14 ("[A]ny WTO interpretation of the Berne three-step
test in [the FIMLA] case with respect to a United States copyright exception could well
have repercussions in future cases that the United States may want to bring to challenge
other countries' exceptions.").
268 RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 482.
269 In its initial brief to the WTO, the United States adopts a narrow interpretation the
"special cases" requirement. It argues that the phrase requires only "that exceptions should
be clearly delineated rather than vague and open ended." First U.S. Submission, supra note
7, at 13 (quotations omitted). Under this standard, even very broad exceptions to exclusive

rights would meet the special cases requirement simply by virtue of their clarity.
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are limited in a number of distinct ways. First, the statute applies exclusively
to nondramatic musical works; it does not exempt dramatic musical works (e.g.
operas and Broadway musicals), news programs, talk shows or readings of
literary works. 270 Second, the statute imposes equipment restrictions on larger
restaurants, bars and stores. 27 1 Third, the statute only exempts music received
or
from broadcast and cable transmissions; performances of live music 272
mechanical recordings such as CDs or phonorecords require a license.
Fourth, the exemption is vitiated if businesses collect a "direct charge... to
see or hear" the broadcast. 273 Fifth, the transmission may not be "further
transmitted beyond the establishment where it is received. '274 Finally, the
broadcast or transmission from the radio, television or cable station must be
"licensed by the copyright owner of the work so publicly performed or
'275
displayed.
The arguments in support of the homestyle exemption as a special case
overlap in part with those supporting the FIMLA. 276 The homestyle exemption
applies more broadly to performances or displays of all copyrighted works and
does not require that the initial broadcast be licensed by the copyright
owners. 277 The broadcasting and "direct charge" limitations, however, apply in
the same way as they do in the FIMLA. The homestyle exemption's "further
transmitted" restriction is somewhat broader, applying not to transmissions
beyond "the establishment," but to any "further retransmi[ssion] [of the

270 17

U.S.C. § 110(5)(B) (1999) (noting that exemption applies to "communications by

an establishment of a transmission or retransmission embodying a performance or display of
a nondramatic musical work") (emphasis added).
271 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 110(5)(B)(i)(I); 5(B)(ii)(I); (5)(B)(i)(II); (5)(B)(ii)(II) (1999).
272 Consequently, commercial establishments that want to exercise significant control
over the content of the music they play for their customers or employees or that want to
eliminate commercial advertisements from the performances must either (a) subscribe to a
background music service such as Muzak (whose fees already include a performance
license) or (b) purchase a license to perform recorded music directly from one or more PRO.
For a study concluding that a business's control over the type of music played significantly
affects customer behavior, see Ronald E. Milliman, Using Background Music to Affect the
Behavior of Supermarket Shoppers, 46 J. MARKETING 86, 90-91 (1982).
273 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(iii) (1999) (conditioning exemption on "no direct charge... to
see or hear the transmission or retransmission").
274 17 U.S.C. § 1 10(5)(B)(iv) (1999).
275 17 U.S.C. § 110(5)(B)(v) (1999).
276 The discussion that follows presumes that the FIMLA did not repeal the homestyle
exemption's application to non-dramatic musical works. For a discussion of this point, see
supra note 7.
277 This initial licensing requirement has little practical significance given that nearly all
radio, television and cable stations are licensed by PROs to broadcast or transmit the
musical works contained in their programming. Cf Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283
U.S. 191, 199 n.5 (1931) (finding copyright violation based on hotel's secondary use of
unlicensed radio broadcast).
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copyrighted work] to the public. '278 Finally, and most importantly, the
performance or display must be made "on a single receiving apparatus of the
type commonly used in private homes. ' 279 Commercial sound systems or even
augmented systems not widely available to consumers are not exempt.
Taken together, the limitations of the homestyle exemption and the FIMLA
suggest that both laws have a narrow focus. In addition, the drafting history of
article 9(2) of the Berne Convention supports the United States' position that
the two statutes' limitations on copyright owners' exclusive rights constitute
"special cases." Although the treaty does not contain an illustrative list of
exceptions and limitations, the drafters' debates reflect the wide variety of
permissible exemptions found in national copyright laws.
Permissible
exemptions include judicial and administrative copying, private copying,
copying for research and scientific purposes, industrial and commercial
copying and copying for teaching purposes. 280 If these illustrative uses
presumptively qualify as "special cases," and if the drafters deliberately
refused to codify this list to maintain the treaty's flexibility, 281 then the United
States may plausibly argue that exempting copyright owners' control over
some (but clearly not all) secondary uses of broadcast music is similarly
special.
b.

Arguments for the European Community

In response to these arguments, the EC can assert several powerful
challenges to both statutes. In fact, a slight shift in perspective reveals how
easily the laws can be characterized as broad invasions of foreign copyright
owners' exclusive rights. Recall that the Berne Convention requires member
States to recognize secondary uses of broadcast music as a distinct treatyprotected right. Both the FIMLA and the statutory construction approach to
278 17 U.S.C. § 10(5)(A) (1999).

Several cases have refused to apply the exemption

because the placement of speakers in a different room from the receiver constituted such a
further transmission. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482,
1495 n.14 (7th Cir. 1991).
279

17 U.S.C.

§ 110(5)(A) (1999).

In addition, courts applying a legislative history

approach impose additional limitations on the homestyle exemption based on the size of the
establishment and the ability to afford a subscription to a background music service. Two
recent appellate court decisions, however, focus exclusively on the statutory equipment

requirement. See supra Part II.B.5.a.
280 See RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 485-87 (discussing the origin and probable scope
of each of these exemptions in national laws).
28 See id. at 480, 485 (discussing treaty drafters' refusal to catalogue permissible
exceptions and limitations to reproduction right existing in member states' national laws);
Heide, supra note 229, at 105 (explaining that article 9(2) was "intended to be flexible
enough to allow member countries to keep their array of exceptions and limitations already
existing at the time [the article was adopted], as well as to provide a sufficient margin of
freedom to craft inevitable exceptions in order to address important social or cultural
needs").
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the homestyle exemption sanction an invasion of this right by commercial
establishments that had for many years paid royalties to transmit broadcast
282
music to their customers and employees.
Given the breadth of the FIMLA and the homestyle exemption, the EC
rejects treatment of these laws as special cases. It characterizes the exemptions
as "the result of pressure by special interest groups" and states that "there is...
clearly no reason of public interest justifying [their] existence. ' 283 The EC also
stresses the fact that the laws exempt a commercial use of copyrighted works
by for-profit businesses. This sharply distinguishes them from most exceptions
and limitations found in the national copyright laws of Bere and TRIPs
284
signatories, including the United States.
c.

Evaluating Commercial Establishments' Distributionaland Fairness
Arguments

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that treaty text, drafting history and

commentary provide plausible arguments in support of either party's position.
Therefore, WTO jurists should supplement their analysis of the United States
statutes by evaluating the three distributional and fairness arguments that
commercial establishments have raised in domestic fora to oppose PROs'
licensing efforts.

282 See Examination Procedure, supra note 158, at 29 (discussing percentages of exempt
businesses and licensing losses projected under United States laws).
283 Id. at 15 (emphasis omitted) ("[W]hen one looks at the exceptions contained in
Section 110, it appears clear that ... most are the result of pressure by special interest
groups such as farmers, retailers or war veterans."). Respected United States copyright
commentators have characterized the exemptions in similar terms. See Ralph S. Brown,
Eligibilityfor Copyright Protection:A Searchfor PrincipledStandards, 70 MINN. L. REV.
579, 593-94 (1985) (characterizing homestyle exemption as an unprincipled "pork-barrel
exemption" created "simply because the beneficiaries had a lot of votes, were respectable,
and did not want to pay ASCAP"); Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 101, at 354
(characterizing exemptions in section 110 as a "widen-the-loophole bills"). By contrast, the
Supreme Court in Aiken provided the most principled defense for the exemption, reasoning
that a contrary rule would permit copyright owners to exact "multiple tribute" extending
"far beyond what is required for the economic protection of copyright owners," and "would
be wholly at odds with the balanced Congressional purpose behind" the public performance
right. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 163 (1975).
284 For a discussion of many of those exceptions and limitations, see Center for
International Legal Studies, Copyright Infringement (Dennis Campbell ed. 1997)
(summarizing copyright laws of several industrialized and developing nations);
International Intellectual Property Law: Global Jurisdictions (Dennis Campbell & Susan
Cotter eds. 1996).
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1) Double Dipping
Commercial establishments principally object to granting copyright owners
control over secondary uses of broadcast music because such control
authorizes the collection of performance royalties from both radio, television
and cable stations and from the business that receive those stations'

transmissions. 285 Although the double dipping argument seems persuasive in
its raw form, 286 evaluating it under the Berne and TRIPs treaties requires
disassembling the argument into its different strands and considering empirical
evidence of PROs' licensing practices.
In its broadest form, the double dipping argument conflicts with a bedrock
premise of the Berne and TRIPs treaties: that copyright owners possess distinct
exclusive rights and may demand separate remuneration for exploitation of
each of them.287 Taken to its logical extreme, a double dipping rationale
would, for example, prohibit a copyright owner from licensing a restaurant to
play the songs on a compact disc because the owner had already collected
royalties from the sale of that disc to the restaurant's proprietor.288 Such a
restriction would also undermine copyright law's goal of promoting
289
distribution of music to the public.
The double dipping argument fares little better when framed more narrowly
as a challenge to the multiple performance doctrine or the distinction between
public and private performances of copyrighted works. Article 1lbis(l)(iii) of
the Berne Convention clearly endorses a copyright owner's right to extract
licensing fees for multiple performances of the same broadcast or transmission,
just as it constrains member States from equating the playing of music bars,
290
restaurants and stores with performances that take place in private.

285

286

See supra Part I.B.1 (discussing "double dipping" for licensing fees).
See DENNIS M. MAGNUSSON & VICTOR NABHAN, EXEMPTIONS UNDER

THE CANADIAN

120 (1982) (concluding that the argument that "the copyright owner has
already received compensation [for secondary] use of his work in the fees paid by the
broadcaster for the right to broadcast the work ... has considerable logical force" where
broadcast revenues and copyright licensing fees "vary with the size of the estimated
audience").
287 See Beme Convention, supra note 15, arts. 8-14ter (listing exclusive minimum rights
guaranteed by the treaty); TRIPs, supra note 16, arts. 10, It, 12 (same).
288 Some advocates of music licensing reform in the United States understood the double
dipping argument in these broad terms. See 1994 Hearings, supra note 69, at 147
(testimony of Guy Gregg, National Restaurant Association).
289 See Thorpe, supra note 72, at 214-15 (arguing that "double dipping" promotes the
dissemination of works by enabling copyright owners to "lower[] the price of the initial
sale" or distribution and spreading cost among multiple users).
290 See Berne Convention, supra note 15, hrt. I lbis(I)(iii). This is not to suggest that
Berne member States do not enjoy significant discretion to define the boundary between
COPYRIGHT ACT
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A more subtle version of the double dipping argument, however, does have
some empirical and logical support. United States PROs charge radio stations
blanket and per-program license fees that are based on a percentage of the
station's adjusted gross receipts. Those receipts are generated principally from
advertising revenues. 291 Those revenues, in turn, are based on the total size of
the audience, 292 including listeners and viewers who hear or see a broadcast or
transmission in public places. Thus, copyright owners do receive remuneration
from broadcastersthat is attributable to the performance of broadcast music by
bars, restaurants and other businesses. 293 To the extent that they also collect
royalties from commercial establishments for those same broadcasts, copyright
owners are compensated twice for the same performance.
This version of the double dipping argument accepts the appropriateness of
collecting royalties for multiple performances of the same broadcast or
transmission, but objects to exacting more than one set of royalties for the
same performance-that is, the secondary uses of broadcast music by

commercial establishments. 294 The argument is often buttressed by the
empirically uncertain claim that exempting secondary uses of broadcast music
will increase radio, television or cable listening or viewing, thereby increasing

public and private performances, for example, by adopting a rule that treats as a private (and
therefore non-licensable) performance the secondary use of broadcast music undertaken by
business establishments solely for the enjoyment of a small number of employees. See infra
Part III.B.3.c (discussing such proposals under Australian and Canadian copyright law).
However, the drafting history of article 1lbis(l)(iii) precludes member states from
stretching the public-private boundary to include what have historically been viewed as
public spaces. See supra Part II.B.
291 See KOHN & KOHN, supra note 4, at 878, 937-46 (reproducing sample radio station
licenses).
292 See MAGNUSSON & NABHAN, supra note 286, at 120 (noting that in commercial
broadcasting, revenues received by broadcasters vary with the size of the audience, and fees
paid to copyright owners vary with the size of broadcasters' revenues).
293 See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 163 n.14 (1975)
("[C]opyright holders can and do receive royalties in proportion to advertising revenues of
licensed broadcasters, and a broadcaster's advertising revenues reflect the total number of
its listeners, including those who listen to the broadcasts in public business
establishments.") (emphasis added); Lilenfeld, supra note 117, at 710 n.70, 727 ("[Tjhe
amount of the [license] fee advertisers pay broadcasters is based on the expected number of
total listeners or viewers of the broadcast, including those listeners and viewers in public
establishments"). See also infra note 296 (discussing Arbitron and Nielsen audience survey
methods).
294 As noted above, license agreements between PROs and broadcasters purport to grant
broadcasters the right to transmit their broadcasts only to non-public locations such as
homes, cars and offices. See supra note 69. This does not, however, weaken the challenge
posed by this narrower version of the double dipping argument. Although PROs have
formally excluded certain rights from the broadcasters' license, music copyright owners
nonetheless receive broadcaster-paid royalties that are calculated to include performances
occurring in public locations.
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the size of the audience and, consequently, broadcaster revenues and copyright
295
owners' royalties.
Yet even this more moderate double dipping argument is potentially
insufficient to treat the FIMLA and homestyle exemptions as "special cases"
under the Berne Convention. First, the methods used by survey firms to
measure the size of radio, television 'and cable audiences are likely to
undercount significantly the number of viewers and listeners exposed to
broadcast music in commercial establishments. 296 Second, even if these firms
See Lilenfeld, supra note 117, at 727 (arguing that "copyright owners would benefit
financially from freeing business proprietors to play radios and televisions" without
licensing fees). In the absence of empirical studies, it is impossible to determine the net
effect on PRO royalties caused by exempting secondary uses of broadcast music. Such an
exemption may, for example, encourage businesses that now do not play music in their
establishments to install or turn on radio receivers and television sets, thereby increasing the
size of the broadcast audience and broadcaster license fees. However, the broadcast
audience may also increase because commercial establishments give up paying license fees
for recorded music or background music services and shift to broadcast music as a free
substitute. PROs in the United States have raised the latter argument to deter Congress from
adopting a broad exemption for in-store performances of broadcast music. See PART 2
DIscusSION AND COMMENTS, supra note 134, at 283-84; see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 70, § 8.18[C][2] at 8-215 to 8-216 (discussing how homestyle exemption's legislative
history was structured to deprive Muzak of an argument that a "reduction of Muzak fees is
warranted because it must contend with a competitive free use of background music by
commercial establishments using radio sets"). Broadcast music is not, however, a perfect
substitute for recorded music or Muzak because it results in a loss of control over content
that may be essential to the benefits background music confers on commercial
establishments. See Milliman, supra note 272, at 90-91 (presenting the conclusions of a
study revealing that controlling content of background music crucial to influencing behavior
of supermarket shoppers).
296 Arbitron, a private organization that monitors consumer radio listening habits in the
United States, randomly selects listeners to participate in surveys of their listening habits.
These surveys ask participants to record all the radio programs they hear, with "listening"
defined as "any time you hear a radio - whether you choose the station or not." Arbitron
Ratings, Your Radio Ratings Diary (1997). The survey forms expressly request listeners to
indicate "all the radio you hear," including at home, in a car, at work or in any "other
place." Id. at 1. The forms do not, how.ever, ask listeners to specify the location of that
"other place."
Nielsen Media Research measures television viewing habits in the United States to
provide broadcasters, programmers and commercial advertisers with estimates of audience
size and composition. Nielsen randomly selects sample households and measures their
viewing habits using diaries and a "People Meter" that is placed on each television set in the
sample household. See Nielsen Media Research, Who We Are and What We Do, (visited
December 4, 1999) <http://www.nielsenmedia.com>. Nielsen does not, however, include
information on television viewing that occurs in out-of-home locations in its ratings analysis
to broadcasters or advertisers. Telephone interview with Vincent Nasso, Nielsen Media
Research Communications Department (Sept. 30, 1999). It may, however, survey this outof-home viewing data as part of its "total television measurement [report] to the industry."
295
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were able to measure audience size accurately, the royalties attributable to
secondary uses of broadcast music would still constitute an extremely small
percentage of total broadcaster royalties. 297 Third, because royalties paid by
non-commercial broadcasters are not tied to advertiser revenue and audience
size, those license fees may not fully account for listening and viewing in
business establishments. 298 Finally, the text and legislative history of the
homestyle exemption and the FIMLA suggest that Congress did not consider
royalties from broadcasters as an adequate substitute for royalties from
commercial establishments. 299 To the contrary, both statutes permit PROs to
Press Release, More Than 25 Million Adults Watch Television in Out-of-Home Locations
Each Week, May 14, 1998 (discussing the results of a study commissioned by ABC and
ESPN showing significant out-of-home viewing of football telecasts). Thus, advertising
revenues received by television broadcasters will not always reflect the audience of viewers
in commercial establishments.
297 In the case of radio broadcasts, for example, the limited data available suggest that
significantly less than five percent of a station's total royalty payments to PROs result from
secondary uses of music by commercial establishments. See Arbitron, Radio Today: How
America Listens to Radio at 11 (1998 ed.) (concluding that between 1.2 percent and 4.9
percent of radio listening occurs in locations other than home, car or work). In the case of
television broadcasts, a 1998 commissioned survey suggested that 10 percent of out-ofhome viewing occurs in restaurants and bars, and 14 percent occurs in other places,
including waiting rooms and hospitals. See Press Release, supra note 296, at 2.
29' See MAGNUSSON & NABHAN, supra note 286, at 121; see also Joanne Court, The
Notional Bargain Approach to the Determination of Equitable Remuneration for
Compulsory Licenses, I I SYDNEY L. REV. 348, 364-66 (1987) (asserting that, in Australia,
performance licenses are issued to public television broadcasters based upon the
broadcasters' operational expenditures).
299 In 1961, the Register of Copyrights proposed to exempt the reception of broadcasts
from the public performance right except where an admission fee was charged on the theory
that "[t]he performing license obtained by the broadcaster should suffice, with no further
license required of those who merely receive the broadcast." 1961 Register Report, supra
note 134, at 31. The Register quickly abandoned this proposal in the face of criticism from
PROs and substituted the homestyle exemption in its place. See supra Part II.B.2. Before
the exemption could be enacted, however, the Supreme Court decided Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, holding that PROs had "not demonstrated that they cannot receive
from a broadcaster adequate royalties based upon the total size of the broadcaster's
audience." 422 U.S. 151, 163 n.14 (1975). Congress' decision to overrule Aiken, endorse
the multiple performance doctrine, and adopt only a narrow exemption for businesses using
"homestyle" receivers, strongly suggests that it did not consider royalties from broadcasters
to provide adequate compensation to copyright owners for secondary uses of broadcast
music.
The FIMLA's legislative history contains discussions of broader versions of the double
dipping rationale, see supra Part I.B.1, but does not contain any discussion of whether the
narrower duplicative royalties from broadcasters discussed above would adequately
compensate copyright owners for secondary performances. Congress evidenced its intent to
permit duplicative recover in at least some situations, however, in the provision authorizing
PROs to collect fees from all businesses who receive a "direct charge ... to see or hear the
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collect license fees from at least some businesses, suggesting that Congress
300
believed that copyright owners deserved additional royalties.
This analysis of double dipping does not foreclose the United States from
creating a licensing system in which PROs collect royalties for secondary uses
of broadcast music directly from radio, television and cable stations. As
explained below, both Canada and Australia have considered adopting such a
system. Both countries' proposals, however, would have expressly authorized
copyright owners to collect a separate fee for secondary uses of broadcast
music, in addition to the royalties already received from broadcasters
themselves. 30' Neither the FIMLA nor the homestyle exemption contemplates
such a licensing arrangement and the FIMLA may in fact preclude it.302 In the
absence of a designated revenue stream for in-store performances, WTO jurists
will likely conclude that the limited duplicative royalties copyright owners
currently receive do not justify characterizing the United States' music
licensing legislation as a special case.
2)

Abuse of Monopoly Power & Aggressive Licensing and
Enforcement Tactics
Business establishments have raised two additional arguments in support of
the current licensing exemption. First, they have argued that PROs in the
United States have abused their monopoly power in various ways; second, they
have contended that United States PROs have used inappropriate methods to
force businesses to purchase licenses on unfair terms. The United States might
use these allegations to argue that its music licensing laws satisfy the special
case requirement in two ways. First, unlike the exploitation of many
copyrighted works, the public performance right for music is licensed through
collective organizations that require extensive regulation to prevent abuses of
their monopoly pricing powers.
Second, the repeated allegations of
harassment leveled by business establishments against PROs are sufficiently
severe to justify the differential treatment of PROs, including a licensing
exemption for in-store performances.
The validity of these arguments under the Berne and TRIPs treaties is
uncertain. On one hand, both the text and drafting history of the Berne

transmission or retransmission." 17 U.S.C. § 1 0(5)(B)(iii) (1999).
" See Philip Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 Nw. L. REv. 658, 714-18 (1996)
(arguing that WTO jurists may properly examine legislative motives when reviewing
domestic legislation).
301 See infra Part III.F.2.d.
302 The FIMLA provides that its exemptions "shall not be taken into account in any
administrative, judicial, or other governmental proceeding to set or adjust the royalties
payable to copyright owners for the public performance or display of their works." 17
U.S.C. § 110 (1999). This provision appears to prohibit PROs from petitioning the Rate
Court to increase royalties from broadcasters to offset the loss of licensing revenues
previously collected from commercial establishments.
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Convention reflect member States' concern about collective rights
organizations abusing their monopoly position, particularly with regard to the
performance and broadcast rights. Thus, in debates over the proper
interpretation of Berne Convention article 17,303 a consensus position emerged
that "controls over collecting societies or other abuses of authors' rights did
not come into conflict with the provisions of the Convention," and that
member States could "take all necessary measures to restrict possible abuses of
monopoly. ''3°4 Although governments adopted differing views on how
far
30 5

such controls could extend while remaining compatible with the treaty, most
agreed that any controls must genuinely target abusive monopolistic practices,
"and not simply [be a] pretext for abridging rights which states are obliged to
'30 6
protect under the Convention.
Thus, in order to determine whether the United States legislation is
compatible with these principles, WTO jurists must distinguish between

permissible and excessive monopoly regulation. The drafting history supports
the United States' power to impose significant constraints on PRO licensing
activities through methods such as the antitrust consent decree and oversight of
the Rate Court.307 It is equally clear that the United States and its political
subdivisions are entitled to restrict the manner in which PROs interact with
copyright users over license fees and enforcement practices. 308 Yet even if the
303 Article 17 provides: "The provisions of this Convention cannot in any way affect the
right of the Government of each country of the Union to permit, to control, or to prohibit, by
legislation or regulation, the circulation, presentation, or exhibition of any work or
production in regard to which the competent authority may find it necessary to exercise that
right." Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 17.
304 RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 546, 548 (quoting Berne Convention's drafting
history). See also STEWART, supra note 216, at 139 ("[Tlhere is also nothing [in Beme] to
prevent countries from enacting measures designed to control monopolies and restrictive
practices as a matter of public policy.").
305 In particular, it is unclear whether governments are authorized to impose compulsory
licenses in response to monopoly abuses where the Berne Convention does not already
authorize them. Compare RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 548 (suggesting authorization),
with 1978 WIPO Guide, supra note 210,1 17.3 (denying authorization).
306 RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 548. See also NORDEMANN ET AL, supra note 211, at
160-61 (arguing that the authority conferred on member States by article 17 to prevent
monopoly abuses does not permit countries to expropriate authors' minimum rights in whole
or in part).
307 See STEWART, supra note 216, at 139 ("[T]here is nothing to prevent countries from
enacting measures designed to control monopolies and restrictive practices as a matter of
public policy. The establishment of copyright tribunals to adjudicate in cases of disputes
between collecting societies formed by copyright owners which are virtual monopolies and
users of copyright, also come under this heading.").
311 See Noel L. Hillman, Intractable Consent: A Legislative Solution to the Problem of
the Aging Consent Decrees in United States v. ASCAP and United States v. BMI, 8
FORDHAM I.P., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 733, 758-60 (1998) (discussing enacted and proposed
state laws regulating activities of PROs in relation to commercial establishments). FIMLA
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allegations by commercial establishments that PROs have abused their
monopoly powers are valid, the United States will have difficulty arguing that
this abuse justifies an exemption of an entire category of public performances
and transmissions rather than mere conduct regulation or price controls.
Although the Berne and TRIPs treaties do not impose a least restrictive means
test on member States, they do prevent States from eviscerating the treaties'
30 9
minimum rights under the guise of monopoly regulation.
2. Step Two-The "Normal Exploitation" Requirement
Even if WTO jurists conclude that the FIMLA and the homestyle exemption
are special cases, they cannot rule in favor of the United States unless they
conclude that the statutes do not "conflict with a normal exploitation of the
work. ' 310 Here, too, Berne's text and drafting history provide limited guidance
and State practice suggests that the issue is largely "a matter for national
'311
legislation, and ultimately national tribunals, to determine.
a.

Arguments for the European Community

According to the EC, the United States licensing laws directly conflict with
the normal exploitation of copyrighted music owned by its songwriters and
publishers. The EC reasons that because the Berne Convention expressly
grants to copyright owners a distinct right to control the secondary use of
broadcast music, by definition "such right is regarded by all Members of the
Union of Berne [including the United States] as being part of the normal
exploitation of a copyright work. ' 312 It then argues that "any kind of
commercial exploitation of a musical work.., should always be considered as
part of 'the normal exploitation of a work' in the sense that commercial
exploitation of a work should always entitle the rightholder to

remuneration."

313

appears to approve of these laws; it provides that "nothing in this title shall be construed to
relieve any performing rights society of any obligation under any State or local statute,
ordinance or law... governing its operation .. " 17 U.S.C. § 101 note (1999).
10 TRIPs itself supports a similar conclusion, although it too is not free of ambiguity.
Articles 8(2) and 40(2) authorize member states to adopt "appropriate measures" to prevent
abuses of intellectual property rights. TRIPs, supra note 16, arts. 8(2), 40(2). However,
they also specify that these restrictions must be "consistent" with the provisions of the
treaty. See id.; see also Reichman, supra note 29, at 379-80 (emphasizing the lack of
consensus over how these provisions should be applied).
310 Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. 9(2); TRIPs, supra note 16, art. 13.
3' RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 483.
312 Examination Procedure,supra note 158, at 17.
313 Id.
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Arguments for the United States

These claims by the EC are remarkably broad. They suggest that copyright
owners are entitled to enjoy virtually unfettered control over all commercial
uses of their works. If adopted in full by the WTO dispute settlement bodies,
the EC position would significantly alter the discretion member States have
long enjoyed to decide whether an exception or limitation to an exclusive right
is necessary to achieve a proper balance of interests between copyright owners
314
and users.
In addition, the drafting history of article 9(2) strongly suggests that the
Berne Convention does not require such an expansive interpretation of the
"normal exploitation" requirement. Although, as noted above, the drafters
could not agree on how the requirement would be applied in all cases, they did
agree on conduct that was beyond its outer margin: making a "very large
number of copies for a particular purpose," or making "a rather large number
of copies for use in industrial undertakings," where no equitable remuneration
is paid. 315 Finding an appropriate analogy in the performance and broadcast
setting for this undisputed violation of the reproduction right is not a simple
task. It is not immediately obvious, however, that either the FIMLA or the
homestyle exemption exceeds this outer boundary. If it does not, more than a
century of state practice and commentary dictate that the United States be
afforded some deference to fashion its copyright laws as it sees fit. 316

Consequently,

as with the special cases requirement, WTO jurists must

consider additional arguments to analyze the "normal exploitation"
requirement persuasively. The EC has suggested two such arguments. Both
are more narrowly tailored than the EC's principal argument and thus provide
more persuasive challenges to the United States laws.
314 In its initial WTO brief, the United States stresses the importance of this discretion.
See First U.S. Submission, supra note 7, at 13 ("WTO Members have flexibility to
determine for themselves whether a particular case represents an appropriate basis for an
exception to exclusive rights.").
315 See RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 483-84. See also Ruth L. Gana, Prospects For
Developing Countries Under The TRIPs Agreement, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 735, 760
(1996) ("Historical notes on the interpretation of Article 9(2) ... suggest that conflict with
'normal exploitation' refers to such things as massive amounts of photocopying, particularly
where it is done for industrial or economic gain."); Paul Edward Geller, Legal Transplants
in InternationalCopyright: Some Problemsof Method, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 199, 215
(1994) (remarking that the meaning of cumulative tests in article 9(2) "remains unclear,
except that together they would preclude large-scale copying without compensation").
316 See RIcKETSON, supra note 211, at 487 ("The decision of the [drafters] to delete any
list of permissible purposes leaves a considerable area of discretion to national legislation.
While this means that there will be divergences between national laws on these matters, it
has the considerable advantage that each country is able to take into account its own
particular needs."); Heide, supra note 229, at 105 (stating that article 9(2) "did not present
Berne Union states with a solution and left it to each country to resolve the matter as it
wished subject to the guideline language of that Article").
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c. Normal Exploitation Defined by Market Failure
WTO jurists may attempt to decide which exploitations of copyrighted
works are "normal" by analyzing PROs' voluntary licensing practices. 317 Even
where copyright statutes create broad exclusive rights, copyright owners may
choose not to exercise those rights to their fullest extent because the
transaction costs associated with licensing exceed the revenues generated by
the licenses. 318 This situation will prevent users from purchasing a license,
thereby precluding productive uses of copyrighted works. Faced with such
failures in the licensing market, the economic efficiency approach discussed in
Part I provides a compelling justification for national legislatures to create free
319
use exemptions for copyright users.
The history of secondary uses of broadcast music in the United States
reveals that transaction costs have shaped the licensing practices of PROs,
causing them to refrain voluntarily from licensing certain secondary uses of
broadcast music even where those uses provide a financial benefit to
commercial establishments. That history also demonstrates, however, that
users not included in this voluntary practice have resisted paying licensing
fees, both in interactions with PROs and in rent seeking before Congress and
The United States' WTO brief advocates this approach. First U.S. Submission, supra
note 7, at 14 ("To determine what constitutes normal exploitation, the Panel must look at all
the ways in which an author might reasonably be expected to exploit his work in the normal
course of events.") (quotations omitted).
38 See supra Part L.A (discussing transactions costs as causes of market failures).
Compare RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 483 (advocating an interpretation of normal
exploitation which suggests a market failure approach), with Paul Edward Geller,
Reprography and Other Processes of Mass Use, 38 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 21, 23-31
(1990) [hereinafter Geller, Reprography] (arguing that mass uses of copyrighted works
outside of functioning markets must be considered in determining normal exploitation).
319 See First U.S. Submission, supra note 7, at 14 ("To determine what constitutes normal
exploitation, the Panel must look at 'all the ways in which an author might reasonably be
expected to exploit his work in the normal course of events."') (quoting RICKETSON, supra
note 211, at 483).
This is not to suggest that a market failure approach is the only or even the preferred
method of analyzing whether national copyright law exemptions are compatible with Berne
and TRIPs. To the contrary, statutory provisions that place "limits on the scope of copyright
protection play a valuable role in promoting the progress of knowledge and the creative
arts" distinct from their use in correcting market failures. See Cohen, supra note 57, at 239;
see also Helfer, supra note 29, at 432-33 (explaining important social values many national
law exceptions and limitations serve). It is difficult, however, for the United States to argue
Most commercial
that the music licensing exemption promotes these objectives.
establishments who use broadcast music do so to enhance the ambience of their businesses,
promote sales or increase the productivity of their employee. They do not use music to
advance public discourse, or disseminate culture or ideas to the public, still less to create
new copyrighted works of value to society. See supra note 283 (characterizing exemptions
as a product of interest group politics). Thus, any such instrumental arguments the United
States asserts to defend the laws are unlikely to persuade WTO jurists.
317
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the courts. This resistance has increased the transactions costs of music
licensing and, in part, explains congressional decisions in 1976 and 1998 to
codify broader exemptions than the PROs' voluntary licensing forbearances
dictated. For both the homestyle exemption and the FIMLA, therefore,
Congress' action overcorrected the market failure, cut off a stream of royalties
that PROs had been collecting (or at least actively seeking to collect)
immediately prior to the statutes' adoptions, and encouraged users to engage in
fresh acts of resistance to PRO licensing efforts.
The EC emphasizes many of these points. It acknowledges that market
failures may justify free use exemptions to the public performance and
broadcast rights, but it also identifies in-store performances that PROs had
licensed prior to the statutesg enactments, including retail chain stores and
private agreements with user industry associations such as the NLBA. 320 The
EC further asserts that the exemptions have increased user resistance, thereby
diminishing PRO incentives to seek licenses even from businesses outside the
321
exemptions' scope.

In response, the United States argues that PROs have no reasonable
expectation of collecting license fees for in-store performances encompassed
within the homestyle exemption and the FIMLA. 322 It asserts that the
homestyle exemption "codif[ied] licensing practices already in effect by the
right holders and their licensing organizations," whereas the FIMLA merely
enacted an exemption scheme that PROs had already accepted as part of the
NLBA agreement. 323 The United States concludes that although the FIMLA
may be marginally broader than the homestyle exemption and the NLBA
agreement combined, "this minor limitation on some secondary uses of
broadcasts to the public simply does not rise to the level of a conflict with
324
normal exploitation."
The flaw in the United States' argument is twofold. First, the United States
mischaracterizes the scope of the homestyle exemption and the NLBA
agreement. For example, the NLBA agreement is only available to its
members; businesses that do not sell alcohol on their premises are ineligible to
join. 325 Second, the United States' attempt to rely on a market failure theory is

320 See Examination Procedure,supra note 158, at 15-16.
321 See id. at 30 ("United States collecting societies encounter strong resistance when

attempting to license small to medium size premises which do not benefit from the
exemption, and particularly those which only marginally fail to meet the applicability
criteria of Section 110(5).").
322 See First U.S. Submission, supra note 7, at 15.
323 Id. at 15, 16.
324

Id. at 16.

325 See National Licensing Beverage Association, (visited Dec. 4, 1999) <http://nlba.org>

(NLBA represents over 16,000 bar, tavern, restaurant and package store owners); First U.S.
Submission, supra note 7, at 7 n.17 (conceding in introductory section of brief that "an
establishment must sell alcohol on its premises" to be an NLBA member).

HeinOnline -- 80 B.U. L. Rev. 170 2000

20001

FAIRNESS IN MUSIC LICENSING ACT

unpersuasive. Although the economic efficiency approach to copyright
regulation justifies creating free use exemptions to correct market failures, that
justification is markedly weakened where user resistance and rent seeking are
among the transaction costs creating those failures. In the United States,
resistance and rent seeking have caused the legislature to exempt uses that
were previously part of copyright owners' licensing market, thereby
diminishing their royalties. 32 6 For this reason, WTO jurists are likely to rule in
favor of the EC if they adopt a market failure approach to the "normal
exploitation" step of the three-step test.
d.

Normal ExploitationMeasured by Other Copyright Statutes

A second method of determining whether the United States laws infringe a
normal exploitation of copyrighted music is to compare the FIMLA and the
homestyle exemption to the laws of other State parties to the Berne and TRIPs
treaties.
Accepted principles of treaty construction authorize using a
comparative law approach focusing on the "State practice" of the signatories to
supplement textual, purposive and other interpretive methodologies. 327 A
comparative law analysis of national copyright statutes also enables WTO
jurists to provide a specific contextual framework against which to measure
328
United States laws, thereby providing further support for their rulings.
The European Community.
The EC recognizes the importance of
comparative analysis. It asserts that none of its fifteen member states have

Relying on the NLBA agreement is also flawed because it was negotiated in the shadow
of the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1997, a bill that contained a blanket exemption for
secondary uses of broadcast music clearly incompatible with Berne and TRIPs. See supra
Part II.B.5.b. 1). For a discussion of the treaty-compatibility of private licensing agreements,
see infra Part IV.C.2.
326 The diminution of royalties will increase to the extent that commercial establishments
substitute free broadcast music for licensed background music services or the performance
of recorded music. Compare 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 18 (testimony of Marybeth
Peters, Register of Copyrights, expressing this concern), with supra note 295 (contending
that the extent of substitution, if any, is difficult to predict).
327 See Vienna Convention, supra note 202, arts. 31, 32; IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 137-38 (2d ed. 1984).
328 The national copyright laws of Berne member States and the judicial decisions
interpreting them which preceded the entry into force of the TRIPs Agreement serve as an
important interpretive guideposts for WTO jurists in interpreting TRIPs. See Frederick M.
Abbott, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
IntellectualProperty Rights, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND THE GATTIWTO DIsPuTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 415, 421 (1997); Netanel, The Next Round, supra note 32, at 447.

Legislative changes and judicial decisions by TRIPs member States that post-date the
Agreement's entry into force are a form of State practice long recognized as an aid to treaty
interpretation. See Helfer, supra note 29, at 426-31 (collecting authorities on treaty
interpretation and explaining in detail ways in which WTO dispute settlement jurists can use
national laws to assist in interpretation of the TRIPs Agreement).
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enacted exemptions similar to those found in the United States, nor have they
exercised their discretion under the Berne Convention to create a compulsory
licensing system for the secondary use of broadcast music. 329 The EC also
claims that the copyright laws of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and Brazil

do not contain provisions similar to the homestyle exemption. 330 In fact, the
legal situation is more complex.
Australia. By far the most revealing national copyright system against
which to compare the United States statutes is found in Australia. In June
1998, the Australian Federal Parliament published a detailed study and
recommendations devoted to the question of whether small business should be

required to pay copyright royalties for playing music in their establishments. 331
The study was initiated at the urging of the Attorney General of Australia in
July 1997 after the Australian Performing Rights Association ("APRA")
stepped up efforts to collect royalties from small businesses. The Australian
Copyright Act of 1968 grants copyright owners the exclusive right to perform
their musical works publicly, 332 but it was not until the mid-1990s that APRA

began a national compliance campaign that actively sought to license
secondary uses of broadcast music. 333 Small business owners stridently
objected to these licensing efforts, and asked the government to examine
334
whether the APRA was authorized to collect such fees.

329

See Examination Procedure, supra note 158, at 17, n.31. See also Lionel Bently,

United Kingdom, in INT'L COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 227; Alberto Berovitz & German
Berovitz, Spain, in INT'L COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 227; Adolf Dietz, Germany, in INT'L
COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 227; Mario Fabiani, Italy, in INT'L COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note
227; Herman Cohen Jehoram, The Netherlands, in INT'L COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 227;
Gunnar Karnell, Sweden, in INT'L COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 227; Georges Koumantos,
Greece, in INT'L COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 227; Andrd Lucas & Robert Plaisant, France,
in INT'L COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 227; Alain Strowel & Jan Corbet, Belgium, in INT'L
COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 227.
330 See Examination Procedure,supra note 158, at 17-18, n.32
331 See House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal & Const. Affairs, Don't
Stop the Music! A report of the inquiry into copyright, music and small business (June 1,
1998) <http://www.aph.gov.au/house/committee/LACA/Inquiryincopy.htm>
[hereinafter
Don't Stop the Music].
332 See id. at 13-15. (discussing Copyright Act framework). The Australian Copyright
Act does not define which performances are public. However, judicial decisions have
established a very broad definition of 'public.' See id. at 16 ("[Tjhe case law has
established that if music is played in the presence of more than one person other than in
private or domestic circumstances, it is likely that it will constitute a public performance.").
"I The campaign involved a shift in APRA's licensing practices from personal meetings
with individual business owners to a national "telemarketing campaign." Under the old
enforcement regime, transaction costs precluded APRA from seeking licenses from small
businesses. See id. at 30 ("Pursuing multiple businesses was costly and time consuming and
the license fees for background music were not high.").
131 See id. at 32 (describing reaction to enhanced compliance efforts as "one of
confusion, disbelief and outrage").
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The study examined a number of salient issues relating to the dispute
between music copyright owners and small businesses. These included the fee
structure of the licenses collected, the distinctions between broadcast and
recorded music, the purposes for which small businesses use music, and the
legal, economic and distributional arguments in favor of creating some form of
exemption for small businesses. The study also analyzed the compatibility of a
range of licensing exemptions with Australia's obligations under the Berne
335
Convention and TRIPs.
As an initial matter, the report noted a significant distinction between
performances designed to provide an "ambience or mood" for customers and
those intended for employees. As to the first type of performance, many
business representatives who testified before the Parliamentary Committee
accepted that licensing fees were reasonable given the "commercial nature for
which the music is being used in these sort of situations." 336 They objected
music was used to entertain employees
only to requiring a license fee when 337
and indirectly raise their productivity.
Other business owners, however, asserted that they should not be required to
pay any license fees for playing music in their establishments. 338 The
Parliamentary Committee categorically rejected their argument, reasoning that
a "blanket exemption for small businesses would mean that those businesses
using music in a manifestly commercial manner would be exempt from paying
license fees." 339 "It is highly likely that Australia would be in breach of its

obligations under TRIPs and the Berne Convention if the Copyright Act was
would
amended to-prove an exemption for small business. Such an exemption
340
not fall within any of the exceptions contemplated by the treaties.
The Committee considered in some detail the possibility of exempting
businesses from paying license fees for broadcast music and instead shifting
liability for those fees to radio and television broadcasters. The report made
clear that this licensing system would require broadcasters to pay royalties "in
...See id. at 43-94.

Id. at 49.
See id. at 49-50 (giving examples of worker productivity and use of music).
338 See id. at 66-68. (comparing United States, Canadian and Japanese rules). In part,
this argument was premised on the claim that copyright owners seeking to license in-store
performances of broadcast music were "double dipping" for license fees. The Committee
noted both sides of this argument but did not evaluate its merits. See id. at 59-60.
336

137

... Id. at 61.

14 Id. at 60. In support of this conclusion, the report cited the testimony of two law
professors, Warwick Rothnie and James Lahore, who argued that "blanket exemptions
covering a broad sector of the economy would probably be too broad to satisfy the 'special
cases' requirement" of Berne article 9(2) and TRIPs article 13. The report also noted,
without analysis, their views that any such exemption "in a commercial context" would
conflict with the remaining two steps of the three-step test. See id. at 23. It is uncertain,
however, whether these statements refer to a blanket exemption covering the performance of
both broadcast and recorded music, or whether they are directed at broadcast music alone.
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addition" to those currently collected by the APRA. 341 Both business and
copyright owners endorsed such a proposal as having practical advantages over
342 Not surprisingly,
the collection of separate royalties from business owners.343

the broadcasting industry strongly opposed this proposal.
Although the Committee found the broadcaster licensing proposal
superficially appealing, it ultimately rejected it on the ground that "there are

significant legal, practical and philosophical barriers to its implementation that

would be difficult to overcome."'344 In particular, the Committee reasoned that
"if anyone is to be paying license fees for public performance[s], it should be
345
the person who is causing the public performance rather than a third party.
The Committee concluded that the proposal would violate neither Berne nor
TRIPs, 346 provided that music copyright owners received an additional royalty
347
from broadcasters.
341The APRA estimated that it collected approximately two million Australian dollars

annually from the playing of radios and televisions, -with the royalties divided equally
among each media. See id. at 71-72. It also estimated that adding one million dollars to the
fees currently paid by broadcasters would increase their licensing rates by seven to eight
percent. See id.
342 See id. at 71. Although the report does not discuss these advantages, they clearly
include significant transaction cost savings for copyright owners. The proposed licensing
system would no longer require APRA to engage in the time-consuming and expensive
process of collecting royalties from the thousands of individual businesses throughout
Australia.
343Commercial stations objected that they would not necessarily be able to pass on the
royalties to their advertisers given the competitive market for advertising; community and
public broadcasters argued that they would not be able to absorb the costs without additional
government or public funding. Both groups argued that it would be "impossible to establish
a fair method of setting an amount for collection and then dividing this amount amongst
different broadcasters." Id. at 77. Finally, they asserted that it would be unfair to expect
either broadcasters or advertisers to pay for a commercial benefit received by small
businesses who performed broadcast music for their customers or employees. See id. at 7678.
4 Id. at 93. The most significant legal barrier addressed was the likelihood that the
proposed licensing system would create an unconstitutional tax on broadcasters. See id. at
80-83.
341 Id. at 93.

346 Canadian copyright law contains a broadcaster licensing system similar to that
proposed by the ARPA. However, Canadian PROs do not currently receive license fees for
the performances of music by commercial establishments. See infra text accompanying
notes 363-65. The Committee's report suggested that the Canadian law violates TRIPs. See
Don't Stop the Music, supra note 331, at 83.
14'The Committee cited the views of professors Rothnie and Lahore, who argued that
Article 1Ibis of the Berne Convention requires only that copyright owners be paid equitable
does not stipulate that the
remuneration for the secondary use of broadcast music; "[i]t
person making the payment must be the person responsible for bringing about the public
performance." Id. at 83. However, the professors cautioned that a treaty breach was likely

HeinOnline -- 80 B.U. L. Rev. 174 2000

2000]

FAIRNESS IN MUSIC LICENSING ACT

The report considered two other proposals, one of which it adopted. The
first proposal involved modifying the Copyright Act to define "public
performance" in a way that excluded certain performances on business
premises from music copyright owners' licensing powers. The Committee
rejected this proposal on the ground that the Berne Convention did not provide
sufficient discretion for Australia to introduce such a "restrictive definition of
public performance." 348

The Committee also feared that the EC would

349
challenge such a definition before the WTO.
In its third and final proposal, the Committee urged the APRA to voluntarily
issue complimentary licenses to small businesses whose employees play
broadcast music. Although the Committee acknowledged that these businesses
might gain some indirect financial benefit from this exemption, it considered
that benefit too remote when weighed against the "compelling practical and
philosophical arguments in favour of relaxing the licensing requirements. '350
After consultation with the Committee, the APRA agreed to issue such
complimentary licenses provided that: (1) the performance occurred by radio
or television set; (2) the business employed fewer than twenty people and (3)
the music was not intended to be heard by customers of the business or by the
general public.35 1 The third requirement is satisfied only if "neither the radio
or television set nor any speakers are located in an area that is accessible to
customers or the general public and any performance inadvertently heard by
'352
customers or the general public is manifestly unintentional.
The Committee hailed this solution as a compromise that alleviated the
concerns of many small businesses while complying with Australia's
international obligations. 353 It also asserted that music copyright owners'
interests were protected, inasmuch as the APRA had already voluntarily
refrained from seeking royalties from many small businesses using music in
this way. 354 Finally, the Committee stated that it would monitor this

if Parliament created an exemption for small businesses without ensuring that copyright
owners collected additional license fees from broadcasters. See id. The Attorney-General
concurred in this view, stating that "there would need to be appropriate mechanisms in place
to ensure that copyright owners were in fact equitably remunerated by broadcasters for the
public performance of their works." Id. at 84.
341Id. at 85.
349The report noted the EC's reference to the legal situation in Australia as "the most
important matter for concern, since there is a serious risk that this country may introduce
legislation inspired by section 110(5) of the United States Copyright Act." See id. at 88
(citing Examination Procedure, supra note 158, at 33).
350

Id. at 68.

"' See id. at 91.
352 Id. Several examples contained in the report make clear that the complimentary
license would be granted even if a radio or television set was located "behind the counter"
where it could incidentally be heard by customers. See id. at 91-93.
...See id. at 10.
114 See id. at 53, 68-69.
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complementary licensing system and reserve the right to introduce a legislative
355
solution if the policy did not succeed.

Developments in Australia are highly favorable to the EC's complaint
against the United States. Facing a situation remarkably similar to that which
existed in the United States during the same time period, the Australian
government compromised the competing interests of the businesses and music
copyright industries by urging the adoption of a voluntary licensing system far
narrower than either the FIMLA or the homestyle exemption. It also asserted
that a broader exemption would violate international copyright norms.
Canada. The situation in Canada is somewhat more favorable to the United
States. In 1938, the Canadian Parliament exempted businesses from paying
royalties for broadcast and recorded music in response to a public perception
that PROs were abusing their licensing powers. 35 6 At that time, courts in
several Berne member States, including those in Europe, did not consider the
reception of a radio broadcast as a public performance. 357 However, at least

one Canadian court had concluded that such a reception was a public
performance, 358 which motivated the Parliament explicitly to exempt such
performances in the following language:
In respect of public performances by means of any radio receiving set or
gramophone 359 in any place other than a theatre that is ordinarily and
regularly used for entertainments to which an admission charge is made,
no royalties shall be collectable from the owner or user of the radio
receiving set, but the Copyright Appeal Board shall, in so far as possible,
provide for the collection in advance from radio broadcasting stations or
gramaphone manufacturers, as the case may be, of fees, charges and
royalties appropriate to the conditions produced by the provisions of this
subsection and shall fix the amount of the same; in doing so the Board
shall take into account all expenses of collection and other outlays, if any,
355 See id. at 94. In commentary on the report, the Attorney General characterized the
report as "a win-win outcome" for small businesses and music copyright owners. See
Attorney General News Release, Report on Playing Music in Small Businesses (visited June
1, 1998) <http://law.gov.au/aghome/agnews/1 998newsag/424_98.htm>.
356 See MAGNUSSON & NABHAN, supra note 286, at 123 & 133 n.42 (noting that Canada
adopted the exemption because of "a widespread public perception of unfairness and
unreasonableness"); see also Don't Stop the Music, supra note 331, at 72 (noting this
rationale when analyzing Canadian Copyright Act as possible precedent for revisions to
Australian copyright law).
157 See MAGNUSSON & NABHAN, supra note 286, at 132 n.33, 136 n.63
358 See Canadian Performing Rights Society v. FordHotel, [1935] 2 D.L.R. 391, 396-97

(holding that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's copyright by allowing songs to be
performed without the plaintiffs consent),
359 In 1993, the Parliament eliminated the exemption's application to performances by
gramophone to comply with Canada's obligations under the North American Free Trade
Agreement. See An Act to Implement the North American Free Trade Agreement, R.S.C.,
ch. 44, §73 (1993) (Can.).
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saved or savable by, for or on behalf of the owner of the copyright or
performing right concerned or his agents, in consequence this
subsection.

360

Several features of this law are noteworthy. First, the exemption applies to
businesses using broadcast music for expressly commercial purposes,
including business who collect a direct charge from customers to hear the
broadcast. Second, judicial decisions have construed the statute to apply even
to "fairly elaborate installations of ...radio receiving equipment involving
multiple speakers. ' 361 Third, these judicial decisions have also characterized
the exemption as "absolute, unqualified and unconditional" in making the
362
public performances it embraces lawful and non-infringing.
The last requirement is particularly significant given the way in which
Canada has implemented the exemption. After the statute was adopted in
1938, the Canadian Copyright Board attempted to implement the new law by
setting a tariff for broadcasters that took into account secondary uses of
broadcast music. The Board had considerable difficulty in fixing an
appropriate fee, however, in part because of a lack of information concerning
the number of exempted radio receiving sets used by businesses across
Canada. 363 Between 1939 and 1941, the Board authorized the Canadian
Performing Rights Society to collect $1000 per year from broadcasters, but for
reasons that commentators have not been able to ascertain, the Society
abandoned collection of that fee shortly thereafter. 364 No royalties have been
paid to music copyright owners under this section of the statute since 1957 at
365
the latest.
In the years since the exemption was first enacted, several government and
expert reports have analyzed this statute. In a 1957 study, a government
commission recommended that the exemption be retained, arguing that. it
protected performances of radio broadcasts that "are essentially private" even
if members of the public incidentally hear them. 366 Subsequent reports were

360 See Canadian Copyright Act, § 50(7) (emphasis added), reprinted in A.A. Keyes & C.
Brunet, Copyright in Canada: Proposals for a Revision of the Law 157 (1977). In 1985,
section 50(7) was renumbered as section 69(2). See R.S.C., ch. C-42, § 69(2) (1985) (Can.);
R.S.C., c. 10 (1985) (4th Supp.) (Can.).
361 MAGNUSSON & NABHAN, supra note 286, at 117-18 & n.9. The exemption does not,
however, apply to "wired music systems" such as Muzak. See id. at 118.
362 See, e.g., Vigneux v. Canadian Performing Rights Society, [1945] 2 D.L.R. 1, 10
(P.C.) (holding that no fee should be collected from owners of radios).
363 See Don't Stop the Music, supra note 331, at 75 (quoting 1939 decision by Canadian
Copyright Board).

'64See id.
365 See id. at 74 (stating this result based on inquiry to Canadian Copyright Board); see
also Keyes & Brunet, supra note 360, at 160.
366 Royal Commission on Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Industrial Design,
Report on Copyright 29 (1957).
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far more critical, however. For example, a 1977 study, after stating that the
law deprived copyright owners of any remuneration for in-store performances
and was inconsistent with the Berne Convention's principles, recommended
67
that the exemption be limited to business with three or fewer employees.
I A 1982 study provided the most detailed critique of the statute. The study
found that the "double dipping" argument would have "considerable logical
force" if evidence showed that license fees collected from broadcasters
accurately correlated to the size of the listening audience. The study noted,
however, that audience measurement services may not accurately account for
the audiences tuned to in-store performances, that in-store audiences "may not
be regarded as very valuable to advertisers" and that the performance royalties
collected from non-commercial broadcasting may not be calculated based on
audience size.

368

Without resolving these empirical questions, the study noted a distributional
objection to the double dipping argument. Even assuming that the royalties
paid by radio broadcasters accurately reflect the size of the listening audience,
the burden of those royalties do not fall on those who exploit them. For this
reason, a "fairer system" would permit representatives of music copyright
owners to receive royalties from broadcasters only for "private and domestic
369
use" and collect a second set of royalties from commercial establishments.
With respect to market failures, the study reasoned that although the cost of
collecting license fees for in-store performances was high, PROs would seek
such fees even from small businesses whenever they could obtain any net
increase in revenue above those costs. However, the study questioned whether
it was "in the public interest that scarce resources be squandered in the
collection of these fees" and that some exemption might therefore be justified
3' 70
"to prevent [such] waste from occurring.
Based on these considerations, the 1982 report encouraged the Canadian
Parliament to adopt a statute similar to the United States homestyle exemption.
The proposed law would apply only if the performances were "directed
primarily at the proprietors, operators and employees" of the establishment
using home-type audio or video receivers and were not further transmitted to
the public. 371 Nor would the law exempt performances used directly or
indirectly to enhance the profitability of a business. 372 However, the proposal
367 See Keyes & Brunet, supra note 360, at 161 (suggesting that Canada is in violation of
the treaty). In 1998, the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee also
suggested this conclusion. See Don't Stop the Music, supra note 331, at 75-76 ("With no
royalties currently being paid for the public performance of music played on the radio, there
is an issue as to whether Canada is fulfilling its obligations under TRIPs.").

368 MAGNUSSON

& NABHAN, supra note 286, at 120-2 1.

Id. at 121.
310Id.at 122.
371 Id. at 128.
372 See id.(explaining that the exemption would be vitiated if the business charged a fee
369
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did not limit the type of copyrighted works eligible for the exemption and,
unlike the United States homestyle exemption, it applied to in-store
performances of audio and video tapes. 373 According to the authors, this
narrower exemption would not violate Canada's obligations under the Berne
374
Convention.

The final attempt to repeal section 69(2) occurred in 1993 and was defeated
in a legislative committee. 375 As a result, Canadian copyright law currently
contains an exemption for broadcast music far broader than that created by
either the FIMLA or the homestyle exemption. As the foregoing discussion

reveals, however, not only is the exemption not operating as originally
intended, but studies have encouraged its restriction or elimination, and some
commentators have characterized the statute as being in violation of both the
376
Berne Convention and TRIPs.

377
Japan. Japan maintains its own version of the homestyle exemption.
Article 38(3) of the Copyright Act of 1970 provides that:

It shall be permissible to communicate publicly, by means of a receiving
apparatus, a work already broadcast or diffused by wire, for non-profitmaking purposes and without charging any fees to audience or spectators.
The same shall apply to such public communication made by means of a
378
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes.

for or advertised the performance to the public).
173 See id. at 124-25.
114 See id. at 126-27. However, the authors addressed the compatibility issue under the

1928 Rome version of the Berne Convention.

As noted above, the distinct right to

communicate a work to the public by loudspeaker set forth in article I lbis(l)(iii) was not
adopted by Beme member states until the Brussels revision of the Convention in 1948. See
supra Part III.B. Canada did not become a party to this more recent version of the treaty
until 1994. See David Vaver, Canada §1 [2], in I INT'L COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 227, at
CAN- 1l. Thus, Canada enjoyed far greater leeway to adopt exemptions for the secondary
use of broadcast music. See id.
371 See Section 6, Bill C-88, An Act to Amend the Copyright Act, Third Sess. 34th Parl.,
40-42 Eliz. 11 (1993). In addition, a 1984 government study outlined a variety of options for
modifying the exemption, but did not recommend one of these for adoption by Parliament.
See Judy Erola & Francis Fox, From Gutenberg to Telidon, A White Paperon Copyright 4748 (1984).
376 See MAGNUSSON & NABHAN, supra note 286, at 126-27; Don't Stop the Music, supra
note 331, at 83-84.
377 Japan has been a Berne member since 1899. However, it did not ratify the 1948
Brussels Act or the 1971 Paris Act of the Convention until after the enactment of its 1970
copyright law. Japan has also been a WTO and TRIPs member since 1995. See Teruo Doi,
Japan §§ 1[1] & 1[2], in INT'L COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 227, at JAP-5-8.
378 MINPO, article 38(3), Law No. 48 (Japan) (as amended May 6, 1970) translation
available at (visited Dec. 4, 1999) <http://www.cric.or.jp/crice/ecolj/cl.html> (defining
"fees" as including "any kind of charge to be imposed on the offering and the making
available of a work to the public").
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The second sentence of article 38(3) does not make clear whether it exempts
all public communications by homestyle receivers or only those
communications which are not carried out for profit. Furthermore, there are
apparently no judicial decisions interpreting the statute's scope. 37 9 However,
other provisions of the Copyright Act, including a provision exempting certain
public performances of recorded music from a copyright owner's control,
suggest by analogy that at least some secondary uses of broadcast music
carried out for profit are exempted by section 38(3).380 Further, in a statement
relevant to the "normal exploitation" issue, one article recently noted efforts by
Japanese courts to counteract "the still widespread attitude in Japan that
copyright infringements by public performances of music are an elegant and
'38 1
negligible offence, if at all."

Other nations. Research for this Article has not disclosed any other
exemptions in the national copyright laws of other signatories to the Berne and
TRIPs treaties. To the contrary, several national laws or judicial decisions
expressly grant to copyright owners the right to control secondary uses of
broadcast music.

382

379See Doi, supra note 377, § 8[2][-b][v], at JAP-58. Reports from Australia and the
United States conclude that Japan maintains a homestyle exemption closely analogous to
that found in the United States. See Don't Stop the Music, supra note 331, at 67 (noting that
Japan's exemption is broader than Australia's); Final Report, supra note 207, at 529.
380 A supplementary provision of Japanese copyright law exempts "the public
performance of musical works by the use of sound recordings made lawfully, other than
those given by public transmission, and those given by enterprises which use such
recordingsfor the purpose of profit-making and which are defined by Cabinet Order."
Transitory Provisions, Article 14 (1969) (emphasis added), translationavailable at (visited
Dec. 4, 1999) <http://www.cric.or.jp/cric e/ecolj/clsp.html>. According to the Cabinet
Order referred to in Article 14, the following establishments are not exempt from paying
performance license fees for recorded music: "(i) coffee shops and restaurants which
publicize by any means that they offer music to customers, or which are provided with
special equipments for offering music to customers; (ii) cabarets, nightclubs, dance halls and
other similar establishments with dance floors for customers; (iii) enterprises giving public
entertainments accompanied with music, such as theatrical performances, variety shows and
stage dances." Cabinet Order No. 335 (December 10, 1970), translation available at
(visited Dec. 4, 1999) <http://www.cric.or.jp/cric-e/ecolj/clold.html#clold+1l3>. The net
effect of these interlocking provisions is that "ordinary public establishments, such as hotels,
.coffee shops, and pinball parlors, may freely provide recorded background music if they fall
outside these general and specific categories." Doi, supra note 377, § 8[2][a][iv], at JAP57. Article 38(3)'s application to broadcast music in stores appears at least as broad.
381Decisions: Copyright and Design Law: Japan: "Karaoke Snak Bar I1,
", 30 IIC 467,
469 (1999) [hereinafter "Karaoke Snak Bar"].
382See, e.g., Dietz, supra note 329, at GER-108 (citing the German constitutional
guarantee of property and the corresponding mandate of compensation for the author in
situations involving "the continuous performance of music" in public places); Lucas &
Plaisant, supra note 329, at FRA-123-24 (requiring payment to the author for performance
of copyrighted works in all instances except performances within the family circle); see also
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Summary and Evaluation. The overwhelming majority of the 135 TRIPs
member States and 140 Berne signatories do not exempt the secondary use of
broadcast music from copyright owners' licensing powers. Two States do
maintain somewhat narrower exemptions, while a third, Canada, contains a
much broader exemption than that found in the United States Copyright Act.
This "head count" of national laws reveals that the United States is in an
extremely isolated position compared to its intemational copyright colleagues
383
and WTO trading partners.
3.

Step Three-The "Unreasonable Prejudice" Requirement

The final step in the three-step test requires proof that the United States'
licensing legislation does not "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the author." The drafters of Article 9(2) clearly envisioned this step as an
additional requirement upon which national laws might be found incompatible
with the Berne Convention even if the laws survived examination under the
first two steps. The drafters also believed that because any exercise of the
copyright owner's exclusive rights would prejudice her interests to some
degree, only unreasonable prejudice would be proscribed. 384 However, other
than noting that the use of compulsory licenses would mitigate prejudice, the
drafters could not reach agreement on the meaning of "unreasonable
prejudice." 385 As a result, commentators have provided only cursory guidance
to its application, characterizing this phrase as imposing a "flexible standard of
Copyright Act, 1994 (N.Z.) § 32(3), available at (visited Dec. 4, 1999)
Zealand
(New
<http://www.knowledge-basket.co.nz/gpprint/acts/maps/actsc.html>
copyright act noting that copyrighted work can be infringed "by the performance, playing,
or showing of the work in public by means of apparatus for receiving visual images or
sounds conveyed by electronic or other means"); Zambia Copyright and Performance Rights
1999)
1994, § 17(2)(c) & (d), available at (visited Dec. 4,
Act,
<http://lii.zamnet.zm:8000/acts/1994/copyrt94.htm> (granting music copyright owners
control over "broadcasting or inclusion in a cable program service" or "communication to
thc public by any other means").
383 A head count of national copyright laws is only one factor to consider in analyzing
normal exploitation, however. WTO jurists should exercise caution in the early years of the
dispute settlement system when asked to impose a position sanctions by the laws of a
majority of member States against a State that has "not joined in an otherwise broad-based
trend" interpreting the Berne and TRIPs treaties. See Helfer, supra note 29, at 428.
However, statutes such as the FIMLA and the homestyle exemption which are "far outside
of the global mainstream-as demonstrated by a comparative law analysis," bear a
particular heavy burden of justification. Id. at 437.
384 See RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 483-84.
385 See 1978 WIPO Guide, supra note 210, at 56 ("In cases where there would be serious
loss of profit for the copyright owner, the law should provide him with some
compensation."); see also NORDEMANN ET AL, supra note 211, at 109 ( "[T]he interests of
the author always ... have been unreasonably invaded when he can demonstrate a
reasonable interest that this type of exploitation should remain reserved for him or that it
should be permitted only upon payment of a suitable royalty.").
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reasonableness" that is "to be ultimately determined by national law." 386
The EC asserts that the copyright owner's "legitimate interests" refers to the
royalties he or she may expect in return for using the work. It invites WTO
jurists to apply "a rule of reason standard" that requires a ruling in its favor
because the royalty losses created by the exemptions are more than "a
negligible and insignificant fraction of [copyright owners'] income in respect
of the public communication of their works in the United States." 387 To
support this argument, the EC uses an "extrapolation model" which projects
that the homestyle exemption creates a loss to European copyright owners of
388
between $3.8 and $6.9 million per year.
The United States has responded by challenging the EC's statistics as
"failing to account for the majority of relevant factors that determine whether a
right holder would be economically prejudiced" by the exemptions. 38 9 In
particular, the United States argues that the EC has improperly overestimated
the number of commercial establishments from which PROs collected royalties
prior to the passage of the FIMLA. As a result, the United States concludes
that "the EC has not presented a prima facie case that any prejudice suffered
by EC right holders is unreasonable. .".. ,,390 Given the uncertain meaning of
this last step of the three-step test, it is difficult to predict how WTO jurists
will respond to the parties' arguments.
G.

Summarizing the Treaty Arguments and Their Significance
for Future WTO Litigation

The United States must overcome numerous hurdles to prove that its music
licensing laws are compatible with the Berne and TRIPs treaties. The text of
the treaties, their objectives, the practice of other signatory nations and, in
some instances, the drafting history and writings of commentators all strongly
suggest that the United States cannot overcome these hurdles. A ruling against
the United States thus appears to be imminent.
386 RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 484.

See also STEWART, supra note 216, at 80

("[E]ach member country has to decide what the legitimate interests of the author are [and]
whether the prejudice of these interests, which is inevitable, is reasonable or
unreasonable.").
387 Examination Procedure,supra note 158, at 18.
388 See id. at 29-30. This figure is equal to between 13 percent and 24 percent of the
remittances received from United States PROs. See id. To calculate this royalty loss, the
EC's extrapolation model first estimates the number of businesses exempted by United
States law. It then calculates the lost royalties by applying a hypothetical license fee equal
to the average fee PROs now charge such businesses for performing recorded music.
Finally, the model estimates the EC's share of those lost royalties based on the United States
PROs' annual royalty distributions to PROs within the EC. See id. at 24-30. Since the
passage of the FIMLA, the EC has recalculated the total royalty losses to be $30.3 million
per year. See supra note 19.
389 First U.S. Submission, supranote 7, at 18.
390

Id. at 19.
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Although the United States is likely to lose the FIMLA dispute, it is
uncertain whether the WTO panel and Appellate Body will analyze United
States laws under the three-step test. Precisely because the test is ambiguous
and its proper interpretation contested, WTO jurists should decide the case on
the narrowest possible grounds and decline to evaluate the United States laws
under that standard. 391 Such a narrow resolution of the FIMLA dispute would
provide only weak predictive value for future WTO litigation over copyright
limitations and exceptions. It would also defer resolution of the most

controversial and unsettled questions of treaty interpretation identified above,
allowing member States additional time to harmonize their national laws in
392
light of recently adopted international treaty standards.
It is equally plausible, however, that WTO jurists will reach the three-step
test, either because the parties have raised it393 or because the jurists wish to
For an argument that nascent dispute settlement bodies should resolve cases on
narrow grounds and develop their jurisprudence incrementally to earn the trust of States
parties, see Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 367 (1997); see also Heifer, supra note 29,
at 438 (encouraging WTO jurists to "[proceed] cautiously and incrementally" when
interpreting copyright exceptions and limitations clauses).
392TRIPs was adopted in 1994 and entered into force for industrialized nations on
January 1, 1996. For nations with developing and transitional economies, however, most of
TRIPs' substantive provisions do not become binding until 2000 or 2006. See TRIPs, supra
note 16, arts. 65(1) & 66; Helfer, supra note 29, at 377 (outlining implementation timetable
for TRIPs signatories). Deferring a ruling on controversial questions of treaty interpretation
will also allow additional time to clarify the relationship between TRIPs and the WIPO
Copyright Treaty. Commentators have argued that the latter treaty restores much of the
discretion that national decisionmakers arguably lost in the TRIPs Agreement through the
adoption of the three-step test in TRIPs article 13. See supra Part III.C. Commentators
have also noted, however, that the relationship between the two treaties will remain murky
until the WIPO Copyright Treaty enters into force. See, e.g., Netanel, The Next Round,
supra note 32, at 467-75.
313 A conflicting record is emerging regarding whether WTO dispute settlement bodies
are resolving disputes on narrow grounds that allow member States the discretion to balance
free trade against other social objectives, including labor rights, environmental protection,
national culture and a balanced regime of intellectual property protection. Several recent
cases suggest that WTO jurists are giving free trade norms undue primacy over these
equally crucial societal interests and are reaching to decide legal questions in favor of
member nations complaining of treaty violations. See, e.g., Chi Carmody, When "Cultural
Identity Was Not At Issue": Thinking About Canada-Certain Measures Concerning
Periodicals,30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 231, 239 (1999) (predicting that "future panels
will view the Uruguay Round results strictly through an economic prism, meaning that there
is apparently little room to evaluate the cultural content of goods and services or the distinct
cultural purposes motivating certain laws") (footnote omitted); Steve Charnovitz, The World
Trade Organization, Meat Hormones, and Food Safety, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1781,
1785 (Oct. 15, 1997) (criticizing a panel decision as "bludgeon[ing]" the losing party and
reaching to decide issues at the contested intersection between trade and health law
unnecessary to resolve the dispute).
391

HeinOnline -- 80 B.U. L. Rev. 183 2000

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:93

provide guidance for States to interpret the test in future dispute settlement
proceedings. 394 If the jurists choose this route, they will create a new
jurisprudential gloss against which to judge whether the myriad exceptions and
limitations in national copyright laws are permissible under the treaty. Given
the cumulative strictures of the three-step test, that gloss is unlikely to favor
countries seeking to preserve balanced intellectual property regimes tailored to
suit local needs and conditions. 395 The approach is particularly unlikely to
favor the United States, whose open-textured fair use doctrine is suspect under
396
the three-step test and ripe for WTO challenge.
Other decisions, by contrast, reflect a more circumspect approach and appear to grasp the
virtues of deciding disputes on the narrowest or least controversial grounds to minimize the
politically charged nature of the controversy and to encourage defending states to implement
it. Compare J.H. Reichman, Securing Compliance with the TRIPs Agreement After U.S. v.
India, I J. INT'L EcON. L.J. 585, 594-95, 596 (1998) (arguing that the WTO Appellate
Body's first TRIPs decision endorsed a "cautious, strict constructionist approach" that
"reinforce[s] the residual power of states to forge their own intellectual property laws and
policies") with Geller, International Copyright, supra note 227, § 5[5][b][ii] at INT201("strict construction" of first TRIPs decision may not apply to incorporated Berne
articles). See also Charnovitz, supra, at 1785 ("When a panel finds a health or
environmental measure in violation of WTO rules, the panel should decide the case on the
narrowest possible ground. A panel should seek to nudge the violator into compliance.").
'9' See Serge Frechette, Performance of the System III: Appellate Body, 32 INT'L
LAw.747, 748 (1998) ("In some cases, the [WTO] Appellate Body has provided clear and
concise explanations for its conclusions; in others, it has not."); Daniel Pruzin, WTO
Decision On EU Beef Imports To Have Impact Beyond Hormones, 15 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 142 (Jan. 28, 1998) (stating that member States attach particular importance to
recent WTO rulings when predicting outcomes of other disputes relating to the same treaty).
'9' For commentators advocating such balanced regimes, see, e.g., Dreyfuss &
Lowenfeld, supra note 235, at 300-07 (highlighting different ways that States might deal
with copyright issues and urging deference to local solutions); Heifer, supra note 29, at 414
("Some deference to national decisionmakers will thus be essential if TRIPs jurists are to
avoid unduly straining the dispute settlement system's authority and legitimacy."); Neil W.
Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 217, 222 (1998) ("Copyrights' constitutive value for democratic development depends
heavily on local circumstances."); J.H. Riechman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers:
Global Competition Under the TRIPs Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L & POL. 11 (1997)
(urging a pro-competitive strategy for implementing the TRIPs agreement whereby nations,
especially developing ones, would be granted significant latitudes to account for local
conditions).
396 See Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 235, at 306 (questioning the compatibility of
the United States fair use doctrine with seemingly narrower TRIPs exceptions); Paul
Edward Geller, Can the GATT IncorporateBerne Whole?, 12 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 423,
425 (1990) (noting likelihood that United States fair use doctrine will be found to be in
violation of TRIPs). See also Tyler G. Newby, Note, What's Fair Here is Not Fair
Everywhere: Does the American Fair Use Doctrine Violate InternationalCopyright Law, 51
STAN. L. REV.1633, 1648 (1999) (expressing concern over whether the United States fair
use doctrine is compatible with article 13's three-part test).

HeinOnline -- 80 B.U. L. Rev. 184 2000

2000]

FAIRNESS IN MUSIC LICENSING ACT

For these reasons, the United States would be prudent to settle the FIMLA
dispute before WTO jurists issue a definitive ruling. If it does not, the EC may
seek to impose sanctions against the United States, possibly by withholding
remittances to United States PROs in an amount equal to the royalty losses to
foreign copyright owners generated by the treaty-incompatible licensing
laws. 397 Thus, whether the United States settles the dispute or instead chooses
to litigate the case to a final ruling by the Appellate Body, Congress will soon
need to consider revising the Copyright Act to bring the statute into
compliance with United States treaty obligations.
IV.

SOLUTIONS TO THE FIMLA DISPUTE: ENCOURAGING PRIVATE

AGREEMENT WHILE COMPLYING WITH THE BERNE AND

TRIPS

TREATIES

If WTO jurists rule in favor of the EC, the United States will face the
politically sensitive task of deciding whether and how to revise its copyright
laws to conform to the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement. This Part
begins by dismissing on political and pragmatic grounds two alternative
solutions to the FIMLA dispute-abolishing the licensing exemption solely for
music of foreign origin and requiring broadcasters to pay for in-store
performances. It then draws upon and extends the economic efficiency
arguments developed in Part I, together with the historical precedents
discussed in Part II and the international law arguments developed in Part III,
to identify and defend a legislative reform option that is both compatible with
United States' treaty obligations and that encourages copyright owners and
copyright users to reach an efficient private agreement to resolve the dispute
over licensing secondary uses of broadcast music.
A.

Repeal the FIMLA and Homestyle Exemptions for Foreign Music Only
The United States could comply with an adverse WTO ruling by repealing

the FIMLA and homestyle exemptions, but only for copyrighted music whose
country of origin is other Berne or TRIPs member States. Because neither
treaty compels governments to provide copyright protection to the works of its
own nationals, the United States could adopt a dual copyright system, retaining

the FIMLA for all copyrighted music whose country of origin is the United
States, while repealing the statute for all musical works that originate from
other Berne or TRIPs signatories.3 98

Although this foreign-domestic

distinction is unassailable from the

117 For a discussion of the Berne-compatibility of retaliatory measures relating to a
TRIPs copyright dispute, see Geller, International Copyright, supra note 227, § 5[5][b][ii]

at INT-203.
398 See, e.g., NORDEMANN ET AL, supra note 211, at 21 ; STERLING, supra note 237, at 460.
As noted above, the Berne Convention contains complex rules for determining the works to
which it applies. There is no dispute, however, that for the United States the Convention
would not apply to works first published in the United States. See Final Report, supra note
207, at 5.
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perspective of the United States' treaty obligations, it is highly dubious as a
political and practical matter. First, the Copyright Act's exclusive rights and
exemptions provisions have treated foreign and domestic copyrighted works
identically since the United States first became a Berne signatory. 399 Other
400
State parties have followed the same approach.
The reason for this de facto equal treatment is obvious: it is "politically
difficult to grant rights to foreigners but not to nationals." 40' If United States
PROs and American songwriters, lyricists and music publishers failed, when
opposing the FIMLA, to muster sufficient political support to protect their
interests over those of restaurants, bars and small businesses, they are unlikely

to do so solely for foreign (and non-voting) music copyright owners.40 2 This is
so even though, under this proposal, foreign PROs will likely remit more
money to United States copyright owners for secondary uses of broadcast
music in foreign countries than United States PROs will remit to foreign
owners whose works are played in bars, restaurants and retail stores in this
403
country.

Numerous practical problems would also plague a foreign-domestic
exemption distinction. First, businesses tuning in to radio, television and cable
broadcasts or transmissions cannot readily distinguish between foreign and
domestic music nor can they exercise perfect control over the content of the
music transmitted in their establishments. 4°4 A statute that exempted only
'9' See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106 (1994 & Supp. 1995), 106A (1994), 107 (1994), 110 (1994 &
Supp. 1999); see also Scott M. Martin, The Berne Convention and the U.S. Compulsory
License ForJukeboxes: Why the Song Could Not Remain the Same, 37 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 262, 299-300 (1990) (noting that Berne implementing legislation "does not include a
two-tiered structure" for juke box performance rights). Only a few provisions of United
States law apply more favorable rules to foreign works. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104A (1994
& Supp. 1998) (restored works of foreign origin); § 411 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (registration).
400 See, e.g., RICKETSON, supra note 211, at 206 ("[E]ach Union country will usually...
grant identical protection both to its own authors and to Union authors."); David Vaver, The
National Treatment Requirements of the Berne and Universal Copyright Conventions, 17
IIC 577, 586 (1986) (explaining that although Berne minimum standards only apply to
foreigners, in practice states grant the same rights to nationals).
401 Geller, International Copyright, supra note 227, § 2[3][b] at INT-39. See also
NORDEMANN ET AL, supra note 211, at 72 ("[N]o country has any rational interest in placing
foreigners in a better position than its own citizens.").
402 Indeed, those politicians favoring a repeal of the FIMLA stress the harm that it causes
to American composers, lyricists, and music publishers. See Schumer, supra note 195; E.
Scott Johnson, Law Gives Copyrights New Life, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 8, 1999, at C12.
403 Cf. 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 68 (letter of Robert L. Stoll, U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office) (noting that United States music copyright owners received a net surplus
of $300 million in royalty remittances in 1996 from foreign PROs attributable to all types of
performances of works).
404 Cf. U.S. Copyright Office, Implementing Legislation to Permit U.S. Adherence to the
Berne Convention: A Draft Discussion Bill & Commentary, 10 Colum.-VLA J. L. & the
Arts 621, 631 (1986) ("[T]here must be a unitary system with respect to juke box rights,
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domestic music would thus require PROs to devise a method to measure when
businesses with highly diverse music needs perform non-exempt foreign music
as opposed to free domestic music. 40 5 Such a measurement system-which is
likely to be inaccurate, unpopular with users and subject to abuse by
licensees-would increase significantly the transaction costs of licensing and
enforcement. In addition, PROs are likely to face pressure from businesses that
do perform foreign music to adopt a "mini-blanket license" for all foreign
works in their repertories or a royalty scheme based on the actual use of
foreign works. Both of these systems would be far more cumbersome and
40 6
expensive to administer that the traditional blanket license.
B.

Mandate Broadcastersto Payfor Secondary Uses of BroadcastMusic

A second way for Congress to satisfy the United States' treaty obligations is
by requiring radio, television and cable stations to pay for the secondary uses
of broadcast music by commercial establishments. Under this system, PROs
would charge broadcasters a license fee in addition to the fee they currently

since it would be unduly burdensome to all concerned if a juke box proprietor could avail
himself of a compulsory license for works of U.S. origin but had to negotiate a license for
foreign works.").
405For purposes of distributing royalties to their members, PROs use statistical sampling
and surveys to determine which selections from their repertories have been performed by
radio, television, and cable stations and with what frequency. See KOHN & KOHN, supra
note 4, at 883. No effort is made to sample secondary uses of broadcast music, however, on
the "assumption that the music being performed over the radio and television is roughly the
same as the music being performed in cafes, hotels, sports arenas, and restaurants, and
nightclubs." Id. That assumption would no longer hold under a system in which
commercial establishments have an incentive to perform music that does not require a
license. Thus, PROs would need to establish a separate system to monitor secondary uses of
broadcast music. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Moor-Law, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 758, 769-770
n.16 (D. Del. 1981) (dismissing proposal to create a performance license fee tailored to a
nightclub's use of only specific styles of music because proposal would require establishing
a system to monitor use and nightclub would have an incentive to manipulate the system to
reduce license fees), aff'd, 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982).
4 The early and influential court decision in the Moor-Law, Inc. case rejected a
proposal for a use-based system or a "mini" blanket license for businesses seeking to
perform only certain styles of music on precisely this ground. See id. at 768 (explaining that
such licenses would "necessarily cost more to administer than the full repertory license '
because they "involve categorization costs, additional policing costs, and the costs of
resolving, and of attempting to avoid, disputes over the scope of the license"). A dual
system might also harm foreign copyright owners in another way. Because commercial
establishments under a dual system would have an interest in playing only domestic music
and because broadcasters are aware that their advertising revenues are enhanced by the size
of the listening audience, some radio stations might specialize in broadcasting only domestic
music and encouraging businesses to "tune in for free." Were such a system to become
widespread, the royalties paid to foreign music copyright owners for in-store performances
would diminish sharply.
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collect to compensate copyright owners for performances of broadcast music
by bars, restaurants and retail stores. This additional fee would satisfy the
Berne and TRIPs requirement that copyright owners receive, at a minimum,
"equitable remuneration" for secondary uses of broadcast music. 40 7 Having
collected royalties from broadcasters, PROs would then be barred from
collecting any additional royalties from commercial establishments for the
secondary performances.
At first blush, this "broadcaster pays" proposal appears to create significant
efficiency gains. In particular, it removes the significant transaction costs
associated with negotiating, monitoring and enforcing license agreements for
thousands of dispersed (and often resistant) commercial establishments and
shifts those costs to more concentrated cable and broadcast networks and
stations. Because these entities already negotiate with PROs for performance
licenses on an industry-wide basis 40 8 and because their high-profile use of
music constrains them from free riding without being noticed by PROs,
consolidating licensing at the broadcaster-cable level at first appears more
cost-efficient than a system compelling PROs to devote resources to licensing
myriad secondary users of broadcast music. 40 9 Indeed, this proposal would
effectively eliminate the market failure problem for end-user licensees since
410
there would be no more market to license.
Upon closer scrutiny, however, the transaction costs savings of a
"broadcaster pays" proposal are far from clear. Although such a system would
preclude PROs from licensing secondary uses of broadcast music from
commercial establishments, it would not bar them from licensing businesses
that perform recorded or live music. Thus, for businesses with omnivorous

music needs, transaction cost savings would be negligible or nonexistent.
More importantly, the freedom from PRO supervision created by a
"broadcaster pays" proposal gives commercial establishments a strong

407

Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. I lbis(2). As noted above, the treaties do not

specify from whom equitable remuneration must be paid.
408 See, e.g., Besen et al., supra note 55, at 399 & n.59 (providing example of PRO and
industry-wide radio, television station and network licensing fee agreements).
409See Don't Stop the Music, supra note 331, at 71 (suggesting this conclusion);
MAGNUSSON & NABHAN, supra note 286, at 122 (noting inefficiencies of charging licensing
fees to broadcast receivers). In addition, to the extent that this proposal requires PROs to
negotiate with copyright users possessing greater bargaining power, it may reduce the PROs
monopoly pricing power. See United States v. ASCAP (In re Turner Broadcasting, Inc.)
782 F. Supp. 778, 790 (S.D.N.Y 1991) aff'd 136 F.2d 21 (2nd Cir. 1992) (adopting this
rationale as a justification for requiring PROs to negotiate with cable and broadcast
networks rather than with each affiliated station).
410 For example, the proposal would allow PROs to collect from broadcasters licensing
fees that reflect all secondary uses of broadcast music, including uses by small businesses
with homestyle equipment whose use of music was never licensed because of high
transaction costs. See Korman, supra note 127, at 528 n.32.
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incentive to switch secretly, from broadcast music to recorded music, 4 11 a
performance medium that allows them to exert greater control over customer
and employee behavior. 4 12 The risk of such infringing activity and the
associated diminution in licensing royalties would deter PROs from cutting
back on their monitoring and enforcement of commercial establishments,
thereby significantly reducing the transaction costs savings of any "broadcaster

pays" system.
Even assuming that a "broadcaster pays" solution to the FIMNLA dispute is
efficient, its distributional consequences may preclude Congress from adopting
it. The proposal has the unusual characteristic of requiring entities other than
the commercial establishments that receive financial benefits from the
performance of music to pay for its exploitation. Determining which parties
ultimately pay for in-store performances will depend on hard to quantify
empirical data concerning the competitiveness of the broadcast industry and
the substitution incentives for stores who now pay to perform recorded music
4 13
or purchase background music services.

For example, if the market for advertising is highly competitive,
broadcasters will be unable to pass along to advertisers the additional license
fees and will be forced to pay the royalties themselves. 414 This is likely to
generate significant rent seeking by broadcasters in an effort to prevent
Congress from adopting the proposal. However, even if advertisers are
compelled to take on a share of the new royalties (a prospect that will depend
in part on whether more businesses tune in to "free" broadcast music and

411 See Examination Procedure, supra note 158, at 31 n.37 (arguing that the homestyle
audio technology allows commercial establishments to shirk their licensing obligations by
switching from exempt broadcast music to licensable recorded music, thereby reducing PRO
royalties).
412 See Milliman, supra note 272, at 90-91.
413 See Wilk, supra note 165, at 839 (noting absence of empirical studies of alternative
licensing models for secondary uses of broadcast music and arguing that because costs and
benefits "are indirect, fleeting, and often indistinguishable from other costs, it is unlikely
that comprehensive studies of the subject will be definitive"). Cf Lewis Kurlantzick &
Jacqueline E. Pennino, The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 and the Formation of
Copyright Policy, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 497, 508-15 (1998) (identifying numerous
and conflicting variables associated with quantifying the economic impact of home
recording and the effect of imposing a levy on the sale of recording equipment and blank
tapes). See also supra note 295 and accompanying text (identifying variables affecting
whether increase in size of broadcast audience will occur if secondary uses of broadcast
music are exempted from PRO licensing powers).
414 In a perfectly competitive market, radio, television or cable operators will be unable
to absorb these fees and may thus go out of business or broadcast less copyrighted music to
the public. If this occurs, one of the core objectives of the Copyright Act-maximizing the
distribution of works to the public-would be undermined. See Twentieth Century Music
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (balancing creators' rights against greater goal of
"1promoting broad public availability of literature, music, and the other arts").
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thereby increase the number of listeners and viewers hearing their
commercials), producers of the advertised goods and services, or the
consumers who purchase them, will ultimately bear the financial burden of
415
increased broadcaster royalties.
These same distributional inequities prompted the Australian Parliamentary
Committee to recommend against adopting a "broadcaster pays" proposal and
motivated Canadian copyright commentators to urge the abolition of Canada's
moribund "broadcaster pays" system. 416 Thus, even if a "broadcaster pays"

system creates some efficiency gains, they are unlikely to overcome the
political opposition created by the distributional effects of such a system,
4 17
making the political feasibility of the proposal dubious at best.
415

See MAGNUSSON & NABHAN, supra note 286, at 121 (noting that "indirectly at least"

the burden will fall "on the purchasers of goods and services from the advertisers who pay
the broadcaster to advertise"). Note that these consumers may not be the same ones who
pay marginally more to eat, drink or shop in establishments that play broadcast music. The
extent to which the royalties will be paid by consumers, rather than producers, will depend
on the shape of the relevant demand and supply curves for the goods and services in
question. See PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, EcONOMics 60-66 (16th ed.
1996).
416 See Don't Stop the Music, supra note 331, at xxi, 78-79 (listing reasons why the
Australian committee opposed a "broadcaster pays" system); MAGNUSSON & NABHAN,
supra note 286, at 122-26 (listing inefficiencies of current Canadian system and
recommending modifications).
117 The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (1994) (hereinafter
AHRA) imposes a two percent levy on the sale of digital recording equipment and a three
percent levy on the sale of blank audio tapes to offset the economic losses allegedly created
by private home taping. See § 1004(a)(l) (1994); § 1004(b). As two commentators argued
in a recent article criticizing Congress' decision to adopt this royalty scheme, the AHRA
creates significant distributional inequities and "violates the common precept that those who
obtain a product or service ought to be the ones who pay for it." Kurlantzick & Pennino,
supra note 413, at 523. In particular, the statute forces recording equipment and blank tape
purchasers who do not record copyrighted music to subsidize the activities of consumers
who make such recordings. See id. at 522 (indicating that the "levy burdens all those who
purchase blank audio tape an audio recording equipment irrespective of [their] actual use").
Although Congress adopted the AHRA notwithstanding its distributional consequences,
there are several reasons to believe that the distributional consequences of a "broadcaster
pays" resolution to the FIMLA dispute will encounter far more significant political
roadblocks. First, political opposition to the AHRA levy system diminished only after
recording equipment manufacturers agreed to support the legislation. See id. at 500-01.
They did so in part to settle a lawsuit brought by music copyright owners claiming that the
sale of the recording equipment and tapes made manufacturers liable for home taping as
contributory infringers. See id. at 500 n.9, 501. With manufacturer opposition to the levy
eliminated, those most affected by the AHRA's distributional effects-consumers who
purchased recording equipment but did not engage in home taping-were largely
unrepresented before Congress. See id. at 531-34 (noting discrepancy in lobbying power
and presence between the industry desiring the legislation and the "diffuse, unorganized
interests" of consumers). In the case of a "broadcaster pays" system for licensing in-store
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EncouragePrivateAgreements Through a PropertyRule or a Liability
Rule

Although both politics and pragmatism make the foregoing proposals
implausible solutions to the FIMLA dispute, Congress could act upon a third
alternative-revising the Copyright Act to provide incentives for PROs and
industry representatives of commercial establishments to negotiate private
licensing agreements for secondary uses of broadcast music. This section first
assesses the advantages of private agreements over legislatively-mandated
compulsory licenses and free use exemptions. It then addresses whether these
private agreements are compatible with the United States' treaty obligations.
Finally, the section concludes by outlining two treaty-compatible legislative
reforms for Congress that will encourage PROs and associations of
commercial establishments to negotiate such private licensing deals.
1. Assessing the Advantages of Private Agreements over Statutory
Exemptions for Secondary Uses of Broadcast Music
Intellectual property commentators have recently devoted considerable
attention to the questions of how to encourage copyright owners and users to
bargain around the baseline entitlements conferred by domestic copyright laws
and of whether those baseline entitlements are superior or inferior to such

performances, by contrast, broadcasters are likely to voice significant opposition to the
proposal. See Don't Stop the Music, supra note 331, at 78 (noting that broadcasters opposed
a similar proposal in Australia). PROs may also oppose the proposal, particularly if they
believe that the aggregate royalties received from broadcasters, commercial establishments
and background music services under the new system will be lower than the aggregate
royalties currently collected from these sources.
Second, under the AHRA levy scheme, manufacturers' support for the legislation was
likely influenced by their ability to distribute, albeit imperfectly, the cost of the levy to
consumers engaging in home taping. See Timothy J. Brennan, An Economic Look at Taxing
Home Audio Taping, 32 J. BROAD. & ELEC. MEDIA 89, 101 (1988). This is unlikely to occur
for the royalties collected by broadcasters for in-store performances, since there is no way
for broadcasters to control who tunes into their programming or whether music is performed
by commercial establishments. See Don't Stop the Music, supra note 331, at 78 (noting that
broadcasters "have no control over or knowledge of the location and use of televisions or
radios" by businesses). (In the limited case of in-store performances of music on cable
television programs, however, the contractual relationship between cable operators and their
subscribers could be revised to allow for such redistribution.) Thus, the financial burden of
the proposal is likely to fall on a concentrated group of entities with a strong incentive to
oppose it.
Third, although levies on the sale of recording equipment and blank tapes have been
adopted by several industrialized countries who are Berne and TRIPs members, see
Kurlantzick & Pennino, supra note 413, at 497, no signatory state has adopted a functioning
"broadcaster pays" system for licensing secondary uses of broadcast music. See supra Part
III.F.2.d. Thus, the treaty compatibility of such a system is untested.
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private agreements.418

One of these commentators, Professor Robert Merges, authored a study of
collective rights organizations ("CROs") in which he argued that an
intellectual property policy that encourages private agreements is superior to
Congressional tinkering with the copyright law. The core insights of Merges'
article, when applied to secondary uses of broadcast music, illustrate the
efficiency gains that result from resolving the FIMLA dispute through a
legislative solution that encourages private agreements between centralized
groups of copyright owners and users. However, as discussed in Part IV.C.3.b.
below, Merges' preference for property rules over liability rules may not in
fact represent the optimal choice for encouraging private bargaining between
PROs and centralized associations of businesses making secondary use of
broadcast music.
Professor Merges' principal claim is that Congress can best encourage
private bargaining by enacting strong property rules for intellectual property
owners and by refraining from enacting liability rules in the form of
compulsory licenses. Although Congress may find itself tempted to enact
compulsory licenses either as a result of rent seeking by copyright users or
because of a need to correct market failures caused by high transaction costs, it
should resist the temptation. He argues that any compulsory license Congress
creates will eliminate copyright owners' incentives to form CROs that can help
to overcome the market failure problem on their own.
Merges asserts that the private licensing arrangements created by CROs are
superior to compulsory licenses in several respects. First, CROs reduce the
"political economy problems" that plague compulsory licenses, including an
initial round of rent seeking by copyright owners and users over the structure
of the licensing system and subsequent rent seeking to modify, repeal or retain
it in the face of changed market conditions. 419 Second, CROs promote
420
efficient consensual transfers more effectively than compulsory licenses.
They have greater flexibility, can rely on experts in the industry and can
negotiate directly with associations of copyright users to create royalty rate
structures that are "much more in tune with their needs than a congressional
scheme of one-size-fits-all transactions. '421 Thus, Merges concludes that
"when private contracts or institutions are a viable alternative, bargaining
418

See, e.g, Bell, supra note 53; Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New

Economic Orthodoxy of 'Right Management,' 97 MICH. L. REV. 301 (1998); Merges,
Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 34; Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra

note 37. For an insightful treatment of the TRIPs Agreement as a "set of default rules to be
bargained around" by private parties and governmental actors, see J.H. Reichman & David
Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPs Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private

Initiatives to Facilitate World Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L
L. 11, 16, 49-65 (1998).
419 See Merges, Contracting into LiabilityRules, supra note 34, at 1295.
420 See id. at 1299.
421 Id.
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422
should be channeled out of the legislative arena" and into the private arena.
An extension of Professor Merges' insights both explains the history of
United States laws governing secondary uses of broadcast music and points the
way to treaty-compatible solutions to the FIMLA dispute that are also wealth
maximizing. First, and most basically, Merges' claims about the choice
between private and legislative remedies to situations of market failure are not
restricted to market conditions prevailing prior to the formation of CROs.
Even after such organizations have eliminated many of the transaction costs
associated with transferring intellectual property rights to their most productive
uses, residual market failures will remain. 423 Thus, Congress must decide
whether to adopt a legislative remedy for these residual market failures or,
alternatively, to allow industry-wide associations of copyright users to
negotiate group license fees with PROs that include previously unlicensed
performances of music.
Second, Merges' concerns about the dangers of compulsory licenses apply
with at least equal force to free use exemptions. As with compulsory licenses,
Congress' decision to remedy a transaction-cost-induced market failure with a
free use exemption generates incentives for rent seeking, both at the time
Congress first creates the exemption and later as the parties battle over
legislation to retain or modify it. Because free use exemptions are more
beneficial to users and more financially harmful to copyright owners than
compulsory licenses, they are also likely to incite even more intensive
lobbying than rent seeking over compulsory licenses. 424 Furthermore, where
copyright users enjoy significant political influence, as is true for the wellorganized business interests supporting the FIMLA, they may even overcome
the presumption favoring the legislative status quo and convince Congress to
425
expand the exemption.
Third, Merges' analysis of how CROs overcome the search, negotiation, and
enforcement costs that stand in the way of productive exchanges can be
extended to transaction costs that take the form of resistance by copyright users
to paying license fees. Indeed, Merges' recounting of ASCAP's early history

422

Id. at 1314-15.

423 See supra Part I.A.4 (discussing market failures created by enforcement and

resistance costs); see also Korman, supra note 127, at 528 n.32 (describing how small
businesses chose to turn off their radios rather than pay the least expensive license PROs
could cost-effectively offer).
424 See Cohen, supra note 57, at 238 (discussing protracted negotiations in Digital
Millennium Copyright Act over exceptions to exclusive rights); Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, supra note 112, at 883 (noting that the 1976 Act's
"fair use provision resulted from elaborate, protracted, down-to-the-wire negotiations

conducted under congressional sponsorship").
425 See Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules, supra note 34, at 1312. This political
clout is most likely to exist for "pork barrel" exemptions benefiting defined interest groups
than for more "principled" exemptions such as those favoring educational users or the fair
use doctrine. See Brown, supra note 283, at 593-94.
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illustrates how collective action by copyright owners, without any legislative
intervention, reduced resistance through aggressive use of litigation and
426
education efforts to reshape user preferences.
Finally, Merges' prescription to legislators to avoid rushing to intervene in
the private marketplace for intellectual property rights in order to encourage
the formation of CROs is equally applicable to the issue of whether the
government should permit copyright users to solve their own collective action
problems by forming centralized or industry-wide associations to negotiate
private agreements with PROs over licensing issues. As the example of the
NLBA agreement demonstrates, these private agreements have significant
advantages over adopting a legislative exemption solution to licensing dispute.
They allow the parties to negotiate a package deal that encompasses a variety
of issues of concern to both copyright owners and users. These agreements
also markedly reduce transaction costs, including the cost of user resistance, by
enlisting user associations themselves in education, monitoring and
enforcement efforts. With reduced transaction costs, PROs can lower their
license fees with no adverse effects on music copyright owners. 427 Finally,
private agreements channel the resources of the disputing parties away from
rent seeking and toward more productive activities.
For all of these reasons, private agreements provide the best opportunity to
eliminate the market failure problem for secondary uses of broadcast music
without encouraging the culture of user resistance that followed previous
Congressional efforts to modify the Copyright Act. This is not to suggest,
however, that a property rule rather than a liability rule is a superior device by
which to encourage the parties to negotiate such an agreement. Nor does it
imply that private agreements are superior solutions in other areas of copyright
law, such as fair use, where the statutory entitlement baseline serves vital
social objectives and where users are disaggregated and may be unable to
bargain with copyright owners effectively. 428
426 See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 34, at 1330-33. The period
from 1931 to 1975, after ASCAP's victory in Jewell-LaSalle solidified its right to collect
royalties for secondary uses of broadcast music, provides further evidence of this concept.
See supra Part II.B.2. After an initial flurry of renting seeking in the 1930s and early 1940s
to overturn the decision legislatively or to narrow it judicially, copyright users appear to
have largely acquiesced in PROs' licensing efforts-at least until Congress codified
ASCAP's licensing practices in 1976. See id.
427 The NLBA agreement contained reduced license fees unavailable to commercial
establishments under the FIMLA. See supra Part II.B.5.b.3).
428 Private agreements may in fact be inferior substitutes for legislative exemptions such
as the fair use doctrine, which play an essential role in promoting the progress of knowledge
and culture. As Professors Julie Cohen and Neil Netanel have observed, if society values
limits on copyright protection because those limits serve important expressive, democracyenhancing or other non-market objectives that are likely to be distorted by private
transactions, then it would be desirable for Congress to limit the ability of parties to bargain
for a different set of entitlements. See Cohen, supra note 418, at 335-44, 382-90; Cohen,
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FAIRNESS IN MUSIC LICENSING ACT
The Treaty Compatibility of Private Agreements

Can the United States legislatively encourage copyright owners and users to
reach a private agreement consistently with its Berne and TRIPs obligations?
Commentators analyzing the settlement of domestic law disputes have long
observed that private parties bargaining over legal rights and obligations are
strongly influenced by the legal framework that serves as a backdrop for their
negotiations. Because private parties always "bargain in the shadow of the
law," this underlying legal framework shapes and sets parameters on the scope
429
of their agreement.
These insights are equally applicable to private agreements negotiated in the
shadow of international treaty obligations and their domestic laws analogues.
Consider the NBLA agreement and voluntary exemptions adopted in Australia
as contrasting examples. The NLBA agreement was reached shortly after
legislators sympathetic to business interests introduced bills to expand the
homestyle exemption to all commercial establishments making incidental uses
of music. 430 The fear that Congress might enact these bills and vitiate
copyright owners' control over secondary uses of broadcast music both
enhanced PROs' incentives to reach an agreement with the NLBA and shaped
the content of that agreement. 43' By contrast, the decision of the Australian
Performing Rights Association to adopt a much narrower voluntary exemption
was influenced by the limited scope of the licensing reform proposals then
432
pending before the Australian Parliament.
The lessons of these examples for the United States in seeking to encourage
the parties to reach a private agreement are clear. In the wake of an adverse
WTO ruling, it would be risky for Congress to encourage the parties to bargain
in the shadow of domestic laws that are incompatible with the Berne and
TRIPs treaties because any agreement that resulted from such negotiations
would also be suspect and subject to a WTO challenge. 433 Rather, the United
supra note 57, at 239-40; Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 37, at 341-64.

In the case of secondary uses of broadcast music, however, private bargaining between
relatively well-matched copyright owner and user groups is likely to result in an exemption
that is broader than any found in the Copyright Act. See 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at
61 (statement of Marybeth Peters). Moreover, bargaining in this area concerns an
exploitation of copyrighted works that is hardly essential to the copyright's knowledge or

democracy-enhancing functions. See Brown, supra note 283, at 593-94.
429 See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979) (arguing that in divorce proceedings

the parties' bargaining is a direct result of the "shadow of the law" under which they
bargain).
430

See Examination Procedure, supra note 158, at 21 (characterizing NLBA agreement

as a "compromise" that sought to avoid expanding the homestyle exemption). See also
supraPart II.B.5.b.3).
431

See id.

See supra Part III.F.2.d (discussing background of Australian exemption).
433 See Martin, supra note 399, at 312-13, 326 (arguing that the private agreement
432
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States should first bring the Copyright Act into compliance with the treaties,
but should do so in a manner that preserves the parties' incentives to reach a
private bargain.
3. Choosing Between a Property Rule and a Liability Rule
In seeking to make the Copyright Act treaty-compatible, Congress is not
entirely constrained in its legislative options. To the contrary, both the Berne
and TRIPs treaties grant Congress discretion in choosing among different
alternatives. In particular, because Berne article I lbis(2) authorizes member
States to create compulsory licenses for secondary uses of broadcast music,
Congress may choose between a property rule and a liability rule in seeking to
encourage private agreements between centralized associations of copyright
users and PROs. The choice that Congress makes between these two
approaches will significantly affect both the likelihood that the parties will
negotiate a private agreement and the terms of that agreement.
a. A Modified Property Rule
Under a modified property rule regime, Congress would repeal the FIMLA
and homestyle exemptions and restore to music copyright owners the right to
control secondary uses of broadcast music, subject to the constraints of the
antitrust consent decree. 434 Under this rule, all commercial establishments
seeking to perform broadcast music would be required to purchase a license
from PROs or from individual copyright owners and would otherwise risk an
infringement action.
Although a modified property rule would unquestionably satisfy the United
States' obligations under Berne and TRIPs, its effect on the licensing market is
less certain. Much will depend on the strength and character of user resistance
once copyright owners reacquire their statutory rights to demand royalties for
in-store performances.
If resistance is intense because commercial
between PROs and juke box owners was tainted because it was negotiated in the shadow of
a Berne-incompatible compulsory license). For this reason, it is inaccurate to suggest that
because an agreement reached between copyright owners and users is private it shields the
United States from dispute settlement proceedings by the EC or other WTO member States.
See 1997 Hearings, supra note 19, at 62 (statement of Marybeth Peters) (responding
affirmatively to the question of whether "because the NLBA agreement [was] a private
agreement, a complaint against the United States would not stand"); see also First U.S.
Submission, supra note 7, at 8, 16, 19-20 (relying heavily on fact that private NLBA
agreement closely mirrors FIMLA as a means of refuting EC's argument that FIMLA
violates the TRIPs Agreement).
414 1 characterize this property rule as "modified" because, as a result of the consent
decrees, neither ASCAP nor BMI can withhold licenses from users who request one. See
supra note 64. As Merges notes, however, the consent decrees merely formalized the
practice that PROs had already adopted of voluntarily transforming their property rule
entitlements into contractual liability rules. See Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules,
supra note 34, at 1296-97, 1340.
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establishments have had a taste of free use,4 3 5 PROs may find that the costs of
monitoring and enforcing licensing agreements are exceptionally high. Nor
would a modified property rule regime entirely eliminate rent seeking. Even if
the strictures of the United States' treaty obligations make legislative lobbying
an unprofitable activity, 436 copyright users could still contest the amount of
their license fees, either before the Rate Court in New York or by using the
local challenge procedures created by the FIMLA. 437 Although businesses
have made limited use of the Rate Court because of the high cost of litigating
minor licensing disputes far from home, they may be far more active in
438
challenging royalties under the new, more user-friendly challenge rules.
Faced with these high transaction and resistance costs, the three PROs in the
United States may seek to negotiate broad-based agreements with associations
of copyright users to trade reduced license fees and exemptions for certain
businesses in exchange for assistance from the associations in monitoring and
enforcing the payment of fees by their members. Even if such agreements
mirror the equipment and square footage requirements of the FIMLA exactly,
they would still be compatible with the United States treaty obligations
because they were negotiated in the shadow of a treaty-compatible statutory
baseline. Of course, the parties are not certain to reach such agreements. If
they do not, both parties would continue to waste significant resources seeking
new ways to evade detection or catch infringers, thereby exacerbating market
failures and preventing broadcast music from being put to a productive use. 439
b. An Ex Post Liability Rule
Congress need not, however, incur the risks that a modified property rule
engenders. Instead, it should devise a compulsory license regime that provides
strong incentives for the parties to bargain in its shadow.
In his study of CROs, Professor Merges argues that only property rules
create the proper incentives for private bargaining. Other commentators
contend, however, that liability rules can provide at least as effective
inducements for efficient consensual transfers between copyright owners and

2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW AND PRACTICE 972 n.428 (1994) (noting
widespread non-compliance with copyright law after abolition of free use exemption for
juke box performances).
436 See Donald J. Kochan, "Public Use" and The Independent Judiciary: Condemnation
435 Cf.

in an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 92 (1998) ("When the

likelihood of success ... is too low, the economically rational special interest will find rentseeking too expensive.").
...See 17 U.S.C. § 513 (1999).
438 Given the discretion Berne and TRIPs confer on member states to regulate PROs'
monopoly powers, see supraPart IIF.1 .c.2), Congress would not have to remove these new
royalty challenge procedures to comply with any WTO ruling.
...See supra Part I.A.4 (identifying harmful consequences of user resistance).
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users. 440 Professors Ayres and Talley have demonstrated that "when two
parties have private information about how much they value an entitlement,"
endowing each party with a partial claim to the entitlement (the result achieved
by a compulsory license) "can reduce the incentive to behave strategically
during bargaining, thereby enhancing economic efficiency." 441 For intellectual
property rights, the authors use this model to demonstrate how a compulsory
442
license can remove deadlocks in negotiations between two patent holders.
Professor Neil Netanel has shown that Ayres's and Talley's claims are also
443
applicable in the copyright context where multiple licensees are involved.
Netanel makes a distinction between compulsory license fees set in advance
and those determined ex post. When the license fee is fixed in advance at an
amount that most prospective licensees would be willing to pay, a "multiple
taker" problem may arise. 44 Because the price of the license is likely to attract
the interest of many potential licensees or "takers," the copyright owner "will
be unable to buy out unwanted uses and may have to accept less than the
prescribed fee for prospective uses that she does not want to transpire." 445 As a
result, the bargaining price is skewed downward below what would otherwise
have been the efficient market price.
By contrast, an efficient private agreement is far more likely to result when
440 See Ayres & Talley, supra note 54, at 1032 (arguing in favor of a liability rule rather

than a property rule because the liability rule "possess(es) an information-forcing" quality
which facilitates "more efficient trade"); Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 37,
at 334-35 (arguing in favor of liability rules to promote bargaining around compulsory
licenses).
" Ayres & Talley, supra note 54, at 1029-30.
442 See id. at 1093-94 (using example of a patent dispute case to show that a liability rule
would minimize costs by facilitating the exchange of information, while a property right
rule leads to deadlocks in negotiations). Professor Merges asserts that this conclusion is
limited to a two-party context. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules, supra note 34, at
1304-05 (stating that Ayres' and Talley's model is inapplicable when more than two parties
are negotiating).
443 See Netanel, Democratic Civil Society, supra note 37, at 334-35 & n.248 (addressing
Merges' claim that Ayres' and Talley's model would only apply to situations with two
parties involved, and demonstrating that this "multiple taker" problem is solved by setting
the compulsory license fees ex post).
44 See id.
445 Id. at 334 n.248. The core conceptual point here is that bargaining is a two way
street-either party may pay the other for the right not to exercise its portion of the divided
entitlement. See Ayres & Talley, supra note 54, at 1030-31. Thus, copyright owners who
value entitlements highly may pay copyright users not to infringe. However, where there
are many potential users, a fixed compulsory license fee encourages spurious claims of
infringement to extort a payment from the copyright owner. The result is that the copyright
owner is forced to accept royalties lower than the predetermined statutory rate. For a
detailed discussion, see Merges, Contractinginto Liability Rules, supra note 34, at 1305-06,
1310 & n.39 (using the example of a copyright holder's futile attempt to pay off every firm
that claimed an interest in making a cover version of a copyrighted song).
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a compulsory license "takes the form of an ex post determination of the
required license fee, whether on an individualized basis ... or an industry-wide
basis, as where government rate setting tribunals are authorized to prescribe
across-the-board compulsory license fees after copyright holder and user
groups cannot agree among themselves." 446 With ex post licenses,
uncertainties regarding the subsequently-determined fee amount and the
specter of high adjudication costs "would discourage frivolous claimants and
encourage efficient bargaining." '447 Netanel concludes that "the most fruitful"
compulsory license regimes "require industry-wide bargaining under the threat
of administrative determination of binding 'reasonable' license fees if no
voluntary agreement is reached." 448
c.

The Juke Box Compulsory License and PrivateAgreement

The case for using compulsory licenses as incentives for efficient private
exchanges is supported by more than economic theory. There is an apposite
historical precedent that Congress could follow in establishing a compulsory
license for secondary uses of broadcast music-the copyright law revisions
relating to performances of music in juke boxes.
The Copyright Act of 1909 afforded the operators of juke boxes a free use
exemption to perform copyrighted music publicly. Although music copyright
owners initially supported the exemption, believing that juke box performances
would promote the sale of sheet music, they later came to abhor its privileging
of a multi-million dollar industry of music users. During the extensive
negotiations leading up to the Copyright At of 1976, PROs and juke box
operators argued furiously over whether to repeal the exemption. 449 The two
sides ultimately agreed to replace the exemption with a compulsory license that
prescribed a predetermined annual royalty fee for each registered juke box.
Congress enacted this compulsory license and authorized the newly created
Copyright Royalty Tribunal to adjust the royalty rates in advance every year. 450
However, this fixed compulsory license scheme did not work well. Juke
box operators, accustomed to years of free music use, actively resisted by not
446 Netanel, DemocraticCivil Society, supra note 37, at 334-35 n.248.
447Id. Paul Geller's analysis of how copyright owners and users bargained around the
compulsory license rate fixed by the Australian Copyright Tribunal for educational use
copying provides further support for this conclusion. See Geller, Reprography, supra note
318, at 34 & n.50 (1990).
448 See Netanel, DemocraticCivil Society, supra note 37, at 335 n.248 (citing 17 U.S.C.

§§ 114(f) (1994 & Supp. 1998), 116, 118, 119(c)(2)-(3), as examples in the Copyright Act
where this "basic model of providing for voluntary negotiations" has been adopted).
449See Litman, Copyright Legislation, supra note 101, at 306 n.172 (describing the
dispute over the juke box exemption as a "pitched war" between juke box operators and
copyright owners).
450 See PATRY, supra note 435, at 977-82. In its 1980 rate adjustment proceeding, for
example, the Royalty Tribunal established stepped increases each year from 1982 to 1989.
See id. at 982.
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registering their machines and not paying the license fees. 45 1 The PROs
brought numerous infringement actions against them, but could not succeed in
increasing the number of registered juke boxes. 452 In an effort to address these
compliance problems, the three PROs and the Amusement and Music
Operators Association ("AMOA"), the trade association representing juke box
operators, sought to bargain around, the compulsory license. Under the terms
of a 1985 agreement, the PROs agreed to provide substantial royalty rebates to
juke box operators, and in return the AMOA agreed to adopt programs to
encourage its members to comply with the law. 453 The PROs agreed to pay the
rebates, however, only if a certain number of juke boxes were registered by
particular dates, targets that were never reached. 454 Thus, just as the economic
theory predicted, a liability rule with a pre-set royalty resulted in increased
infringements and inefficient bargaining below the compulsory license rate.
Congress soon realized that the statutory compulsory license was flawed in
another way. With respect to works of foreign origin, the statute denied
copyright owners the exclusive right to authorize public performances of music
on juke boxes. 455 This conflicted directly with the public performance right of
Article 11 of the Berne Convention, which, unlike the broadcast and
retransmission rights in Article l lbis, does not allow for compulsory
licenses. 456 Therefore, the juke box provisions of the Copyright Act stood as
major obstacles to the United States ratification of the treaty and entry into the
457
international copyright system.
After extensive negotiations with copyright owners and users, Congress
adopted a provision of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988458 to

451

See id. at 982 (characterizing juke box compulsory license as "one of the greatest

failures of the 1976 Act, entirely due to the deliberate lawlessness by the majority of
jukebox operators").
452 See id. at 982-83 (discussing the steady decline of registered juke box operators up to
1989, despite the enforcement efforts of copyright owners which included over 1000 suits
brought against noncomplying juke box operators).
453 See id. at 983 n.492 (providing details of the 1985 agreement).
454 See id. (noting that although the agreement provided for substantial rebates to be paid
if 110,000 machines were licensed by 1987 and 115,000 by 1988, the number never reached
100,000). For a more detailed discussion of the 1985 agreement, see Martin, supra note
399, at 280-82. The agreement also prohibited the parties from seeking to modify the
compulsory license, a provision added to prevent rent seeking by juke box operators that
had occurred prior to the agreement's adoption. See id. at 282.
455 See Final Report, supra note 207, at 533 (concluding that with respect to work of
foreign origin, the compulsory juke box license was incompatible with the public
performance right secured by the Beme Convention).
456 See id. at 534 ("Unlike the other provisions of the Convention, the public
performance right in Article 11(1) does not expressly sanction compulsory licensing.")
(footnote omitted).
417

See id. at 534-40.

451 See 17 U.S.C. § 116A (1989) (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1994)) (outlining
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encourage the parties to negotiate a private, treaty-compatible licensing

agreement.

First, the Act empowered the Copyright Royalty Tribunal to

schedule negotiations between the parties. Second, it authorized copyright
owners and juke box operators to designate common agents to conduct these

negotiations, thereby encouraging group bargaining. 459 Third, it granted an
antitrust exemption which permitted all three PROs to negotiate a common
agreement with the AMOA. 460 Finally, and most importantly, Congress
retained the compulsory license as a fallback position in the event the parties
could not reach agreement. 46 1 Congress did, however, modify the fallback
compulsory license in a significant way: it eliminated the system of ex ante,
fixed royalty fees and replaced it with an ex post system of royalty valuations
to be set by the Copyright Royalty Tribunal under a new and uncertain
formula. 462 According to the economic theory discussed above, this modified

compulsory license was precisely the sort of liability rule likely to produce an
efficient private agreement.
Faced with these multiple incentives to bargain in the shadow of an ex post

liability rule, the parties quickly reached a ten-year agreement over juke box
licensing, precluding the fallback compulsory license from ever coming into
force. 463 Unlike the 1985 compact, the 1990 agreement provided for a
different and significantly higher royalty rate structure than the pre-Berne

compulsory license. 464 The agreement has also proved remarkably stable over
procedures for negotiating licenses). This section was amended in 1993 by substituting an
arbitration process for the compulsory license proceeding as the fallback remedy if the
parties could not reach a negotiated agreement. See § 116.
411 See § I16(b)(l).
460 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 70, § 8.17[C][1] at 8-192.63 n.85 (discussing

how the parties negotiating under this subsection "enjoy an implicit antitrust exemption").
461 For a detailed discussion of each of these provisions, see id. § 8.17 at 8-192.51 to 8192.65 (discussing the Juke box licensing dilemma and the recent changes in § 116A and
116); PATRY, supra note 435, at 983-87 (detailing the mechanics of the statute, in particular,
the relationship between negotiated license agreements and the fallback position of
compulsory licensing).
462 See 17 U.S.C. § 801(b) (1989) (amended in 1993) (authorizing Royalty Tribunal to
set fallback compulsory license rate taking into account rates previously determined by the
Tribunal to provide a fair return to the copyright owner and rates contained in any license
negotiated by the parties); Martin, supra note 399, at 311 (characterizing this as a "market
rate standard" and stressing the differences from pre-Berne compulsory licenses).
463 See Martin, supra note 399, at 315-16 (discussing the factors that influenced the
negotiations for a licensing agreement, and emphasizing that the incentive produced by the
ex post liability rule was essential to the parties coming to terms).
164 Whereas the pre-Berne compulsory license fee provided for a royalty of $63 per juke
box per year for 1987, 1988 and 1989, the negotiated agreement set fees for 1990 at $275
per year for the first juke box, $55 per year for the second through tenth juke box and $48
per year for each additional juke box, with subsequent rate adjustments linked to the
consumer price index. See PATRY, supra note 435, at 982, 986. These rates are available to
all juke box operators, not only to AMOA members. See Martin, supra note 399, at 327.
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time. So stable, in fact, that in 1993 Congress repealed the fallback
compulsory license altogether and replaced it with a ystem of ad hoc
arbitration over royalty rates should the agreement ever unravel. 465 At present,

however, the agreement is still in operation and is being automatically renewed
each year. 46 6
d.

Qualifying the Juke Box Agreement as a Precedent

The statutory incentives adopted in 1988 to encourage a private licensing

agreement between the three PROs and the AMOA provide a particularly apt
analogy for Congress to consider if it chooses to modify the Copyright Act to
comply with an adverse WTO ruling. Indeed, because article 1lbis(2) of the
Berne Convention expressly authorizes the United States to impose
compulsory licenses for secondary uses of broadcast music, the use of a
compulsory license to encourage private bargaining will not be tainted in the
manner that the juke box agreement arguably was, even if the agreement it
engenders mirrors the FIMLA exemption.467
A compulsory license is not the only way for Congress to assist the parties

to reach a private agreement, however. When combined with other incentives
such as forced negotiations through group agents or antitrust exemptions, a
modified property rule can also encourage PROs and associations of
commercial businesses to bargain. Thus, in choosing between a modified
property and a liability rule, Congress will need to consider not only economic
Operators pay the fees to the Jukebox License Office, a consortium formed by the PROs to
license the operators, collect the fees and encourage compliance with the agreement. See id.
at 319 (providing a detailed description of how the 1990 agreement works).
...
See Copyright Royalty Tribunal Reform Act, H.R. REP. 103-286, 103d Cong., 1st
Sess. 14 (1993) ("The [negotiated] agreement has provisions for automatic renewal and the
Committee expects that the parties will continue the agreement in 1999, and perhaps for
another ten years."); see also 17 U.S.C. § 801(b) (1994) (providing arbitration as fallback
provision, in contrast to the prior law which emoloyed a compulsory license as the fallback
provision if the parties did not reach a negotiated agreement).
466 Telephone interview with Mike Vaughan, Jukebox License Office, in Memphis,
Tenn. (Aug. 20, 1999). Nevertheless, the number of licensed juke boxes has continued to
decline during the 1990s, driven principally by factors unrelated to user resistance, including
attrition of vinyl "45" juke boxes, regional declines in the bar and restaurant business,
changing patterns of music use by commercial establishments, and sale of juke boxes for
private use. See letter from Mike Vaughan, Jukebox License Office (Aug. 26, 1999) (on file
with author).
467 See supra Part III.D. This is not, however, the case with respect to one narrow
segment of the FIMLA-secondary uses of non-broadcast cable transmissions. Under the
Berne Convention, such uses are governed by Article 11 rather than Article 1 Ibis, which
member States may not subject to a compulsory license. See RicKETSON, supra note 211, at
432, 451 (distinguishing between broadcast and non-broadcast cable transmissions and
noting that non-broadcast cable transmissions may not be subject to a compulsory license).
Thus, to ensure the Berne compatibility of any private agreement, Congress would need to
adopt a property rule for such cable transmissions.
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efficiency, but distributional concerns as well.468
For example, if Congress adopts a modified property rule, it will give the
PROs the power to set royalty rates unilaterally, placing the onus on copyright
users to challenge before the Rate Court or the local arbitration panels the fees
set by ASCAP and BMI as "unreasonable. '469 If, by contrast, Congress adopts
a fallback compulsory license with ex post royalty rates to be set by copyright
arbitration royalty panels, it will give greater negotiating power to copyright
users. This is particularly true if it instructs the panels to consider policy
47 0
considerations other than those focused on market rates.
In the wake of an adverse WTO ruling, there is thus likely to be a further
round of rent seeking before Congress-a round similar to the lobbying by
PROs and juke box operators that occurred in the years leading up to the
United States ratification of the Berne Convention. 471 This rent seeking is

468 See supra Part

I.B (identifying distributional arguments raised by businesses

supporting exemption for secondary uses of broadcast music).
469 See United States v. ASCAP, 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH)

62,595 at

IX(A)

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 1950) (allowing licensees to apply to the Rate Court for the
determination of a "reasonable" license fee if parties cannot agree on such a fee); United
States v. Broadcast Music, Inc., Civil No. 64-CV-3787, 1994 WL 901652, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 18, 1994) (modifying the original 1966 consent decree to provide procedures for
copyright users to contest the reasonableness of fees set by BMI in accordance with the
decree). Because it is not governed by the consent decree, SESAC Inc.'s license fees are
not subject to review by the Rate Court.
470 See Martin, supra. note 399, at 311 (describing "market rate standard" initially
adopted for the fallback juke box compulsory license). See also 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B)
(1994 & Supp. 1998) (Librarian of Congress to set compulsory license rates "that most
clearly represent the rates and terms that would have been negotiated in the marketplace
between a willing buyer and a willing seller" for certain transmissions of digital audio
music).
Under the current arbitration system, by contrast, arbitration panels must consider four
statutory objectives in setting or adjusting juke box royalty rates: (1) maximizing the
availability of creative works to the public; (2) affording the copyright owner a fair return
for his or her creative work and the copyright user a fair income under existing economic
conditions; (3) confirming the relative roles of the copyright owner and the copyright user in
making the product available to the public with respect to relative creative contribution,
technological contribution, capital investment, cost, risk and contribution to the opening of
new markets for creative expression and media for their communication; and (4) minimizing
any disruptive impact on the structure and practices of the industries involved. See 17
U.S.C. § 801(b)(1) (1994). These factors do not require "market rates" for compulsory
licenses. See Recording Industry Ass'n of Am. v. Librarian of Congress, 176 F.3d 528,
532-33 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim that § 801(b)(l) requires the use of a
"market rate" and instead holding that the statute requires "reasonable rates" determined
with reference to the four statutory criteria).
471See PATRY, supra note 435, at 983-84 (noting that because of the obvious conflict
between § 116 and the Berne Convention, there were "extensive hearings over four years
[concerning] a political and legal solution for repealing [the juke box compulsory license]").

HeinOnline -- 80 B.U. L. Rev. 203 2000

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80:93

likely to address both the distributional and efficiency consequences of
choosing between a modified property rule and a liability rule, and, if the latter
approach is adopted, the structure of the fallback compulsory license. If,
however, Congress can adopt a statutory baseline that contains adequate
incentives for private bargaining, the juke box precedent suggests that the
parties' energies will be channeled out of the legislative arena and toward
reaching a more efficient private agreement.
CONCLUSION

In enacting the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, Congress
deliberately chose to ignore the United States' international trade and
intellectual property policies and to enact a treaty-incompatible statute that the
European Community was virtually certain to challenge before the World
Trade Organization. Congress' decision to expose United States copyright
laws to the scrutiny of WTO jurists can only be understood by analyzing the
complex web of licensing practices and legal regulations governing secondary
uses of broadcast music that evolved in the United States over the last seventyfive years.
The tension between licensing and enforcement efforts by music copyright
owners acting through performing rights organizations, and resistance to those
licensing and enforcement efforts by copyright users created failures in the
licensing market. Partially to remedy those market failures and partially in
response to rent seeking by both parties, Congress in 1976 and again in 1998
adopted free use exemptions benefiting commercial establishments that
perform broadcast music on their premises. The effect of those revisions to the
Copyright Act did not, however, remedy the market failures. Rather, it led
commercial establishments to devote increasing resources to resistance and
rent seeking.
This Article has identified the economic and distributional arguments that
underlie this complex history of domestic copyright laws and licensing
practices. It has shown how these arguments are likely to affect WTO jurists'
analysis of the EC's complaint against the United States, including an
examination of the ambiguous and contested three-step test found in the
exceptions and limitations clauses of the Berne Convention and the TRIPs
Agreement. Finally, the Article has drawn on economic principles and
historical precedent to outline treaty-compatible options for Congress to
resolve the FIMLA dispute. These options will not only permit the United
States to continue its efforts to protect the intellectual property rights of United
States authors, inventors and businesses in other nations, but will also
encourage the parties to channel their resources away from rent seeking and
toward more efficient private licensing agreements.
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